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PREFACE
Over the past several years I have been involved in teaching 
in a unit on the psychological assessment of children and youth 
to postgraduate students of counselling. This experience has 
highlighted what was for me a stark and inexplicable schism between 
research and practice: Namely, that practitioners (in this case
school counsellors) persist in using psychological assessment 
techniques and instruments for which negative results concerning 
reliability, validity and utility are in the ascendency. Moreover, 
not only do they use tests of dubious validity but express 
unshakeable confidence in the resultant clinical judgement based 
on test data.
In a sense, I was grateful to find that the difference between 
my perceptions as to the value of psychodiagnostic tests and those 
of my practitioner colleagues was neither an atypical nor endemic 
phenomenon. Recent evidence suggests that the popularity of 
psychological tests, including projective techniques, has persisted 
in everyday clinical practice. Most clinicians, undaunted by the 
data, apparently feel comfortable basing their judgements and 
predictions on inferences shown experimentally to be illusions. 
Surprisingly, most practitioners know about the negative research, 
yet themselves continue to use the devices regularly, assumedly 
because they have seen the signs "work" in their own clinical work. 
Similarly, even when psychologists are cognizant of the vast 
literature attending to the fallibility of selection/mental status
interviews, it is commonly observed that they not only conduct such
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interviews but express considerable confidence in their predictions. 
There is a puzzling and substantial discrepancy existing between 
the findings of research on psychological assessment and judgemental 
fallibility and the clinicians' stubborn confidence in their own 
diagnostic acumen.
As a result of teaching in the assessment unit, and the con­
comitant discussion, debate and reading, I have begun to identify 
some of the possible factors contributing to this schism and the 
persistence of the illusion of validity. But despite the occasional 
insight, the intractability of the situation remains daunting. For 
although I could claim some success in convincing an occasional 
student of the telling nature of the research data, I have been 
singularly unsuccessful in 'developing' a practitioner capable of 
not succumbing to the temptation of the 'offending' assessment 
procedures and the resultant illusions of validity.
Although the overarching aim of the counselling program is to 
develop competent 'scientific practitioners', my experience has 
been that it is inordinately difficult to teach trainee counsellors 
to harness the power of science in a manner that would promote 
reliable and rational psychodiagnostic procedures; that is, to 
develop counsellors who incorporate ways of behaving that maximise 
the possibility of uncovering invalid and ineffectual approaches to 
human problems and who in an ongoing, everyday way refine the 
practice of psychodiagnosis by exposing themselves to 'good', 'hard' 
data. In contrast unfortunately it appears that most practitioners
unwittingly behave in ways - such as relying on subjective impressions
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accrued through personal experience with tests to guide usage - 
which maximise their vulnerability to fall prey to such phenomena 
as illusory correlates and the 1Barnum effect'; resulting in the 
widespread presence of 'magical thinking’’ in psychodiagnosis.
The aim of this essay is to thoroughly explore the antecedents of the 
research/practice dislocation - in order to uncover some of the 
plausible reasons for the persistence of what appear to be patently 
untenable practices and the paradoxical but equally untenable, 
illusion of validity. Hopefully, in future years my teaching 
efficacy may be augmented by the inclusion of the recommendations 
that flow from the critical analysis of the traditional 'attribution' 
approach to psychodiagnosis.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Over a decade ago Walter Mischel (1968) published 'Personality 
and Assessment', a book that was widely perceived to be an attempt 
to debunk the traditional dispositional approach to assessment and 
usher in an alternative paradigm. The book was seen to be a 
situationalist manifesto aimed at undoing the role of dispositional 
explanations of human behaviour. However, Mischel (1979) claimed:
"My intentions in writing that book were not to 
undo personality but to defend individuality and 
the uniqueness of each person against what I saw 
as the then prevalent form of clinical hostility: 
the tendency to use a few behavioural signs to 
categorise people enduringly into fixed slots on 
the assessor's favorite nomothetic trait dimensions 
and to assume that these slot positions were 
sufficiently informative to predict specific behavior 
and to make extensive decisions about a person's 
whole life. My intention in 'Personality and 
Assessment' was to document the potential hazards 
to such attributions, of such categorisations often 
made on the basis of flimsy evidence. My aim was 
to call attention to the specific reciprocal 
interactions between person and context and hence 
to the need to examine those interactions in fine­
grained detail. My concern was that clinicians, 
like other scientists tend to infer, generalise, 
and predict too much while observing too little. 
Moreover the judgments of clinicians - like every­
one else's judgments - are subject to certain 
systematic biases that can produce serious 
distortions and oversimplifications in inferences 
and predictions." (p.245)
Mischel's intention in 'Personality and Assessment' is shared 
by the author of this essay and is the central motivating factor 
for writing the essay. The focus of this essay, like that of 
Mischel's treatise, is primarily on current psychodiagnostic 
assessment and classification, an enterprise that seems to have 
changed little in the last decade and of which a major component
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remains the administering and interpretation of various tests.
These tests are many and varied and range from the Rorschach, in 
which the person being tested responds to a series of inkblots by 
describing what he or she 'sees', through more objective person­
ality inventories such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI) in which the person answers a series of questions 
about preferences and thoughts, to standard intelligence tests.
Some of the more popular tests among psychodiagnosticians have 
been the Rorschach, the MMPI, the Thematic Apperception Test, 
various forms of an Incomplete Sentence Test, various intelligence 
tests, and certain tests that require the examinee to draw things.
The model implicit in the administration of such tests is that the 
only variable is the 'personality' of the examinee. Thus, any 
differences in the Rorschach protocols, for example, produced by 
two different people are presumed to reflect differences in their 
personalities, differences in their preoccupations and concerns.
There have, of course, been other challenges, protests and 
revolts in addition to Mischel's critique - for example, in contrast 
to the implicit assumption mentioned above, Rotter (1960) emphasised 
the situational specificity of test behaviour, and, in Britain 
particularly, Shapiro (1961, 1966, 1970) inspired an experimental 
clinical model. In one of his earliest papers, Shapiro (1951) set 
out clearly the reasons for his dissatisfaction with current clinical 
psychological assessment procedures, especially those derived from 
the 'battery' approach of Schaefer (see Rapaport, Gill and Schaefer, 
1946). His views are summarised in the following quotation.
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"Psychiatric patients suffer from a variety of 
disorders of affect, cognition, and volition.
A large number, if not the majority, of papers 
published by psychologists do not deal with these 
phenomena. Instead, they report upon the perform­
ance, by psychiatric patients, of a variety of 
tasks which might be described, without much loss 
of accuracy, as puzzles and indoor games. Examples 
are such tests as the pursuit rotor, the mirror 
drawing test, the block design test, the 
Rorschach test and the Thematic Apperception Test." 
(Shapiro and Ravenette, 1959, p.295).
Although one may disagree with Shapiro and Ravenette's 
evaluation of the various tests cited, their quote does sensitise 
us to an image of the psychodiagnostician. The traditional image 
of the psychodiagnostician as tester, the role expectations of 
other professionals, and the extraordinary faith in assessment 
devices that lack clinical utility have been hard to shrug off.
As Clarke and Clarke (1973) caustically remark:
"[Assessment] has been classically regarded as the 
main contribution of psychologists. As currently 
employed it appears more often as an epiphenomenon 
keeping them busy, stimulating often unprofitable 
research and leading to a perpetual quest for the 
philosopher's stone (better and better tests) which 
will ensure more and more accurate prediction."
(P-24)
Dependence on intuitive and invalid projective devices, lack 
of contact with the methods of experimental psychology and an 
over-reliance on the routinely administered test battery are all 
real criticisms of the stereotyped assessment that has character­
ised clinical psychology too long. For practising clinicians 
there is a need for assessment that is prescriptive (describing 
behavioural deficits and assets as the starting point for a 
treatment programme) and evaluative (providing an objective measure 
of treatment progress) rather than diagnostic (describing the client
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with reference to some comparison population) or prediction 
(estimating the client's probable status at a later time).
Peterson (1968) expressed this earlier in his conjecture that "the 
only legitimate reason for spending time ... in assessment is to 
generate propositions which are useful in forming decisions of 
benefit to the person under study" (p.32). As we will see 
subsequently Shapiro would fully endorse Peterson's statement.
With respect to the above, it should be noted that one may 
construe people alternatively from many complementary perspectives.
Thus if our aim is to seek strategies to induce change in performance 
the above focus may be most appropriate. Alternatively, construed 
from the perspective of the theorist interested in how therapy 
produces its effect it may be more useful to focus on competencies, 
personal constructs, expectations and other theoretical person 
variables that may mediate the effects of intervention on behaviour.
In short, different goals require different foci and measurement 
strategies. This point is often ignored, as will be evident in 
the subsequent discussion. In this essay the status of the attribute 
model of assessment is oriented primarily to the goals of clinicians 
interested in assessing the problems of the individual.
The argumentation of both Mischel and Shapiro form the back­
drop for the argument to be presented. As we have seen, Mischel's 
central point is that we are best served by viewing our clients as 
complex and multifaceted beings that defy easy classification and 
comparison on any single or simple common dimension; as being multiply 
influenced in a reciprocal fashion by a host of interacting determ­
inants; as uniquely organised on the basis of prior experience and
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future expectations; and yet, as rule guided in systematic, 
potentially comprehensible ways that are open to study by the 
methods of science. Hence it becomes difficult, if not meaningless, 
to attempt to achieve broad, sweeping generalisations about human 
behaviour: many qualifiers must be appended to our notions about
cause-effect relations when dealing with human beings.
To this perspective, Shapiro (1951, 1961, 1970) brings a cogent 
argument for the application of the 'hypothetico-deductive' 
method of investigation to the individual case. For thirty years 
Shapiro has repeatedly argued that the clinical psychologist must be an 
experimental psychologist, though not of the conventional kind. He 
saw assessment and therapy as being inextricably interwoven in an 
on-going hypothesis generation-and-testing process, a position 
recently endorsed by proponents of behaviour assessment. The 
discriminativeness or 'specificity', and ideographic organisation 
in how behaviour is generalised and patterned across situations 
argued for by Mischel (1977, 1979) need not depress or discourage 
clinical assessors. On the contrary, more limited, specific, modest 
assessment goals may be refreshing for a field in which hubris 
has often exceeded insight. The requirement to qualify our general­
isations about our clients does not prevent us from studying their 
behaviour scientifically. The recent spate of books on the 
intensive study of the individual case attests to this possibility 
(see, e.g. Hersen and Barlow, 1976; Kratochwill, 1978; Thoresen, 1979).
However, as was briefly alluded to earlier, psychological 
assessment has tended to be "... dissociated from the mainstream 
of contemporary psychology" (Anastasi, 1967, p.290) and that
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"... testing today is not adequately assimilating developments 
from the science of behaviour" (p.300). Mischel (1968) has also 
pointed out that "... developments in personality assessment have 
been largely oblivious to advances in our knowledge of the conditions 
that change and influence human behaviour" (p.2). The principles 
that emerge from basic research have too often not been seen as 
directly relevant to the understanding of the determinants of test 
responses in the clinic.
In the assessment literature there appear to be two independent 
realms; the abstract and artificial situations of the researcher's 
laboratory and the 'realities' of life that confront the clinician 
and demand immediate attention. The resulting schism is graphically 
evidenced by the occasional proclamation from academic researchers 
to the effect that the psychodiagnostic enterprise is 'dying' and 
rather than prolong the agony, they advocate euthanasia by abandoning 
or at least reducing the time devoted to training graduate students 
in psychodiagnostic procedures. In stark contrast a comprehensive 
recent survey concluded that "... clinicians have definitely not 
abandoned testing" (Wade and Baker, 1977, p.879).
The Research/Practice Schism
Nowhere in psychology does the disparity between practice and 
the body of empirical research findings appear more glaring than 
in the domain of psychodiagnostic assessment and psychiatric 
classification. Although it has been repeatedly claimed that the 
role of psychodiagnostic testing, both in use and status has 
plummeted in the past two decades (Lewandowski and Saccuzzo, 1976;
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Ivnik, 1977), recent surveys indicate that clinicians of all 
theoretical persuasions still devote substantial time to testing 
(Garfield, Kurtz, 1974; Wade and Baker, 1977).
Particularly interesting is the finding that the preferred 
assessment techniques have changed little since the early 50's 
(Lubin et al, 1971; Reynolds and Sundberg, 1976). Thus, despite 
the numerous inveterate critiques (e.g. Meehl, 1954; Mischel, 1968; 
Peterson, 1968; Stuart, 1970), despite claims that information 
provided by many objective and projective tests is not reliable or 
valid and lacks utility (e.g. Bern, 1972; Chapman and Chapman,
1971; Little and Schneidman, 1959), and despite the more recent 
calls for a totally new approach to testing (e.g. Bersoff, 1973; 
McClelland, 1973) clinicians have not abandoned psychodiagnostic 
testing.
Nor have they abandoned the traditional system of classifying 
problematic behaviour. For although other than at the grossest 
of levels, neither diagnostic classification per se nor test 
findings typically lead in themselves to differential treatment 
(Linder, 1965; Breger, 1968), and notwithstanding the documented 
unreliability of diagnostic classification and its questionable 
nosological foundations (Blashfield and Draguns, 1976; Cromwell 
and Blashfield and Strauss, 1975), psychodiagnostic labels still 
carry an authority and a stigmatising connotation that has not 
languished (Langer and Abelson, 1974; Stuart, 1970).
While academics may be convinced by the negative results 
concerning reliability, validity and utility - so much so that they 
have advocated the discontinuance of such enterprises - the
8.
practitioner appears unconvinced and largely unaffected having 
sailed through the storm with almost complete aplomb.
Apparently the intrinsic deficiencies identified are insuff­
icient to offset the information about personality structure they 
furnish the practitioner. Indifference to reliability and validity 
was patent in the survey conducted by Wade and Baker (1977).
While poor reliability and validity were recognised as distinct 
disadvantages by most practitioners, these characteristics were 
not considered particularly important in test usage decisions.
Instead personal experience with tests was the primary criterion in 
test selection. Unfortunately, a reliance on subjective impressions 
accrued through personal experience renders clinicians prey to such 
phenomena as 'illusory correlates' (Chapman and Chapman, 1971) and 
the 'Barnum effect' (Meehl, 1956; Snyder, Schenkel and Lower, 1977). 
Such effects can provide compelling and tenacious subjective 
indicators of efficacy and serve to reinforce untenable clinical 
assessment practice: untenable, at least from the perspective of
the researcher. But are 'such phenomena' sufficient to account 
for the continued dominance of the field by the assessment devices 
spawned by the 'attributed' model?
How can the contradiction between the considerable evidence 
concerning the doubtful validity of many popular tests, the lack 
of reliability and utility of the psychiatric labelling process, 
and the fallibility of human judgement, be reconciled with the 
seemingly unshakeable confidence clinicians exhibit in their 
diagnostic ability? What promotes and maintains the 'illusion of 
validity'? These are questions addressed in this essay.
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Old Paradigms Never Die - But They Should Fade Away
Thomas Kuhn (1970) has suggested that science progresses through 
the confrontation or clash of paradigms. Once the clash is over, 
the less-sensitive and less-comprehensive paradigm is not simply 
thrown on an historical garbage heap, but continues to struggle 
until its main proponents have died away. But importantly, by that 
time its task has been fulfilled and it has become a link in the 
cultural-sociological history. Thus old paradigms never die - they 
simply fade away.
It appears that in recent years, within the academic literature 
we have witnessed a sweeping shift, a still continuing dialectic 
process concerning the relative importance of the person and the 
environment in the control of human behaviour. According to 
Kanfer (1979) we are currently witnessing the synthesis stage of 
this dialectic - a synthesis that should result in the eventual 
abandonment of both prior positions. The true implementation of an 
approach that recognises the transactional nature of the person - 
environment relationship requires that the person be viewed at the 
psychological level as a component of the complex system of which he 
or she is a part (see, e.g. Buss, 1977; Howard, 1979; McReynolds, 
1978).
However, it is doubtful that this 'revolution' has touched the 
practising clinician. It appears that s/he may well be operating 
in a different paradigm. For example, practitioner proponents of 
psychological testing are not in the main ignorant of the critical 
research findings in respect of reliability, validity and utility
but generally feel that the relevant research is inadequate, that
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accurate prediction of behaviour and accurate diagnostic assignments 
are not important goals of test usage (Holt, 1967; Weiner, 1972), 
that tests are too subjective and complex to be objectified and 
examined in an analytic fashion (Blatt, 1975) and as mentioned 
above, that personal experience with tests is a better basis for 
evaluation and a guide to practice than empirical data (Wade and 
Baker, 1977).
Kuhn (1970) further suggested that a paradigm, no matter how 
flawed and inadequate, is only made obsolete by the occurrence of 
a more viable alternative. On this point it is interesting to note 
that Wade and Baker (1977) found that a common argument for the 
continued use of traditional psychological tests was that they were 
seen to be the only economical and practical diagnostic tool 
available to the private clinician or institution. In this sense, 
their efficacy is proven by default. And neither the behavioural 
assessment nor interactional assessment paradigms are construed as 
viable alternatives.
To treat this as a sufficient explanation for the schism would 
be superficial and unwarranted. As we have seen paradigms arise and 
are maintained because they serve a purpose - that is to solve particular 
problems. If what is seen to be an obsolete or defective paradigm by 
one group fails to 'fade away', an analysis of the relationship 
between the solutions it provides and the socio-political intentions 
of a strong power group may prove illuminating. Such an analysis 
is undertaken in the essay.
Notwithstanding the obvious failure to agree on what constitute 
suitable criterion for evaluating current psychodiagnostic practices 
and the dearth of sound data, it is widely assumed that there has
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been a marked decline in both testing and dispositional assignment. 
Numerous papers have been written elucidating the various events 
and forces that have been identified as antecedent and precipitating 
variables in the decline (e.g. Cleveland, 1976; Ivnik, 1977; 
Lewandowski and Saccuzzo, 1976).
On the Rise and Fall of Psychodiagnostic Assessment
As has been indicated, the value of psychodiagnostic endeavours 
has been hotly debated among psychologists for the last 20 years. 
Reading the scholarly journals, one could justifiably conclude that 
psychologists have forsaken - or certainly should have - traditional 
assessment procedures. However, whether the much debated decline in 
use and status of psychological testing and categorical assignment 
has substance remains a moot point. Personal opinion and theoretical 
polemic are a feature of the debate (e.g. Bersoff, 1973; Mischel, 
1968). Rational evaluation based on sound empirical data is 
difficult as a feature of the scanty research available is its 
equivocal nature.
Chapter II reviews the relevant literature that addresses the 
question of the status and use of psychological tests. Surprisingly, 
in the light of the prior discussion, it concludes that despite a 
marginal decline in the time spent testing, psychological testing 
as a diagnostic procedure continues to be a frequent and significant 
activity of the clinical practitioner. In the light of this 
conclusion, the delineation of factors that purportedly have acted 
as antecedents to the decline appears a little misguided or at least 
mislabelled. It may be better to identify these factors as those
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leading to disillusionment regarding psychodiagnostic assessment 
primarily in groups of non-practitioners.
It is patently obvious that the vast amount of negative 
evidence is unlikely to precipitate the downfall of the dominant 
assessment model - what is required is a viable alternative.
However, even if a viable alternative did exist a major obstacle 
to its acceptance in practices would be the role expectations for 
clinical psychologists and the imperatives of their professional 
identity within the mental health professions. It is suggested 
that the current use and status of psychological tests cannot be 
fully understood independently of the nexus between test adminis­
tration and the professional identity of the practising clinical 
psychologist.
Although a cogent argument can be put -with respect to the 
inextricable link between psychodiagnostic assessment and inter­
vention (see, e.g. Frank 1978; Shapiro, 1970, Yates, 1975), 
historically, the opposite has been the case. For many years 
clinical psychologists were excluded from performing therapy and 
were 'left' to do routine assessment work for psychiatrists. In 
retrospect, it is clear that clinical assessment was the major 
vehicle for psychologists to gain entry to the medically dominated 
'mental health' arena and that the importance of this for subsequent 
attitudes and practices should not be overlooked.
In Chapter III it will be shown that the rivalry between the 
professions of psychiatry and psychology and the psychologists' 
struggle to repudiate the depreciated clinical role, were important 
determinants of our current assessment attitudes and procedures.
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It will be shown that the early exigencies created an environment 
that promoted a 'proprietary dogma' surrounding testing that almost 
led to the development of an exclusive guild based on the mystif­
ication of testing and scientific pretence.- The importance to 
early clinical psychologists of the justification of their practices 
by recourse to science is emphasised. It will be argued that many 
myths and false claims were perpetrated under the guise of being 
'scientific'. Because of the authority and high esteem accorded to 
science in our society the benefits of such claims, although patent, 
are misguided. It is a central contention of this essay that 
science is only one of many available ways of gathering knowledge 
and is, of itself, not intrinsically superior to alternative methods. 
Each method of knowledge generation should be judged against the 
criteria selected for evaluating the knowledge produced, rather 
than against each other.
Thus, when it is argued in this essay that, for example, 'the 
history of psychometrics is a chronicle of pseudoscience', the 
label 'pseudoscience' merely conveys the judgement that the knowledge 
generated did not satisfy somebody's or some group!s criteria for 
ascribing the label 'scientific' but that it aspired to be so 
labelled. It is not necessarily a pejorative label, although it 
has taken on a negative value in our society. It is sobering to 
realise that today's science may well be tomorrow's alchemy.
In a recent article Bersoff (1973) 'accused' the psychological 
assessment enterprise of being little more than psychological 
alchemy, little different from the assessment techniques of our 
predecessors (i.e. horoscopic astrology, physiognomy). It is easy
14 .
to disparage unkindly the assessment techniques of bygone days 
and to admire our present psychometric sophistication, but can the 
two be differentiated against the criteria of scientific knowledge? 
Bersoff thinks not and posed the question: "Who is to be held
accountable for this psychological alchemy?" and his answer was:
"two brands of "psychos": psychoanalysts and
psychometricians. Psychoanalysts are to blame 
because they have perpetrated a fraudulent 
(Freudulent?) theory of personality and have 
perpetuated its myth. Psychometrists, the test 
constructors, are to blame because they have 
forgotten their historical antecedents and have 
become overly concerned with psychometric 
aesthetics to the neglect of validity." 
(Bersoff, 1973, p.892)
Psychoanalytic theory and psychometric theory come together and 
are encompassed under the assumptions of the attribute model of 
assessment since the model purports to measure both psychodynamic 
states and traits. Thus if Bersoff's accusations can be substan­
tiated then grave doubts about the scientific status of the 
attribute model must be entertained. For this reason it was 
decided to include a chapter evaluating the charge of psychometric 
pseudoscience and evaluating the charge of Freudian pseudo­
science .
Psychological Assessment as Alchemy
The charges of pseudoscience directed at contemporary psycho­
metric testing can be understood only by knowing how the discipline 
developed its concepts, vocabulary and experimental procedures.
For this reason Chapter IV focuses particularly on the early 
development of intelligence tests and the relationship with the 
eugenics movement. Of particular interest is the transformation
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of the concept of intelligence perpetrated at the hands of 
eugenicists. It will be argued that much of the work of the 
scientific testing movement was fallacy ridden principally because 
it was conducted within a defective paradigm. That is, the psycho­
metricians operated within a paradigm that specified questions without 
having any available method of scientifically validating their answers. 
It will be shown that the history of intelligence testing is largely 
a chronicle of 'pseudoscience' with both defective argument and 
false conclusions becoming institutionalised primarily because of 
its pretence to 'science'. Although worthless as 'science', much 
of the resultant research did perform an important ideological 
service to 'the ruling elite'. Thus it will be argued that the 
psychometric intelligentsia participated in 'Lysenkoism' on a scale 
to rival the notorious example in Soviet agricultural science in the 
30' s.
Bersoff's (1973) charge against psychoanalysis was that it 
promoted a theory of behaviour that emphasised intraorganismic 
causal factors to the exclusion of situational determinants.
According to this model, personality is perceived as a set of needs, 
drives, repressed impulses, trans-situational traits, etc. that 
initiate and guide behaviour. These dispositions are considered to 
characterise the individual and become translated into classificatory 
description. Because these traits and states are seen as underlying 
overt behaviour, special assessment devices, primarily projective 
tests, are designed to elicit responses (signs and symbols) that
facilitate the accurate assessor inferences.
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In Chapter V it will be shown that the extraordinary social 
and professional penetration of Freud's ideas was, to a considerable 
extent, promoted under the guise of 'being scientific'. It will be 
shown that against various criteria Freud's theories do not meet 
the requirements for the ascription of the label 'science', whereas 
there are considerable grounds to justify the labelling of the 
enterprise 'pseudoscience'.
Stereotyping, Clinician Fallibility and the Attribute Model
In the light of the conclusions of Chapters IV and V,
Bersoff's claim that psychoanalytic and psychometric theory 
and practice do not provide a sound scientific foundation for the 
practice of clinical assessment does seem justifiable. For this 
reason Chapter VI is devoted to analysing the now dominant attribute 
model of psychodiagnosis. The Chapter is designed to undertake an 
analysis of the underlying assumptions implicit in the conceptual 
model and to evaluate the empirical support for these assumptions. 
This will lead to an examination of the model of causality that is 
intrinsic to the model and guides much professional clinical 
practice.
It will be shown that the 'quasi-medical' model of abnormal 
behaviour represents the logical extension of the attribute model 
to the explanation of grossly deviant behaviour. The assumptions 
implicit in the quasi-medical model and their implications for our 
daily clinical practice will be discussed. Lastly, the way in 
which the model defines normality/abnormality will be elucidated 
and the resultant tendency to medicalise social problems
will be discussed.
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The suggestion of a latent, socio-political function of the 
clinician's covert social mandate, raised in the previous chapter, 
will be developed in Chapter VII. It will be argued that a picture 
emerges which supports the assertion that'diagnosis represents a 
transformation of stereotyped thinking and social prejudices into 
clinical descriptions that then serve as a basis for diagnosis.
In this way the 'attribute model' converts undesired differences 
into deficits or symptoms. This is, psychodiagnostic categories 
may be construed as little more than scientific sounding social 
stereotypes that serve a distinct sociopolitical purpose. Empirical 
data to support this conjecture will be presented.
It is possible, however, to suggest that psychodiagnosis is a 
form of stereotyping in a different sense, namely, that the 
psychological processes in both everyday and social stereotyping 
and psychodiagnosis are similar and amenable to similar situational 
and information processing sources of bias and distortion. And that 
psychodiagnosis - being an interpersonal encounter - is an 
inevitably fallible endeavour. Empirical data attesting to the lack 
of reliability in psychological assessment and classification will 
be discussed.
The last chapter offers evidence corroborating the conjecture 
that trained professional clinical psychologists are generally 
as fallible in their inferential judgements as intuitive psychologists. 
Additionally, it will be shown that trained professionals are equally 
vulnerable to the temptations of magical thinking. As we have seen 
stereotyping and psychodiagnosis are in principle no different and 
thus we would expect magical thinking to be a pervasive character­
istic of the psychodiagnostic enterprise.
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The aim of Chapter VIII is to reveal the sources of biases, 
distortions, preconceptions and expectations in psychodiagnosis 
that interfere with the accuracy of clinical judgements. The 
evidence presented in this chapter casts severe doubts on the 
ability of a practitioner operating within the assumptive base 
of the attribute model to accurately code and process assessment 
information in a way that does not lead to systematic error and 
generate illusions of validity.
The central aim of this essay was not only to highlight the 
substantial disparity between psychodiagnostic practice and the 
body of empirical data evidencing its shortcomings, but to 
delineate plausible explanations for the failure of clinical 
psychologists to adapt themselves to the imperatives of the literature. 
Notwithstanding research discussed above, the failure of clinical 
psychologists to adapt themselves to this situation remains an 
outstanding anomaly. Clinicians to this day continue to try to 
confine their assessment operations to general traits, and in so 
doing they concern themselves therefore with only a relatively 
small part of the reliable variance of behaviour and experience.
When one places the great variety of human phenomena in the context 
of relative specificity, one is led to expect a unique pattern of 
dysfunctions and related variables in each individual client.
However, a conventional psychometric approach which aims to measure 
common variance only, and not specific variance, does not acknowledge 
this and cannot therefore be expected to meet our clinical needs and 
inadvertently serves to maintain what Mischel (1979) identified as 
the 'prevalent form of clinical hostility' (p.245).
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In the earlier chapters several of the more important research/ 
practice anomalies were discussed along with a delineation of the 
factors and processes that maintain what appears to be untenable 
practices. However, before considering what may be done to change 
the situation, if that is desirable, it was decided to discuss 
briefly, factors that may influence the clinician's initial approach 
to psychodiagnostic assessment.
In their recent survey, Wade and Baker (1977), found that 
70.7% of their respondents first learned to use assessment 
instruments in graduate training, 27.7% in undergraduate training 
and only 1.6% in postgraduate employment. These figures strongly 
suggest that initial training instructions are to be held at least 
partly responsible for the current situation. This is augmented 
by other findings, for example, only 20.6% of respondents indicated 
that they systematically collected and analysed data regarding 
their own testing practice. Additionally, although 54.7% indicated 
that they read at least several articles relevant to testing every 
six months, only 25% stated that the studies critical of tests 
seemed accurate. The majority of respondents indicated that these 
studies employed inappropriate criteria or questionable methods, 
that they over-generalised or that they reported conflicting findings.
It will be argued in Chapter IX that the initial training of 
clinicians in Universities and Colleges appears to fail in at least 
two important respects. Firstly, they continue to teach students 
to administer and interpret tests of dubious validity, and secondly, 
they fail to develop behaviours compatible with the ideals embodied 
in the concept of 'scientist-practitioner'. It is beyond the scope
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of this essay to undertake an analysis of the factors that could 
explain this situation but it should be reiterated that negative 
evidence may not prove sufficient to dissuade neophytes from using 
the 'offending' tests, especially when faced with the role 
expectations of mental health colleagues. A necessary but 
probably insufficient requirement will be the provision of a viable 
alternative.
A Prolegomenon for Interactional Assessment
In the light of the importance of initial training of clinicians 
for later assessment practices, the conclusion (Chapter IX) will 
focus specifically on the implications of the earlier chapters for 
the teaching of clinicians. The specific aim is: Firstly, to
recommend ways of improving clinical assessment conducted within 
the dominant approach. This will be intentionally brief as it is 
the author's view that the paradigm is not the 'best' available.
It has been argued that the model is not only conceptually and
empirically inadequate but that it facilitates the medicalisation of deviance
and supports a 'blame-the-victim' ideology (Ryan, 1971). Although
the essay has been largely negative it will be argued that it is
possible to convert some of the critical findings into recommendations
that may help clinicians avoid some of the shortcomings. Although
this may amount to little more than 'mending a thread bare' paradigm,
it cannot be disputed that the attribute model remains the dominant
assessment model and as such, until a viable alternative is accepted,
the onus is on trainers and researchers to develop strategies that
diminish the errors and biases in diagnostic assessment conducted
within the paradigm. Thus in this section several recommendations
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for inclusion in the training course for students in psychodiagnostic 
assessment will be made. They include suggestions on how to improve 
the clinician's ability to learn from experience, on how to sensitise 
clinicians to the importance of the cognitive structure and strategies 
they bring to the assessment situation, on how to sensitise the 
clinicians to the influence of their values and biases in clinical 
judgement, on how to give up the luxury of global labelling, and so 
on.
Secondly, an already available alternative assessment paradigm, 
namely, behavioural assessment, will be briefly introduced. Again 
its presentation will be brief as it is considered to be predicated 
on an equally limited and truncated image of humans. However, it 
will be argued that many of the problems associated with the 
attribute approach and delineated in the earlier chapters, are avoided 
when the behavioural model is applied. Thus it will be argued that 
it is a preferable approach.
Although at the theoretical level social learning theorists have 
emphasised the reciprocal interaction of the person and the situation, 
rarely has this commitment manifested itself in practice. In 
practice a rather static, unidirectional model of causality where 
the individual is construed as relatively passive seem to dominate. 
This is particularly the case with much of the operant assessment 
therapy. It will be argued that the behavioural assessment model 
does not represent 'true' interactionalism, rather it adopts what 
Buss (1977) referred to as a 'mechanistic'paradigm and Overton and 
Reese (1973) referred to as a reactive model. That is, behavioural 
assessment assumes that 'independent variables' affect 'dependent 
variables' whereas modern interactionalism is concerned with
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reciprocal interaction between environmental events and behaviour.
Lastly, an approach to assessment predicated on a recognition 
of the transactional nature of the person-environment relationship 
that requires that the person be viewed at the psychological level 
as a component of the complex-system of which he/she is a part, 
will be advocated. This interactionalist perspective does not 
represent a rapprochement between the opposing theoretical camps 
represented in the two alternatives listed above (i.e. personologism 
and situationalism) but a synthesis of the dialectic. It 
represents a dialectic synthesis that should result in the eventual 
abandonment of both prior positions. The recognition that complex 
human behaviour tends to be influenced by many determinants and 
reflects the almost inseparable and continuous interaction of a host 
of variables both in the person and in the environment, has deep 
implications for psychodiagnostic assessment.
Although it is widely accepted among psychologists that the 
behaviour of a given person in a particular environment is a 
joint function of the relevant behavioural determinants within the 
person and those within the environment, few researchers appear 
to operate within the paradigm. However, it will be argued that 
when examined more concretely, commitment to this paradigm has 
deeper implications for psychology in general, as well as 
specifically for psychodiagnosis. For, if it is useful to construe 
behaviour as a joint function of person and situation determinants,
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then it follows that psychological assessment should systematically 
take account of both person and situational variables in their 
transactions. It need hardly be said that this is rarely the 
case in contemporary assessment practice.
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CHAPTER II: ON THE DECLINE AND FALL OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC
ASSESSMENT
We are, according to McReynolds (1971) at the beginning of what, 
in retrospect, will someday be seen to be a revolution in psychological 
assessment. The revolution - or rapid evolution - has been precip­
itated and fueled by numerous influences, prepotent among the 
influences being:
(a) the widespread disillusionment with the 'traditional' 
approach to psychodiagnostic assessment, personified by 
the battery approach advocated by Shafter and Rapaport; 
(Rapaport, Gill and Schafer, 1946)
(b) the trenchant criticism of both the conceptual and empirical 
adequacy of the theory of human behaviour that stresses 
intraorganism determinants to the exclusion or expense of 
situational determinants (e.g. Bandura, 1969; Mischel,
1968); and
(c) the dramatic proliferation of behaviour therapy (Benassi 
and Lanson, 1972; Kazdin and Wilson, 1978) and the, 
albeit belated, elucidation of a technology of behavioural 
assessment (Ciminero et al 1977; Cone and Hawkins, 1977; 
Hersen and Bellack, 1976).
Concomitant with the attacks on psychological assessment, the 
traditional Kraepelinian system for classifying problematic behaviour 
has undergone increasingly intense scrutiny. Numerous proposals have 
emerged for revising, reformulating or abolishing the system of 
classifying psychological disturbances. Generally criticism has 
been stimulated by three considerations, namely:
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(a) the empirical adequacy of the current psychiatric nosology 
reliability, validity and utility (Zigler and Phillips, 
1961; Zubin, 1967);
(b) the relevance of the psychiatric labels for traditional 
treatment (Meehl, I960; Mintz, 1968) and particularly
for the newer modes of psychotherapy, for example behaviour 
therapy or humanistically inspired therapy (Kanfer and 
Saslow, 1969; Rogers 1973); and
(c) the assumptive base and undesirable consequences of 
equating problematic behaviour with 'mental illness' and 
designating some people 'mentally ill'. (Leifer, 1964; 
Sarbin, 1967; Szasz, 1960).
Overwhelmingly the attack on the traditional psychodiagnostic 
endeavours of clinical psychologists has been mounted by academic 
psychologists and sociologists. A survey of the literature reveals 
that some academic clinicians believe the psychodiagnostic enterprise 
to be 'dying' and rather than prolong the agony, they advocate 
euthanasia by abandoning or at least reducing the time devoted to 
training graduate students in psychological assessment and diagnosis 
(Levy and Fox, 1975). Meanwhile, at the work face, clinical practi­
tioners are faced with the realities of persons coming to clinics 
with a myriad of different complaints and problems and in all cases 
some clinical decision must be made and communicated to colleagues. 
Despite the veracity of the critiques and inveteracy of the deficien­
cies, psychological tests and dispositional labels are often found to 
be helpful in the decision-making process (Maloney and Ward, 1976; 
Wade and Baker, 1977). Clinicians are apparently blissfully ignorant 
of the hypothetical illness that besets their procedures and have 
failed to note the marked progressive deterioration over time.
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An important consequence of the co-existence of disparate 
views on the value of psychodiagnosis has been the development of 
an obfuscatory schism between the academic/researcher and the 
clinical practitioner. The present chapter explores the two divergent 
points of view as to the value of traditional psychodiagnosis. It 
also delineates some of the factors identified as precipitating the 
much vaunted, and occasionally mourned, demise of such endeavours. 
Subsequently it will be argued that rather than 'dying' psycho­
diagnosis is 'alive and well' (Levy and Fox, 1975) and unquestionably 
the dominant assessment system used by practising clinicians 
irrespective of their therapeutic persuasion (Wade and Baker, 1977).
It will be shown that projective and objective testing still 
constitutes a significant part of the clinician's professional activity.
FACTORS LEADING TO THE DECLINE OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT
Obviously some of the forces purported to have precipitated the 
decline arise from changes in the sociopolitical milieu and are so 
pervasive and ephemeral that their identification is difficult. 
Others however are more definitive and yield more easily to identif­
ication. Although the purported demise of psychodiagnosis has not 
yet been corroborated, authors have readily delineated the factors 
that have contributed to the decline. Some of the more frequently 
cited factors will be introduced in a summary form below. Most of 
them will be discussed in much more detail and critically appraised 
in later chapters. Among the factors identified are:
1. the negative research literature;
2. the invocation of psychopathology;
3. the stigmatising dispositional nosology;
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4. the treatment irrelevance of psychodiagnosis;
5. the rise and popular acceptance of humanistic/ 
existential perspectives;
6. the exaggerated emphasis on intraorganismic determinants;
7. the vilification of tests in the media;
8. the poor academic training in psychodiagnostic assessment;
9. the antequated nature of many instruments; and
10. the cost of the enterprise.
1. Negative Research
Allusion has already been made to the negative results concerning 
reliability, validity and utility of psychological tests and disposit­
ional labelling. It would be conservative to conclude that the 
traditional methods of assessment and diagnosis have been convincingly 
criticised on both conceptual and empirical* grounds (see Mischel, 1968; 
Peterson, 1968; Stuart, 1970). Additionally, overwhelming evidence 
for the superiority of actuarial prediction over clinical prediction 
has been offered by Meehl (1960) and Sawyer (1966) for nearly 20 years, 
yet clinicians continue to ignore the former and use the latter. 
Proponents of psychodiagnosis argue that, although generally negative, 
the evidence is equivocal, being ambiguous, indecisive and method­
ologically flawed (Blatt, 1975; Lewandowski and Saccuzzo, 1976;
Weiner, 1972). They have argued that acceptance of the negative 
results reflects more the current Zeitgeist than the compelling 
nature of the data. For example Blatt (1975) admits that a simple
tally of studies would indicate:
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"little, if any, support for the validity of projective 
procedures. But why has there been so much uncritical 
acceptance of the research findings? Could it be that 
the same social-psychological forces which affected the 
attitudes of many psychologists towards psychodiagnostic 
assessment may also be the reason for the eager and 
uncritical acceptance of negative research findings.
Results are far from disheartening ... In fact, a large 
proportion of these studies offer considerable support 
for many of the interpretative assumptions of projective 
techniques." (p.333)
No doubt Blatt is correct in asserting the importance of the 
dominant Zeitgeist in data interpretation (see, e.g. Chalmers, 1976; 
Kuhn, 1970; Mahoney, 1976). As Mannheim pointed out several decades 
ago, protagonists in the present controversy "speak as if their 
differences were confined to the specific question at issue around 
which the present disagreement crystallised. [i.e. the validity 
of projective tests] They overlook the fact that their antagonists 
differ from them in his [her] whole outlook and not merely in his 
[her] opinion about the point under discussion". (Mannheim, 1936, 
p.251). Because the controversy is fundamentally a confrontation 
between competing conceptual systems or paradigms (Kuhn, 1970) , 
empirical critiques are largely inefficacious. In his autobiography, 
Planck (1950) remarked that "new scientific truth does not triumph 
by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather 
because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up 
that is familiar with it." (pp.33-34) If Planck is right, reasoned 
argument and evidence do not play a large part in changing scientific 
paradigms and knowledge. Thus, in this case, rather than the negative 
research being responsible for precipitating change, it may be that 
the generation of psychologists committed to psychodiagnosis are 
dying off and a new generation of clinical psychologists is growing 
up committed to an alternative paradigm. But as we have seen some 
paradigms won't 'fade away'.
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2. Invocation of Psychopathology
A second variable identified as contributing to the devaluation 
of psychodiagnosis has to do with the psychopathological focus of 
much testing. Test and test reports tend to emphasise maladaption 
and dysfunction at the expense of the client assets, personal resources 
and 'healthy' characteristics (Kanfer and Saslow, 1969). Numerous 
studies are available (see, e.g. Soskin, 1954; Samuel, 1965) 
demonstrating that judges exposed only to subjects' Rorschach and 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) test protocols invoked significantly 
more psychopathology in their evaluations than did judges who were 
familiar with the subjects social history or who personally inter­
viewed them.
Bersoff (1973) argues that some projective tests, such as the 
TAT typically elicit symptomatic responses-because of their composition, 
being grey and sombre and portraying sad scenes. To the question:
"What happens to a person who is referred for some behavioural 
difficulties and is administered the TAT?" Bersoff answers:
"Well, like the women accused of being witches in older 
times she is not likely to come out of the assessment 
experience too healthily. During the sixteenth century, 
an alleged witch's guilt was tested in an ingenious way 
... The examination involved dumping her in deep water 
restrained by ropes. If she sank, she was innocent; if 
she floated, she was guilty - in either case she was 
dead. And like the witch, an individual referred for 
projective testing often ends up in the same position. 
Given cards that normally evoke themes of death or sad­
ness or aggression s/he is normally going to tell stories 
that involve these themes. Ignoring the fact that his/her 
behaviour is the result of the interaction of what s/he 
brings to the test and the nature of the test itself, 
in "essence" terminology the testee is likely to be 
labelled 'depressed', 'aggressive', etc. and it will be 
assumed that this is the way s/he is in most, if not all 
situations." (1973, p.896)
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If the goals of psychotherapy are essentially reconstructive 
(Lorr and McNair, 1966), then it would seem imperative that 
diagnostic testing shows the strengths upon which improved function­
ing must be premised (Martin, 1966; Scarbrough, 1966) . Certainly 
with the increasing popularity of behaviour therapy the need for 
assessment strategies capable of identifying the environmental 
variables - internal as well as external, self-imposed as well as 
imposed by others - that are currently maintaining the individual's 
maladaptive thoughts, feelings and behaviour are required rather than 
dispositional diagnosis (Dickson, 1975; Mash and Terdal, 1974;
Ross, 1974). Thus, as a tighter link is forged between assessment 
and intervention procedures the focus on dispositional labelling 
will become less useful.
3. Psychiatric Classification
It has been suggested that many students nowadays enter post­
graduate training in clinical psychology with negative attitudes to 
diagnostic classification as a result of the popularisation of the 
societal reaction 'theory' of deviance (Becker, 1963; Matza, 1969; 
Schur, 1971) and the application of this perspective to the concept 
of mental illness (Sarbin, 1967; Scheff, 1966; Szasz, 1961). Their 
negative attitudes are often seen to be reinforced by the misuse that 
institutions and the public make of diagnostic labels, i.e. to 
stereotype and stigmatise (Farina et al, 1966; Hobbs, 1975; Jones, 
1972). The widespread publicity given to Rosenhan's (1973) pseudo­
patient study, when coupled with movies like 'One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo's Nest', 'Family Life', and 'Outrages', serves to augment 
negative attitudes: as does the bemusing decision by the American
Psychiatric Association to exclude homosexuality from the list of
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mental illnesses by majority vote in 1974 and the equally bemusing 
removal of the mental illness of 'sexual sadism' from their latest 
guide book for diagnosis of mental disorders (DMS-III) following a 
successful feminist lobby (Goleman, 1978).
The issue takes on a more philosophical bent when one considers 
Sartre's assertion that labelling violates the integrity of 
persons and Szasz' claim that the ultimate freedom of all 
individuals is not to be labelled against their will. Rather than 
calling people names, individuals should be experienced and related 
to intuitively - according to the rhetoric of some humanistic/ 
existential therapists (Dana and Leech, 1974; Strupp, 1976). In his 
article 'Clinical Psychology Irrationalism, and the Erosion of 
Excellence' Strupp (1976) makes the point that the notion that diagnosis 
and evaluation are intrinsically antithetical to the proper conduct of 
psychotherapy and thereby harmful to individuals is "one of the greatest 
pseudo-issues besetting our field" (p.564). Rather than be a rigid 
and static assignment to a dispositional category, Strupp suggests 
that assessment should be a process of forming hypotheses and decision­
making (Strupp, 1976). However, the traditional separation of assess­
ment from psychotherapy militates against this experimental approach 
to diagnostic assessment so cogently advocated by the little known 
Shapiro (1951, 1961, 1966).
Psychologists, much like other scientists have shown a strong 
penchant for categorisation (Wallace, 1966). While cognisant of the 
arbitrary boundaries which, as a matter of convenience, separate one 
diagnostic category from another, the ever present danger is that 
categories are used 'as if' they are mutually exclusive and non-
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overlapping. Granted that each individual is unique, then her/his 
interactions with the clinical assessor provides a set of unique data 
which has to be condensed and categorised. Following the logic of 
scientific enterprise propounded by Popper (1963) no one classification 
can logically be said to equal the unique original data. Szasz (1961) 
highlights the naivety of the view that there exists a finite set of 
classifications which can successfully encompass an infinite variability 
of client patterning. It would seem important to have more than one 
set of categories at one's disposal and importantly, to avoid confusing 
any one category with the unique data (Feyerabend, 1970).
Psychologists have not acknowledged, or at least not promulgated 
the notion that psychiatric nosology is pragmatic, provisional and 
should be explicitly open to change in response to experience (Phillips, 
Dragans and Bartlett, 1975). As a consequence,the concept of 'mental 
illness' and the language system used to describe particular kinds of 
'mental illness' have become legitimised as scientific 'facts': their
metaphoric nature being lost. Given the fractious and acrimonious 
debate which rages over the legitimacy of these 'facts', it is hardly 
surprising that there have even been attempts to abolish the concept 
of 'mental illness' altogether and replace it with some alternative, 
non-pathological construct such as deviance, problems of living, or 
community disorder. It is easy to see how this debate could contribute 
to the decline of psychodiagnostic assessment and classification.
4. Treatment Irrelevance
Another factor contributing to the growth of negative connotations 
surrounding psychodiagnosis is the apparent irrelevance of assessment 
decision for therapy. Traditionally psychotherapy and diagnosis were
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relatively independent endeavours, being performed by psychiatrists 
and clinical psychologists respectively. And certainly, for most of 
us, helping a person change for the better is more gratifying than 
doing a psychological assessment. Under 'these circumstances it is 
not surprising that there is a differential valuing of the two processes. 
However, if assessment and diagnosis are conceived to be prescriptions 
for action rather than descriptions of the client (Linder, 1965) then 
it is appropriate to expect that psychodiagnosis will precede psycho­
therapy and to a large degree determine its form.
Generally it can be shown that dispositional diagnosis does not 
predict which treatment will be undertaken (Coles and Magnussen, 1966; 
Kenfer and Saslow, 1969). For example, in an early study Meehl (1960) 
revealed that while 17 per cent of the clinicians studied reported that 
prior knowledge of the client was important in effective therapy, 80 
per cent felt the therapists' characteristics are more important 
determinants of the nature of therapy and its outcome. Similarly Moore 
et al (1968) who questioned psychiatrists about the function and value 
of psychological diagnosis found that the majority of respondents 
indicated that psychological evaluation:
(a) is requested less than 20 per cent of the time;
(b) is not viewed as an essential part of the client work-up;
(c) is not used in making treatment and diagnostic decisions;
(d) would not be used in treatment planning even if changes 
were made to improve the assessment reporting system.
Although these findings appear to be telling, the assumption is 
that psychiatrists' opinions about the value of the psychologist's 
assessment report are a valid criterion for assessing the report; 
this would probably be challenged by most clinical psychologists.
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Nevertheless, that psychodiagnosis is not used as to prescribe 
'treatment', the value of the enterprise vis-a-vis psychotherapy is 
understandable and the implications of this to the hypothesised decline 
appear patent.
5. Dehumanising
Humanistically oriented psychologists have accused assessment 
processes of being discriminatory, stigmatising and dehumanising.
Test proponents would claim that this criticism is more properly 
addressed to the abuse and inappropriately administered tests and 
that testing per se need not be an aversive event for the client. 
However, this is not the case according to Dana and Leech (1974) 
who argue that "the easy recourse for the assessor to power (omni­
potence) and implicit magic have historically diminished the humanity 
of the person who is the client and rendered assessors unwitting 
professional purveyors of dehumanising experience" (p.431). In a 
similar vein Schafer (1954) has labelled the assessment process as 
voyeuristic, oracular and autocratic.
With the advent of client-centred therapy, the notion that psych- 
diagnosis is intrinsically antithetical to the establishment of an 
appropriate client therapist relationship gained currency. The rise 
of the human potential movement, humanistic psychology and existential 
therapy extended this view and gave rise to "the contemporary trend 
toward anti-intellectualism, antiscientism, and antiprofessionalism" 
(Strupp, 1976, p.561) and the concomitant eschewing of psychodiagnostic
assessment.
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Strupp's (1976) diatribe not withstanding, empirical data does 
corroborate the sexist nature of cross-sex assessment (Chasen and 
Weinberg, 1975; Harris and Masling, 1970; Masling and Harris, 1969) , 
the racist nature of some assessment instruments (Mercer, 1973;
Williams, 1974), the impression management that invariably is present 
in assessment situations (Braginsky, 1970; Goffman, 1961) , and 
eisegesis (Dana, 1966). The humanist critique is well summarised by 
May (1958). Speaking for existential analysis May states:
"Existential analysis is a way of understanding human 
existence, and its representatives believe that one 
of the chief (if not the chief) blocks to the under­
standing of human beings in Western culture is precisely 
the over-emphasis on techniques, an emphasis which goes 
along with the tendency to see the human being as an 
object to be calculated, managed, 'analysed'". (1958, p.76)
No doubt the widespread influence of the existential/humanistic critique 
has done much to promote the rejection of traditional approaches to 
psychodiagnosis in some quarters.
6. Organism Error
The sixth factor often identified as contributing to the 
disillusionment is the persistent de-emphasis of situational determin­
ants of behaviour (Mishel, 1968; Peterson, 1968). Psychologists are 
not alone in favouring intraorganismic variables in explaining 
behaviour; lay 'intuitive' psychologists display a similar 
persistent propensity to understate the influence of contextual 
factors. So pervasive is this proclivity that Ross (1977) refers to 
it as the 'fundamental attribute error'. Earlier Wallace (1966) 
had suggested a similar point of view in his suggestion that the 
dominant attribute model of assessment construes personality as 
'essence'; an idiosyncratic character intrinsic to the individual
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which stands behind actions and motivates them. The 'essence' 
concept of personality rests on a 'within-skin' model of causality 
and promotes an assessment focus upon a host of psychodynamic forces - 
for example, repressed impulses, energised traits, latent tendencies 
and needs - all hypothesised to be capable of initiating, and guiding 
behaviour somewhat independently of the current situation.
There now exists a substantial body of knowledge attesting to 
the situational specificity of much behaviour and conversely, a lack 
of large transituational consistencies in behaviour (see e.g. Bern and 
Allen, 1974; Mischel, 1968, 1973; Schweder, 1973). Thus responses 
emitted in assessment situations (as has been alluded to earlier with 
respect to impression management) are not only a function of the 
characteristics of the individual but also of the contextual influence 
(e.g. sex and race of assessor, temporal and physical etc.) of the 
test situation (Bersoff, 1971). Accordingly, Wallace (1966) asks 
"What is the relationship between the ability to make certain verbal 
responses in a make-believe setting and the ability to respond in a 
similar fashion in overt behaviour?" (p.135). There may be very little.
Holland and Richard (1965), for example, report that test information 
correlates poorly with real life performance and McClelland has 
recently critically analysed - what for a long time seemed sacrosanct - 
the relationship between high IQ and 'success' in society. He concluded 
that 'the correlation between intelligence test scores and job success 
often may be an artifact" (McClelland, 1973, p.51) rather than an 
example of causal covariance.
It is now widely acknowledged that assessment does not occur in an 
organismic vacuum'. One has only to read the specific instruction to 
testers designed to facilitate the establishment of rapport and high
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motivation in order to promote optimal performance during administration 
of intelligence tests (e.g. Terman and Merrill, 1960, p.50) to evidence 
the test makers' sensitivity to this point. Consequently if we are 
genuinely interested in gathering data about behaviour that is 
predictive and relevant to the current functioning of an individual 
outside the test situation then we must, according to Bersoff (1973) 
discard the tests that are flagrantly inappropriate to the purpose, 
i.e. those that search for trans-situational intraorganismic factors.
If the traditional approach to assessment is to stem the tide of 
discontent then it must aim at 'contextualising' assessment and discover 
what Fischer (1969, 1973) called the 'when/when not' of specific 
behaviour, or in Mischel's (1979) words to discover the "discriminativeness 
or 'specificity' and ideographic organisation in how behaviour is 
generalised and patterned across situations", (p.742)
7. Poor Media Coverage
Much of the mystique of testing and assessment endeavours has 
been set aside by critical exposes in the popular media, an example 
being the disclosure of accusations of data manufacture and 'cooking' 
directed at Sir Cyril Burt, in the press (e.g. Age 1979; Encounter,
1977; New Stateman, 1978). Additionally several popular books have 
also carried the message that tests are fallible, unreliable and 
amenable to faking and socially dangerous (e.g. Whyte's (1966) 'The 
Organisation Man'; Black's (1962) 'Thou Shall Not Pass'; and 
Banesh's (1962) 'The Tyranny of Testing'). The spate of recent films 
mentioned earlier also served to cast doubt on the ability of psycho­
logists to accurately discriminate between the 'sane' and 'insane' 
and to cast doubts on the humanity of institutional 'help' (e.g. 'One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo's Next'; 'Family Life' and 'Outrages'). In
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return the public have accused psychologists of everything from 
"reading our minds and invading our privacy" to "imposing a yoke of 
conformity on employees and stifling originality in school children, 
driven by morbid sexual curiosity and cynical pursuit of money"
(Rapaport et al, 1968, p.23).
Public concern over testing is also evidenced by the legal 
challenges to testing in schools and university. For example, in 
the U.S.A., in what promises to be a landmark decision after a seven 
year court battle, San Francisco's chief district court judge has 
ruled that the use of standardised intelligence tests to categorise 
children as mentally retarded discriminates against minorities and 
is thus unconstitutional. The immediate effect will be to make 
permanent a state-wide injunction against these tests. Several 
other states in the U.S.A. have similar and occasionally more wide- 
ranging laws restricting the administration of intelligence tests to 
school children. A petition requesting a moratorium on all standard­
ised testing was recently submitted to the American Psychological 
Association by the Association of Black Psychologists (Mercer, 1978-79). 
Such negative attitudes within the profession can only further 
exacerbate the declining popularity of traditional psychodiagnostic 
assessment procedures.
8. Academic Training
The eighth factor identified as contributing to the declining 
status of psychodiagnostic assessment is the poor quality of academic 
training of clinical psychologists. Several articles have recently 
voiced the dissatisfaction of staff of interim agencies with the 
academic preparation of students in the area of psychodiagnostic
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assessment (e.g. Garfield and Kurtz, 1974; Shemberg and Keeley, 1970). 
Students were perceived as having overly critical attitudes to 
assessment and insufficient experience in practical settings.
University instructors were often accused'of, at the best, half-hearted 
endorsement and at the worst downright cynicism about tests. Accord­
ingly it is thought not surprising that new practitioners approach 
practicums and intei'nships with little enthusiasm or confidence about 
diagnostic assessment procedures (Russ, 1978). The accuracy of this 
conjecture will be evaluated a little later in this chapter.
9. Aging Assessment Instruments
Another factor identified as contributing to the decline of 
testing involves the age of some of the most used tests. Every one 
of the ten most frequently used psychological tests in Lubin, Wallis 
and Paine's (1971) list was at least twenty years old. Several were 
very much older, for example the Rorschach is now approaching 60 years 
in print, the T.A.T. 50 years and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (M.M.P.I.) 40 years. Although revised, some of the 
vocabulary items in the Stanford-Binet date back to 1908 (see 
Popplestone and McPherson, 1974). Many test items are almost totally 
irrelevant in the contemporary context and their anachronistic qualities 
serve as a source of humour rather than penetrative insight into the 
unconscious of the client.
10. Cost
A last factor identified as contributing to the declining status 
and use of psychoassessment procedure is the cost. Cleveland (1976) 
suggests that inflation has led to an escalation of clinical psycho­
logists' hourly fee resulting in a situation where private practitioners
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can ill afford to spend the time necessary to administer, score, 
interpret and write up a psychological test battery. He suggested 
that there is a real possibility that clinical psychologists may price 
themselves out of the market and inadvertently accelerate the already 
declining status and usage of their assessment services.
Without recourse to sound data however, it becomes almost 
impossible to evaluate the different accounts of the status of 
psychodiagnosis and to identify accurately the influential precursors 
to the decline and fall of the enterprise. Much of the foregoing 
discussion with respect to antecedents of the purported 'decline' 
appears to be based on personal opinion, theoretical polemic and 
indirect data. And unfortunately, as is often the case, once a belief 
is adopted (i.e. that the value and usage of tests is declining) it 
can become almost impervious to numerous discomfirming instances. 
Popper's (1963) terms such a belief a 'prescientific dogmatic 
attitude'. Many of the antagonists in the current debate appear to 
evidence this attitude as the data indicates that the reports of the 
death of psychodiagnostic assessment are greatly exaggerated as we 
shall see below.
PSYCHODIAGNOSIS IS ALIVE AND WELL
Fortunately, there exists a body of research literature concerning 
the use and status of psychological tests among clinical psychologists. 
This research can be arranged according to the question that different 
investigators attempted to answer. These questions are:
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(a) do psychologists in academic settings view psychological 
tests differently from their colleagues in the professional 
clinical field?
(b) has the amount of time that professional clinicians 
devote to psychodiagnostic activities declined?
(c) has there been a movement away from using the most 
frequently and trenchantly criticised projective 
techniques?
(a) Academic Prejudice Against Testing
Several authors (Garfield and Kurtz, 1973; McCully, 1965;
Shemberg and Kelley, 1970; Thelen, Varble and Johnson, 1968) have 
compared the evaluation of testing by clinical psychologists working 
in university graduate training programmes with those made by their 
colleagues in internship centres. There was a high degree of 
consensus - university psychologists hold a more critical or negative 
view of psychological tests, especially the projective tests, than do 
their professional counterparts. Interestingly, younger faculty 
members (under 36 years) were more pessimistic and more inclined to 
discard projective techniques altogether, than were members over 45 
years (Thelen, Varble and Johnson, 1968). Parenthetically, this may 
fit the evolutionary change process described earlier by Planck (1950). 
Because of the relatively low status of psychological assessment in 
universities it is usually the younger and least experienced faculty 
member who teaches such courses (Cleveland, 1976). This practise may 
inadvertently be the most important sociohistorical factor in the 
ensuing paradigm choice and use, and thus be the most salient agent
of change.
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The dissatisfaction of internship directors with the preparation 
of clinical psychologist trainees' skills in test administration and 
interpretation was first documented by McCully (1965). The situation 
had changed little when Levitt (1973) repeated the McCully survey.
The trade off between innovation and established practice is a difficult 
choice for training institutions to make and will probably always be 
a source of theory/practice tension.
It does seem clear that academic clinical psychologists, 
particularly younger ones, are more negative about the claimed value 
of psychological tests, particularly projective techniques. It would 
be naive to argue that this attitude is totally shaped by their 
sensitivity to empirical data and that this sensitivity is due to 
their scientific posture - a posture that according to the 'story 
book model' requires an active testing of beliefs, acceptance of 
negative evidence, and a willingness to abandon previously held ideas 
(Merton, 1967; Mitroff, 1974). It would be equally naive and mis­
guided, to accept Rapaport's et al (1968) conjecture that:
"Non-clinical psychologists who saw their own hegemony 
in the science and profession threatened by the far 
greater growth rate of their applied colleagues often 
reacted with suspicion, hostility and rejection. Being 
in positions of power in university departments, they 
put the young clinical faculty members on the defensive, 
to which many reacted by identification with the 
aggressor ..." (p.25)
A more tenable explanation is forthcoming if one:
(a) examines the psychosocial influence operating on the 
clinical psychologist in the university and applied
setting; and
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(b) applies to insights provided by Thomas Kuhn (1970) and
others to an analysis of scientific belief and behaviour.
This will be undertaken in Chapter III. For the present, one can conclude 
that the conjecture that academic psychologists are more negative in 
their attitudes than their professional colleagues can be readily 
corroborated.
(b) Time Devoted to Psychodiagnosis by Clinicians
A cursory examination of published surveys at first suggests 
that practitioners are spending increasingly less time doing diagnostic 
assessment. Garfield and Kurtz (1974) surveyed one third of the 
clinical psychologists who were members of the American Psychological 
Association and found that diagnostic assessment accounted for 
approximately 10 per cent of the profession time. This activity ranked 
fourth among all activities; exceeded only by individual psycho­
therapy (25 per cent), teaching (14 per cent) and administration 
(13 per cent). But although only 10 per cent of the practitioners' 
total time was devoted to assessment this represents 24 per cent of 
the psychologist's direct clinical services. The figures of Garfield 
and Kurtz (1974) are a little below the more recent figures provided 
by Wade and Baker (1977). They surveyed a similar population but 
additionally asked respondents to indicate the amount of time 
devoted to objective and projective testing separately. Interestingly, 
there were no significant differences between the percentage of time 
devoted to administering both. Clinicians report spending 7 per cent 
of their time administering projectives and 7 per cent administering 
objectives, giving a total of 14 per cent spent on diagnostic assess­
ment.
Although comparisons with previous surveys are difficult, the 
recent research cited above is consistent with the prior conclusions 
(see e.g. Thelen, Varble and Johnson, 1968) that diagnostic activities 
have diminished in relative importance fcrr the clinical psychologist 
since the early 50's. The decline evidenced above rather than being 
attributable to general disillusionment with assessment techniques 
may be the result of clinicians devoting extra time to the more 
glamorous and prestigious activity of psychotherapy. In spite of the 
decline in relative importance, assessment activities continue to 
constitute a significant proportion of the psychologists' professional 
labours.
In contrast, Holt's (1967) paper clearly attests to the decline 
in time devoted to assessment by more research oriented clinical 
psychologists. Using the annual A.P.A. conference (Division 12 - 
Clinical Psychology) Holt found that in 1955 63 per cent of the annual 
conference programme was devoted to diagnostic assessment whereas the 
figure had shrunk to 35 per cent by 1965. By 1975 only 7 per cent of the 
A.P.A. conference programme in Division 12 was devoted to psycho­
diagnosis. However, Reynolds and Sundberg (1976) using the number of 
references cited in the bibliography of Büros' 'Mental Measurement 
Yearbook' found that research publications continue at an extraordinary 
rate. For example the Rorschach has had an average of one reference 
every four days for almost fifty years; the M.M.P.I. after 30 years 
has averaged one reference every 2h days.
This high level of research activity, when coupled with the 
significant amount of clinical time devoted to assessment, evidences 
the 'aliveness' of psychodiagnosis, both in the applied setting and 
to a lesser extent, in the university setting.
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(c) On the Decline of Projective Techniques
Allusion has already been made to the marked discrepancy between 
the reliance placed on projective techniques, particularly the 
Rorschach, in many clinical settings and the frequently negative 
attitudes expressed about these procedures by research oriented 
psychologists. It now appears that a discernible shift away from the 
use of projective techniques in clinical settings has taken place 
(Lubin, Wallis and Paine, 1971; Sundberg, 1961). Although their 
data indicates a decline in usage, the Rorschach, the T.A.T., the 
Draw-a-Person, and the House-Tree-Person continue to maintain 
positions of prominence. For example, Brown and McQuire (1976) 
surveyed the use of different kinds of tests and found some shift 
away from projective techniques, but in general the list of the ten 
most used tests had not changed much in the past three decades. As 
indicated above, in the most recently published survey, Wade and Baker 
(1977) found that equal time was given to projective and objective 
techniques.
In the same survey Wade and Baker asked respondent clinicians 
to list the tests they would recommend that clinical students learn. 
Consistent with previous research, projective techniques were 
recommended with higher frequency than objective tests, the Rorschach 
and the T.A.T. being ranked first and second on the list of test 
trainees should master.
From the brief survey of the literature that addresses the question 
of the status of psychodiagnostic assessment it appears that despite 
a marginal decline in the time spent testing, assessment continues to 
be a frequent activity of clinical practitioners. Further, 
projective techniques have maintained their centrality in the clinician
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assessment armamentarium. Far from being dead, reports of the death 
of psychological assessment are grossly exaggerated. The data clearly 
indicates that Directors of intern settings expect trainees to be 
skilled in test administration and interpretation, as do prospective 
employers. This was shown in a study by Levy and Fox (1975) the 
results of which clearly indicated that testing skills are still 
considered a necessary requirement for more than 90 per cent of the 
clinical positions advertised in the A.P.A. Employment Bulletin over 
the calendar year 1971-72. Again 84 per cent of these positions 
required that testing skills include the use of projective techniques.
In sum then, psychodiagnostic assessment is alive and well and 
constitutes a significant aspect of the clinical practitioner's 
professional activity. Has the research demonstrating the doubtful 
aspects of the assessment enterprise been in vain? We know that 
practitioners are fairly cognizant of the evidence which casts 
doubts on the reliability and validity of tests (particularly 
projectives (Wade and Baker, 1977)) and yet they continue to choose to use 
the techniques. Was Bertrand Russell wrong in his assertion that 
there is "...nothing so subversive as a new idea, that neither empire 
nor institution can indefinitely prevail against them?" Certainly 
many of our psychodiagnostic practices have prevailed against an 
onslaught of negative research data.
The crucial objective appears to be not so much to try and convince 
practitioners of the compelling nature of the data but instead to 
furnish them with a viable alternative model of assessment and a set 
of efficacious assessment techniques. A common argument for the 
continued use of traditional psychological tests is that they are the 
only economical and practical diagnostic tools available to the
private clinician and institution. In that sense, their efficacy is 
proven by default. In a different context, but addressing a similar 
problem, Kuhn (1970), has shown that no amount of negative evidence 
will precipitate the downfall of the dominant scientific paradigm 
unless a viable alternative exists and is readily available. This 
conjecture appears to capture the situation vis a vis diagnostic 
assessment.
However, even if a viable alternative did exist (many believe 
the behavioural assessment model does represent such an alternative - 
see e.g. Ciminero et al, 1977; Cone and Hawkins, 1977; Hersen and 
Bellack, 1976) the major obstacle to its introduction in the practical 
arena would be the role expectation for clinical psychologists. The 
nexus between test administration and the professional identity of 
the practising clinical psychologist cannot be over-estimated. The 
importance of this nexus for the rise and current status of psycho­
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diagnosis will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III: ON THE RISE OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT
From the discussion in the first chapter it is apparent that the 
rise and current status of psychodiagnostic procedures is not predi­
cated on empirical data alone, if at all. Authors on each side of 
the dispute (e.g. Breger, 1968; Holt, 1967; Rapaport et al, 1968; 
Rosenwald, 1963) agree that historically the rise of psychodiagnostic 
assessment has been inextricably enmeshed with the emergence of 
clinical psychology as a profession and the concomitant struggle to 
establish professional identity. They point out that clinical 
assessment was a major vehicle for psychologists to gain entry to 
the medically dominated 'mental health' arena.
Regrettably, then as now, assessment was the poor relation to 
psychotherapy. Since it was possible to engage in one of these 
activities to the exclusion of the other and since psychotherapy was 
seen to be the exclusive domain of the psychiatrist, diagnostic 
assessment was 'left' to the psychologist. The reluctance of 
psychiatrists in the late 40's to allow psychologists to function as 
therapists left psychologists to perform the less prestigious auxiliary 
function. The second rate status of this role was probably exacer­
bated by the fact that the clinical psychologists' reports rarely 
influenced psychiatrists'treatment plans (Mintz, 1968; Moore,
Bobbitt and Wildman, 1968). The current ambivalence about diagnostic 
assessment cannot be properly considered independently of the clinical 
psychologists early attempts to repudiate and redefine the depreciated 
role and the historical rivalry between the professions of psychiatry
and psychology (Franks, 1978; Yates, 1970).
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The aim of this chapter is:
(a) to explore further the historically important psychosocial 
influences that set the occasion for and promoted the rise 
and widespread application of psychodiagnostic assessment.
It will be argued that the early attempts by clinical 
psychologists to redefine the depreciated ascribed role 
led to the development of a 'proprietary dogma' (to use a 
George Kelly expression) that spawned an exclusive guild 
based largely on the mystification of testing and scientific 
pretense;
(b) to argue that early clinical psychologists inadvertently 
exploited the ubiquitious dangers inherent in testing and 
measurement, i.e. reifying the variables that the tests 
measure. This resulted in their- participation in an 
elaborate process of 'metaphor-to-myth' transformation 
(Sarbin, 1967). Although once established, myths character­
istically tend to perpetuate themselves, the myths created 
during this period were sponsored and supported by claims
of 'scientific' status; and
(c) to argue that the rise of psychodiagnostic assessment was 
not only characterised by myth generation which was 
reinforced by the false persuasion of scientific pretense, 
but that the associated *psuedoscience' was of a magnitude
to rival the notorious 'Lysenkoism' of Soviet genetics 
and agricultural science of the early 30's. This is a 
serious claim; for this reason Chapters IV and V are
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devoted to examining the accusation that traditional 
psychodiagnostic assessment rests on two important sources 
of pseudoscience; namely, psychometric pseudoscience and 
Freudian pseudoscience.
PSYCHODIAGNOSIS AND THE ROLE OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
The period of triumph for the psychodiagnostic enterprise covered 
the first decade following World War II. It was during this period 
that clinical psychology emerged as an occupational specialisation 
and universities adopted the scientist-professional, or Boulder model 
of training - leading to the PhD in clinical psychology (Rainey, 1950). 
The professional identity of clinical psychology was to a considerable 
extent rooted in assessment procedures that differentiated the 
psychologist from other 'mental health' professionals, notably 
psychiatrists. The centrality of testing in the clinical psychologist's 
professional activities is evidenced by Watson's (1951) description of 
work they customarily performed: mental testing (e.g. the assessment
of intelligence); educational assessment (e.g. backwardness in 
scholastic attainment); personality assessment (particularly by the 
use of projective techniques); diagnostic testing (the differential 
assessment between schizophrenia and hysteria, for example); the 
assessment of intellectual deficits or deterioration of brain damage; 
vocational guidance and selection; psychotherapy and research.
The testing defined a unique domain of professional functioning 
wherein the psychologist was the unquestioned expert. According to 
Cleveland (1976) the clinical trainees' crowning ambition was to 
administer and interpret psychological tests, especially projective 
tests and more particularly the Rorschach. Projective tests and the
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Rorschach above all supposedly provided the ultimate in penetrative 
insights into the person. The Rorschach inkblots were once thought 
(and apparently still are used by some) to constitute a 'royal road 
to the unconscious' eliciting the pattern of internal organisation, 
comparable with X-rays of the person's mind. They were accorded a 
hallowed status (see e.g. Frank, 1939). During this period the 
clinical psychologists report were to case conferences accorded the 
same deference as the pathologist's report in some case conferences, 
however, as we have seen, the reports rarely had an impact on treat­
ment decisions.
Clinical Psychologists as Pseudopsychiatrists
The uncritical adoption of the role of diagnostician, with the 
attendant acceptance of the established tests without questioning the 
purpose of the exercise, when coupled with the need to communicate 
meaningfully with psychiatrists by means of a supposedly common 
language, led to assessment practices in line with the tenets of 
the medical model. Because of this Yates (1970) disparagingly refers 
to the role played by early clinical psychologists as pseudopsychiatrists. 
Be this as it may, the implications for psychodiagnosis of the extra­
polation of the medical model which utilised the model but not its 
content, cannot be overemphasised. The implications of the adoption 
of the intraorganismic or quasi-medical model (Bandura, 1969) for 
psychodiagnostic processes will be fully discussed in a forthcoming 
Chapter (Chapter VI,).
Initially, clinical psychologists used what tests were available 
to them; sometimes without the data to support their decisions.
For example, the configuration analysis of the test data, as practised,
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was not readily amenable to research corroboration, and the 'art' of 
psychological test interpretation overran its scientific verification 
(Ivnik, 1977). As a result of this and similar practices, clinical 
psychologists came perilously close to establishing a guild or 
magicians' union centred on the mystique of testing, particularly the 
use of the Rorschach. According to Albee (1970):
"...what could have been clinical psychologists' most 
mysterious and powerful magic - the Rorschach. Here 
was a procedure that fulfilled most of the criteria 
establishing the power of an independent profession.
The Rorschach belonged to psychology. It had enormous 
face validity and credibility, and it required long 
and arduous supervised training before one could be 
expert in its mysteries and its mystique. Its powers 
were so great that all sorts of controls had to be 
placed around the preparation of those who would be 
using it. Twenty years ago, most of us believed in the 
art of the Rorschach. The public was fascinated by 
the magic we owned. Other professions viewed our magic 
with respect. But along came the hardnosed scientists, 
the measurement people, with their questions about 
reliability and validity, with their split-half 
technique and their demands for public demonstration of 
the value of our magic under strictly controlled conditions. 
As a consequence, the Rorschach is quietly disappearing 
from the professional psychology scene because of our 
professional sensitivity to the claims of science." (p.1075)
Even if Albee was correct in his conjecture that the 'Rorschach' 
is 'quietly disappearing', the attendant mystique of testing persists. 
The widely accepted notion that a psychological test is a device that 
the psychologist carries around with him/her with which s/he gathers 
certain data that are then interpreted in terms of special knowledge, 
remains as a central myth of psychodiagnostic practise.
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The Psychological Alchemy of Assessment
The special mystique of tests is related, at least in a genea­
logical sense, to the techniques of horoscopic astrology and 
physiognomy (McReynolds, 1975), to the divination and fortune telling 
practiced by medieval alchemists (Bersoff, 1973), and to 'the decision 
by ordeal' as sponsored by the medical clergy (Mackay, 1932). It is 
easy to disparage unkindly the assessment technique of our predecessors 
and admire our psychometric sophistication. Today we consider that 
assessment techniques such as physiognomy, astrology and phrenology 
are in principle all totally invalid, although we may condescendingly 
concede that in the hands of insightful, discerning and high-status 
practitioners they may, at least on occasions, have been more 
efficacious than generally given credit for. William James (1890) 
recognised this and, using phrenology as an example, suggested that 
"there seems to be no doubt that phrenology, however little it satisfies 
our scientific curiosity about the function of different parts of the 
brain, may still be, in the hands of intelligent practitioners, a 
useful help in the art of reading character". (p.28)
What will the critics in the future conclude when they look back 
at our times? Will they agree with Bersoff's (1973) conjecture that 
the traditional approach to psychodiagnosis is little more than 
psychological alchemy? Will they endorse Blum's (1978) contention 
that the central ideas in psychological testing are fundamentally 
erroneous and that much of what has been accepted because of its 
apparent scientific 'verification' is little more than psuedoscience? 
Will they be equally condescending and suggest that "in the hands of 
an insightful ... etc."? The illusion of validity and the complex 
reciprocal influences exerted by the examiner and examinee that may
54 .
result in invalid procedures accurately predicting the future will 
be discussed in Chapter VIII with particular reference being made to 
illusory correlates, the 'Barnum effect' and self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Wagar's conjecture that "The ultimate function of 
prophecy is not to tell the future, but to make it" (1963, p.66) 
appears to apply equally to the ultimate function of most psycho­
diagnostic assessment.
Several contemporary critics have already reached their conclusion 
with respect to the 'hallowed' enterprise of intelligence testing. Scott 
(1977) for example, suggested that:
"In 25 years time psychologists will look back on IQ's 
as one of the quaintest beliefs of scientific history - 
like the belief that the earth was flat ... IQ has more 
to do with magical beliefs of primitive people than 
with science ..." (p.15)
and Kantor (1971) concurs, stating that "the concept of 'intelligence' 
was not generated by empirical observations but by theology and 
philosophy", (p.165) As we will see later, the metaphysical 
origin of a concept does not make it intrinsically unscientific. But 
we will also see that psychometricians have been more concerned with 
psychometric aesthetics of intelligence tests than in scientifically 
validating the concept of intelligence.
In sum, it should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that 
the early rivalry between psychologists and psychiatrists and the 
depreciated role ascribed to clinical psychologist created exigencies 
that did not favour the conservative scientific evaluation of their 
professional efficacy. Rather it promoted the uncritical acceptance 
and promotion of assessment instruments that enabled a distinct
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proprietary area of expertise to be established. Face validity, 
credibility and exclusivity appeared to be more important than 
established scientific reliability, validity and utility. Most 
assessment instruments were validated by endorsement.
PSYCHODIAGNOSIS AND MYTH MAKING
The manner in which tests were used and interpreted by early 
clinical psychologists exploited an inherent danger in any system 
of measurement, namely, the danger of reifying the variable that the 
test measures. To reify a concept or function is 'to give it a name 
and presently to consider that the name represents a thing, and 
finally to believe that the thing so named somehow explains the 
performance of the function'(Hull, 1943, p.28). In effect Thorndike's 
dictum that if something exists it can be measured was easily and 
illegitimately transformed to read that if a measure is taken, some­
thing exists. With reference to intelligence testing this tendency 
was identified early by the vocal antagonist of testing, Lippmann:
"Because the results are expressed in numbers, it 
is easy to make the mistake of thinking that the 
intelligence test is a measure like a foot rule or 
a pair of scales ... But intelligence is not an 
abstraction like length and weight: it is an
exceedingly complicated notion which nobody has 
yet succeeded in defining ... If the impression 
takes root that these tests really measure intelligence, 
that they constitute a sort of last judgement on the 
child's capacity, that they reveal scientifically his 
predetermined ability, then it would be a thousand 
times better if all the intelligence testers and all 
their questionnaires were sunk without warning in the 
Sargasso Sea." (Lippmann, 1922, 1976)
Another important aspect of the myth making process is the 
propensity of many psychologists to assume the validity of the concept 
under study, while setting out to demonstrate it. That is, rather
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than asking first, whether mental illness or schizophrenia, or 
intelligence is a meaningful or real entity, many psychologists ask 
instead: 'How can we demonstrate that the mentally ill/schizophrenic/
retardates are different from normals?" An illicit conclusion, 
therefore, is entertained (that mental illness/schizophrenia/ 
retardation exists) before it has been adequately defined or empirically 
demonstrated.
Psychological Myth Making
Skinner (1953) and Sarbin (1967) describe the process that allows 
the professional as well as laypersons to accept the realness of some­
thing for which there may be no referent. This phenomenon is 
particularly common with respect to psychological 'characteristics' 
as Skinner (1953) has pointed out:
"Trait names visually begin as adjectives - 'intelligent', 
'aggressive', 'disorganised', 'angry', 'introverted' and 
so on, but the almost inevitable linguistic result is 
that adjectives give birth to nouns. The things to which 
these nouns refer are then taken to be the active cause 
of the aspects. We begin with "intelligent behaviour", 
pass first to "behaviour which shows intelligence" and 
then to "behaviour which is the effect of intelligence"
... but at no point in such a series do we make contact 
with an event outside of the behaviour itself which 
justifies the claim of a causal connection." (p.202)
Psychologists in general and test makers in particular show a 
strong proclivity to give names or labels to the variables on which 
their instruments yield scores. The result is a plethora of 
psychological concepts afforded the mantle of reality. Even such well 
accepted concepts as "intelligence", "adjustment" and "anxiety" have 
been given, through the medium of psychological tests, a much stronger 
aura of fundamentally than they merit (MeReynolds, 1971) . Thus, 
despite the widespread lack of agreement on the meaning of concepts
like "mental retardation", "mental illness", "schizophrenia", etc. 
the myth created represents an almost universally shared conception 
about the nature of mental illness, etc.
Myths, being widely held beliefs that are not true (i.e. readily 
falsified) are major factors behind the inefficiency of therapy, break­
down of communication, and failure to cope with many modern problems 
in humane and efficacious ways. In psychological thinking and 
practice, they create a continuous barrier to innovation and change.
In clinical psychology, the early adoption of the role of diagnostician 
and the struggle by psychologists to differentiate and legitimate 
their professional identity led to the continuance of the myth making 
and psychological alchemy of our ancestors (Bersoff, 1973; McReynolds, 
1975a). Test constructors and administrators apparently forgot their 
historical antecedents and became more concerned with things like 
psychometric aesthetics. This concern often resulted in the neglect 
of validity. They were convinced by statistical norms and charts, by 
the statistical sophistication of their procedures that their tests 
were the instruments of intrapsychic detective work. By optimistically 
assuming the validity of the concept being measured they unwittingly 
facilitated the process of "metaphor-to-myth" transformation (Sarbin, 
1967).
It should be restated that the test constructors never directly 
observe a measure intelligence, introversion or schizophrenia, or for 
that matter, intelligent behaviour, introverted behaviour or schizo­
phrenic behaviour. The terms are simply metaphors chosen to connote 
certain assumed qualities of putative, invisible mental processes.
More specifically, they infer that behaviour appears "as if" it were 
intelligent, introverted or schizophrenic. Too often, Sarbin (1967) 
suggests, the "as if" condition is forgotten and we are left with
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intelligent behaviour etc. As a consequence, intelligence, intro­
version or schizophrenia become accepted as concrete intrapsychic 
states instead of the metaphors that they are.
It is at this point that Sarbin (1967) would say that the concept 
has progressed through a "metaphor-to-myth" transformation. This 
cognitive strategy takes the following form:
"Every metaphor contains a wealth of connotations, 
each connotation has the potential for manifold 
implications, and each implication is a directive 
to action. While metaphors are ordinarily used by 
people to facilitate communication, the peril is 
always at hand that people may be used by metaphors 
(Turbayne, 1960). Such a peril is actuated when the 
user of a metaphor ignores, forgets, or purposely 
drops syntactical modifiers, such as "as if", that 
denote the metaphor, and instead employs the word 
in literal fashion. To say "Jones is a saint" 
carries one set of implications, if we supply the 
tacit modifier ("it is as if Jones is a saint"), the 
sentence carries a radically different set of 
implications if the predicate is treated as literal. 
The effects of permanently ignoring the metaphoric 
property of a word, that is, of dropping the expressed 
or tacit modifiers, is to hypostatize an entity.
Such hypostatization sets the stage for myth-making." 
(Sarbin, 1967, p.447)
Every generation has been victim of its own myths. When people 
believed that the liver was the primary "mental" organ (somewhat in 
the way that we think of the brain), hepatoscopy was patently sensible. 
When they believed that behavioural anomalies were external manifes­
tations of evil spirit possession then the treatment was directed 
accordingly toward exorcising demons. All systems of assessment and 
treatment, be they astrological horoscopy or Rorschach interpretation, 
exorcism or psychoanalysis, imply an underlying theory of personality 
or model of causality. The methods of assessing and modifying
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psychological phenomena therefore cannot be understood independently 
of the personality theory upon which they are based and which provide 
a supportive rationale for professional behaviour.
The pervading, and now classical assessment model-represented 
in the works of Galton (1907), Cattell (1890), Kelley (1923), Hull 
(1928) and Gulliksen (1950) - conceptualises the assessment procedure 
as a üieasuring enterprise and stresses the importance of accuracy of 
measurement. Essentially the aim of this approach is to measure a 
given attribute - intelligence, anxiety, introversion, and the like - 
of given individuals. Assessment consists in the main, of either:
(a) assigning the individual to given categories, or
(b) placing individuals at a specific point on a continuum.
Naturally, psychologists choose to measure attributes that they suspect 
will help them to understand and predict 'important' behaviour.
It is not surprising that by far the most significant class of 
individual differences addressed by developers of assessment scales, 
inventories and procedures includes those traits and characteristics 
which purportedly distinguish the better "adjusted" members of our 
society from their "neurotic", psychotic, "mentally retarded", or 
"criminal" neighbour (Goldberg, 1971). The pressure on psychologists 
to devise indicators of "mental illness", "mental retardation" or 
potential emotional breakdown came not only directly from the military 
and industrial organisations (see e.g. Watson, 1978) but indirectly 
from the growing "medicalisation" of deviance in Western societies.
In this therapeutic-meliorist view of society and social deviance, 
the "mentally ill/retarded" (i.e. social deviants) form a special class 
of 'victims' who must, both for their own good and for the interests
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of the community, be 'helped' - coercively and against their will, 
if necessary - by the healthy, and especially by 'scientifically' 
qualified 'helpers'. Thus the assessment focus was upon the 
individual as the entity to be diagnosed, studied and treated. 
Dysfunctional mental behaviour of individuals was to be observed, 
diagnosed, and categorised according to a classificatory system that 
was assumed to be descriptive of specific behaviour and prescriptive 
of a course of "treatment".
Invariably the resultant assessment practices and instruments 
ignored the individual-situation dialectic and socioeconomic factors, 
and focused almost exclusively upon uncovering the intraorganismic 
determinant of the problematic behaviour. The bulk of assessment 
research stemmed from this "essence" concept of personality or 
causality. That is, the idea that individuals have an essence, a soul, 
or a personality which stands behind actions and motivates them 
(Bakker, 1975). Thus assessment was in fact the search for one or 
other of the host of inimical psychodynamic forces, for example, 
energising tracts, prepotent needs, repressed wishes, latent tendencies, 
unresolved conflicts, etc. that purportedly cause misbehaviour. For 
according to the quasi-medical model, these hypothetical internal 
agents underlie "mental illness" and the deviant or maladjusted 
behaviour is construed as a symptom. Psychological "diseases", while 
not considered to be necessarily real entities, function analogously 
to the systematic and traumatic disorders in the medical model adopted 
by modern medicine (Buss, 1966; Clare, 1976). Assessment and 
treatment to be other than superficial and dangerous, must focus on 
the underlying psychic states or traits. Traditionally, the focus 
has been on identifying disorders and 'symptom' patterns that go 
together, along the lines practised in medicine (Draguns and
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Phillips, 1971) . Once the disorders were clearly described, it was 
assumed that their etiology would be apparent.
Since the turn of this century the dominant conceptions of the 
nature, cause and treatment of mental illness have been products of 
this quasi-medical framework. From the perspective of this model, 
mental illness is something that a person has, like cancer or heart 
disease. A person with mental illness exhibits peculiar, unusual, 
or problematic behaviour which is related to some underlying causes 
that reside in the human organism. The language and concepts of the 
quasi-medical model are unmistakably analogous to that of physical 
medicine, a fact which significantly influences the manner in which 
those afflicted with "mental disease" are "treated". Here lies the 
conceptual foundation and accompanying rhetoric for the establishment 
of the myth of mental illness (Foucault, 1965; Sarbin, 1967; Scheff, 
1966; Spanos, 1978; Szasz, 1960).
The basic assumptions operative have been that the deviant 
individuals, because of their illness, are impaired or defective and 
thus ineffectual or incapable of exercising options. This assumption 
has led inevitably to an institutional device (the mental hospital) 
to provide compensatory help to inflicted persons. Once the deviant 
is hospitalised, this assumption has further dictated a set of 
practices within the institution that have become the subject of much 
recent criticism because of their authoritarianism (Holzberg, 1960) , 
degradation (Sarbin, 1967), dehumanisation (Goffman, 1961) and illness- 
maintenance (Schwartz, 1960). The construct of "mental-illness" is 
not only a "myth" but, because of its intrinsic assumptions, is a 
vehicle for the devaluing of the humanness of those so labelled 
(Laing, 1967; Mitchell, 1973). It may thus facilitate the social
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sanitation process and reinforces the normative structure by 
demonstrating to other participants in the system the negative 
consequences of ignoring the normative boundaries (an obvious 
example of the 'social sanitation process' will be given in Chapter 
IVwith respect to the sterilisation of the "mental retarded") However 
the process is generally more covert and pervasive and not readily 
identified for what it is. The confusion of 'cure' with 'control' 
will be discussed further in Chapter VI.
PSYCHODIAGNOSIS AND PSEUDOSCIENCE
Test developers and administrators alike, failed to exercise an 
appropriate degree of conservatism in the evaluation of their 
evidence: caution and tentativeness (hallmarks of legitimate science)
gave way to confidence, proselytism and false persuasion by 
scientific pretence (Braginsky and Braginsky, 1974; Blum, 1978).
When one examines the history of psychometrics and psychological 
assessment one finds a succession of recognised leading scientists 
(e.g. Burt, 1948; Eysenck, 1971; Galton, 1907; Goddard, 1913; 
Jensen, 1969; Terman, 1916) boldly professing to having empirical 
verification for their ideas. Upon close inspection however, it turns 
out that the supporting evidence and argumentation contain errors, 
ambiguities and untenable implicit assumptions of such magnitude that 
no claims of scientific confirmation could possibly be warranted. Thus 
much of the persuasion of the psychometric/assessment movement was 
effected by establishing a pretence of scientific discovery and data.
As Braginsky and Braginsky (1974) have indicated "In the scientific 
enterprise idolatry may be transformed into 'methodolatry', the worship 
of methods, 'quartopheria', 'testomania' and 'the bribe', publications 
of results leading to promotion, prestige, and so on." (1974, p.29)
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With respect to psychological assessment this description appears 
apt (as will be shown in Chapter IV). However, this is not to suggest 
a conspiratorial plot, no doubt the proposers were, for the most 
part, sincere and believed their work to be genuinely 'scientific' 
but unfortunately were working within a 'defective' paradigm.
In making the claim that 'the period of triumph' and before was 
a period of myth-making and psuedoscience we should not harbour 
illusions about the nature and limits of science. Certainly we 
should remain sensitive to George Orwell's (1946) warning that 
science is a word used in variable ways and in most cases more or less 
dishonestly. The authority and high esteem accorded to science, 
should be analysed and the 'story book' model of science (see e.g.
Barber, 1961; Merton, 1969; Mitroff, 1974) be rejected outright. 
Briefly, the story book model contends that:
(a) scientific knowledge is proven knowledge;
(b) scientific theories are rigorously derived from 
the facts; and
(c) scientific facts are based on what scientists see, 
hear, and touch etc. and are essentially value free 
and neutral.
Such a view is not only seriously mistaken (Mahoney, 1976; Weimer, 1976) 
but is not the way of science (Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos and Musgrove, 1970) 
and serves a politically conservative function (Andreski, 1972; Rose 
and Rose, 1971) . The human element in science makes all science an 
inevitably fallible endeavour (Mahoney, 1976; Mitroff, 1974).
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What is Science? >
To even begin to explore the question of 'what is science?' 
as Ziman (1968) points out: "is almost as presumptuous as to try
to state the meaning of life itself. The question has long been 
debated. Famous books have been devoted to it. It has been the 
theme of whole schools of philosophy. To give an account of all 
the answers with all the variations, would require a history of 
western thought. It is a daunting subject." (p.1-2) Notwithstanding 
Ziman's warning, it is important that we hold a tenable concept of 
what science is if we are to seriously evaluate the charges of 
pseudoscience directed at psychodiagnostic assessment. However, this 
is not an easy task and unfortunately only the briefest of discussions is 
possible here. It is worth noting that even the recent emergence of 
several philosophers of science of great stature (e.g. Bartley, 1962; 
Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959, 1963, 1972) has not led 
to a resolution of the 'demarcation issue'. That is, at this point in 
time no acceptable criterion has been established for the demarcation 
of science from non-science. Attempts to set science apart from non­
science have been numerous and unanimously unsuccessful (Chalmers,
1976; Lakatos and Musgrove, 1970; Weimer, 1976). For example, in 
the early 30's the principle of verification had hardly been proposed 
(see e.g. Ayer, 1946; Carnap, 1939) before its inadequacies were 
recognised. Sir Karl Popper, who did so much to highlight the short­
comings of the verification criterion, proposed the notion of 'testa­
bility' as the salient demarcation criterion (Popper, 1959). For 
Popper the essential aspect of testability is the possibility of 
falsification. Counterintuitive as it may seem, negative results and
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predictive failures have far-reaching logical implications, and 
positive results (successful prediction) have comparatively little 
information content. This is contrary to the popular practice of 
selectively publishing positive result manuscripts and emphasising 
these successes far more heavily in literature reviews (Meehl, 1967).
The epistemological costs of this practice are themselves quite 
distressing (cf. Mahoney, 1977; Smart, 1964). Unfortunately, although 
the logic of falsification is very different from that of verification 
and Popper's philosophy has much intuitive and logical appeal, falsif­
ication as we shall see later (i.e. Chapter 4) also contains critical 
flaws (Chalmers, 1976; Latatos and Musgrove, 1970; Weimer, 1979).
A rather dramatically different approach to the demarcation issue is 
provided by the internationally reputed, epistemological anarchist 
Paul Feyerabend (1970). Feyerabend takes an iconoclastic stance by 
insisting, "when the mood takes him", that there is in fact nothing 
special about science and that it should be seen as one ideology or 
religion among many. That is, science is not intrinsically different 
from religion and,according to Feyerabend,has a hold over modern 
people, akin to the hold that Christianity had over earlier Western 
societies. Similarly, Barnes (1973, 1977) who takes Kuhn's (1970) 
ideas to their logical conclusion also claims that there are no 
independent criteria for distinguishing scientific beliefs from other 
belief systems. Scientific knowledge according to Barnes is nothing 
more than beliefs accepted by the scientific community and their 
acceptance does not necessarily make them 'correct' beliefs. This 
close relationship between religion and science has been identified 
by many writers (e.g. Bakan, 1967; Braginsky and Braginsky, 1973,
Myrdul, 1969). Similarly, the close relationship between the role
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played by religious leaders in days gone by, and that played by 
'scientific' psychiatrists and psychologists in contemporary society 
has been noted by Thomas Szasz (1971) and others (Foucault, 1973; 
Leifer, 1971). According to the Braginsky's:
"The priests' and rabbis' functions have largely been 
taken over by therapists, and those of the new prophets 
and latter-day saints by the researchers and theorists 
in psychology ... It is no accident, then, that 
psychology has flourished in these countries that abandoned 
either a national church or God, especially in times of 
social and political chaos ... Thus, psychology moved 
into the vacuum created by the absence of a religious 
institution that could be counted upon to effectively foster 
the interests of the state. Even in countries with a 
national church, historical accounts (see Foucault, 1965, 
Sarbin 1967, Merton, 1967) show that as the church weak­
ened in its usefulness, the science of psychology and 
its ideological ally, psychiatry, gained in strength"
(1973, p .30)
If it is difficult to erect even a single criterion for demarcating 
science from non-science, then obviously it is equally difficult to 
specify what constitutes legitimate scientific research which happens 
to have flaws, and research so deeply flawed that it becomes tainted 
by pseudoscience. The recent controversy surrounding the work of 
Sir Cyril Burt attests to this difficulty (see Eysenck, 1977; Gillie, 
1978; Jensen, 1974; Kamin, 1974).
Scholars in nearly every field of endeavour (e.g. Kuhn, 1970 
Myrdal, 1969; Polanyi, 1958) have begun to appreciate the role of 
the investigator's values, goals and beliefs as well as his/her 
creativity, in the acquisition of knowledge. We now know that 
perception does not mirror the external world or in Hanson's (1958) 
words "There is more to seeing than meets the eye ball" (p.7). 
Perception is necessarily an interpretation based on sensory
information. Thus, there is no such thing as an ultimate sense datum.
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Physical perception of the world is contingent: it depends on
experience and context. An excellent example of this is provided 
by Michael Polanyi's description of the changes in a medical student's 
perceptual experience when s/he is taught to make a diagnosis by 
inspecting an x-ray picture.
"Think of a medical student attending a course in the 
x-ray diagnosis of pulmonary diseases. He watches, in 
a darkened room, shadowy traces on a fluorescent screen 
placed against a patient's chest, and hears the radiol­
ogist commenting to his assistants, in technical language, 
on the significant features of these shadows. At first, 
the student is completely puzzled. For he can see in 
the x-ray picture of a chest only the shadows of the heart 
and ribs, with a few spidery blotches between them. The 
experts seem to be romancing about figments of their 
imagination; he can see nothing that they are talking 
about. Then, as he goes on listening for a few weeks, 
looking carefully at ever-new pictures of different 
cases, a tentative understanding will dawn on him; he 
will gradually forget about the ribs and begin to see 
the lungs. And eventually, if he perseveres intelligently, 
a rich panorama of significant details will be revealed to 
him: of physiological variations and pathological changes,
of scars, of chronic infections and signs of acute disease. 
He has entered a new world. He still sees only a fraction 
of what the experts can see, but the pictures are definitely 
making sense now and so do most of the comments made on 
them." (Polanyi, 1958; p.85)
It is now widely acknowledged that all scientific theorising 
and research is predicated on a pTZoriassumption and, contrary to 
the popular adage in introductory psychology text books, our theories 
generate rather than reflect our data. That is, theories determine 
data, not visa versa: Indeed there would be no data without prior
theoretical specification of what, in the flux of experience, 
constitutes significant observation. Facts, far from being the data 
upon which theories rest, are end products of theories (see Popper, 
1959; Weimer, 1979). That experience is saturated with theory raises 
questions about Sir Francis Bacon's recommendation that "if you want
to understand nature - look at nature, not at the works of Aristotle".
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The dependence of perception on experience and context applies by 
analogy most directly to questions of the stability of scientific 
facts, data and evidence. Scientific facts are not independent of 
the interpretative schema by which they are apprehended. The status, 
implications and significance of a scientific fact may change dramat­
ically when it is interpreted from a different viewpoint. Therefore 
the existence of a scientific fact necessarily implies a theoretical 
orientation; the difference between fact and theory is one of degree 
rather than of kind (Martin, 1979).
What is Pseudoscience?
Since all science is imbued with values and can be understood in 
its particular sociopolitical context, the label 'pseudoscience' 
becomes pertinent only when the biases displayed by scientists reach 
such extraordinary proportions that their relentless pursuit of 
verification leads to the commitment of major errors of reasoning 
and distortion of the consensually validated data. Paradoxicallyf 
assertions that the truth value of a proposition or hypothesis has 
been strengthened, proven or otherwise augmented by research is 
unfortunate and misleading since no empirical hypothesis can ever be 
scientifically confirmed (Mahoney, 1976; Weimer, 1976).
Sir Karl Popper has noted this for years, and yet scientists 
persist in their claim of confirmation (cf. Popper, 1959, 1963, 1972) 
rather than claiming corroboration (loosely speaking, corroboration 
refers to the act of having survived our most energetic and stringent 
attempts at falsification). This claim of empirical verification, 
proof or truth should be rejected on logical grounds and we should be
wary of 'scientists' who make such claims.
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Tautological fallacies, refusal to consider obvious alternatives, 
untestable assertions, and absolutistic and unconditional claims may be 
other hallmarks of pseudoscience. In contrast, philosophers of science 
suggest we should show considerable tolerance of statements conveying 
relativity and tentativeness, and that we should proceed with humility 
about our understanding of what it is that constitutes 'good scientific 
research'. Thus although we may acknowledge the difficulty of 
demarcation and the intrinsic fallibility of science, Gardner (1957) 
argues that the concept of pseudoscience remains useful. Writing in 
the defence of the concept Gardner states that "The fact that black 
shades into white through many shades of grey does not mean that the 
distinction between black and white is difficult" (1957, p.7). But 
as with the concepts of black and white, an understanding of what is 
science is culturally specific and, probably more importantly, today's 
science may well be tomorrow's alchemy (Mahoney, 1979).
A precise definition of pseudoscience is difficult because there 
are no clear criteria for demarcating between 'actual' pseudoscience 
and normal cases of fallibility by scientists. However 'pseudoscience' 
may be characterised as "a sustained process of false persuasion 
transacted by simulation or distortion of scientific inquiry and 
hypothesis testing" (Blum, 197 , p.145). According to Blum there are 
four parts to the definition:
1. essentially incorrect results are generated;
2. these are successfully and persuasively disseminated 
to a substantial audience;
3. dissemination occurs by a process of convincing the 
audience that results are bona fide scientific
conclusions; and
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4. the normal processes of error correction in science 
are retarded or prevented from functioning, so that 
the incorrect (readily falsifiable) beliefs generated 
are sustained over time.
If a precise definition of pseudoscience is difficult because 
there is no sharp dividing line between actual 'pseudoscience' and 
'science' that is unfortunately and unintentionally flawed, cases 
that are sufficiently flagrant are apparently readily discriminable.
Most identified instances of pseudoscience could be called 'petit'
(Blum, 1978) in that the independent originators who profess eccentric 
theories do so without the benefit of significant institutional 
support. Proponents usually work in almost total isolation from 
their colleagues and are excluded from the scientific journals and 
societies which define them as quacks and cranks. A number of instances 
of this type are described in Martin Gardner's 'Fads and Fallacies 
in the Name of Science' (1957) and MacDougall's Hoaxes (1968). Although 
some practitioners of 'petit' pseudoscience have built up substantial 
cults, aside from their followers they are held in disrepute by the 
•scientific establishment'. The contemporary state of psychotherapy 
seems replete with petit pseudoscience (Frank, 1973; Fish, 1974).
Frank (1973) has provided an absorbing account of the common ground 
between faith healing, persuasion and so-called scientific psychotherapy.
Generally considered to be far more unusual, but perhaps more 
significant, is 'grand' pseudoscience (Blum, 1978). Here the domain 
of interest, rather than being clearly limited to a band of devotees, 
may stretch to an entire nation or group of nations, and the false 
beliefs are openly professed as valid science by respected authorities.
If asked to point to an instance of pseudoscience on a grand scale no
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doubt most Western Scientists would point to the dominance of 
Michuririst biology and the neo-Lamarckian genetics that dominated 
genetics and agricultural science in the Soviet Union in the early 
30's. Referred to as Lysenkoism, this belief system was held to be 
sacrosanct for three decades. The chief results of Lysenkoism have 
bee-'- an acceptance of neo-Lamarckian theory which posits the 
inheritance of acquired adaptive characteristics; persistent faith 
in a variety of bogus agricultural remedies; and a belief in the 
transformation of species. The compatibility of Lysenko's brand of 
genetics and Soviet political ideology need not be emphasised.
In the light of the earlier discussion of the role of the 
scientist's values, goals and beliefs in the acquisition of knowledge 
(e.g. Kuhn, 1970; Myrdal, 1969; Polanyi, 1958) it would be the 
height of naivety to think that 'grand' pseudoscience is not some­
thing found in 'free democratic' societies. In a paper entitled 
'The Lysenko Syndrome in Western Social Science' Alex Carey (1977) 
argues that in fact this is demonstrably the case in both the natural 
and social sciences. Carey (1977) systematically demonstrates that 
several of our most cited 'classical' studies (e.g. the Hawthorne 
studies, Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; The Leadership Style 
Study, Lewin Lippitt and White, 1938; The Democratic Consultation 
Study, Coch and French, 1948) are so methodologically flawed as to 
render them uninterpretable and scientifically worthless. The 
popularity of these studies has more to do with the comfortable 
compatibility of their findings with the dominant cultural ideology 
(i.e. free enterprise capitalism) than with their research worth.
Carey points out that pseudoscience is most likely to develop 
in areas of pressing human concern where traditional and powerful 
institutions have explicit interest in maintaining the status quo:
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For it is here that the possibility of offending against power and 
authority creates a special climate and set of contingencies that 
makes independent research difficult. When faced with the imminent 
prospects of clashing with powerful institutions and orthodoxy,
Carey suggests, many sound scientists opt to work within the dominant 
ideology. Working with the implicit assumption that the broad lines 
of the status quo are sacrosanctmany social scientists abdicate
their subversive role (i.e. creatively inventing and empirically 
tcst-ing new ideas) and become what Baritz (1958) refers to as a 
'servant of power' - thus serving a politically conservative function 
by helping people adjust to the current social milieu.
Although Carey's (1977) catalogue of grand pseudoscience is not 
meant to be all inclusive, he fails to identify two important areas 
of pseudoscience that are of concern to us here. Recall Bersoff's 
answer to the question of who is to be held accountable for the 
psychological alchemy of assessment: '... the answer is two brands
of "psychos", psychoanalysts and psychometricians. Psychoanalysts 
are to blame because they have perpetuated a fraudulent (Freudulent?) 
theory of personality and have perpetuated its myth. Psychometrists, 
the test constructors, are to blame because they have ... become overly 
concerned with psychometric aesthetics to the neglect of validity'
(1973, p.892). In the next two chapters Bersoff's accusation will be 
evaluated in detail. In Chapter IV it will be argued that the 
'scientific' testing movement operated within a fundamentally defective 
paradigm. The inevitable result was the generation of pseudoscience - 
in this case on a grand scale since much of the resultant research 
performed an important ideological service to the 'ruling elite' and 
thus won their patronage. It will be asserted that the psychometric 
'intelligentsia'participated in pseudoscience on a scale that rivals
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the notorious Lysenko affair of Soviet biology. Subsequently, 
in Chapter V it will be argued that Freudian theories also constitute 
an example of grand pseudoscience. Although, as a thinker and therapist 
Freud made an indelible impact on the minds’of twentieth century 
people, it will be shown that pretence to science was a major 
contributing influence in the popular acceptance of his doctrine.
The process of false persuasion by scientific pretence constitutes 
sufficient ground for labelling Freud's theories examples of grand
pseudoscience.
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CHAPTER IV: PSYCHOLOGICAL ALCHEMY - PSYCHOMETRIC PSEUDOSCIENCE
Earlier it was pointed out that empirical science, being the 
systematic invention and testing of new ideas, ought to be incorrigibly 
subversive (Carey, 1972; Russell, 1953). Certainly the revolutions 
sparked off by Corpernicus and Darwin attest to this characteristic 
of science. However, when it comes to the social sciences Carey (1977) 
for one, is skeptical about the fulfilment of this function. He 
claims the 'social scientists in the West (and also in Russia, for 
that matter) are, in fact, under very effective ideological control'
(p.28). According to Carey (1972, 1977) and others (see e.g. Andreski, 
1972; Mahoney, 1976; Rose and Rose, 1972; Winkler, 1975) the 
continually present possibility of asking questions that may offend 
against power and privilege creates a special environment around the 
social scientist that is not generally present for natural scientists.
This environment encourages and reinforces role abdication.
Carey (1972) suggests that the risk of asking offensive/subversive 
questions is actively minimised by scientists adopting one of the 
following two strategies:
1. By confining their research interests to topics so 
remote, minute and esoteric that the possibility of 
results conflicting with the interests of powerful 
groups is effectively removed;
2. Or, by studying questions of social significance 
but from a vantage point which assumes, at least 
tacitly, that the broadlines of the existing order
are given and sacrosanct.
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If the second option is adopted, rather than becoming a potential 
subversive, the scientist becomes a 'trouble shooter' for the 
interests of orthodoxy; 'plumbers to the system' (Baritz, I960;
Whyte, 1956) or in the Braginsky's terms ''high priests of the 
ruling class' (Braginsky and Braginsky, 1973). Too close identif­
ication with the status quo presents relevant, penetrating questions 
from being asked and produces results that fit comfortably with the 
interests of the power elite (Andreski, 1972; Braginsky and Braginsky, 
1974; Carey, 1972; Kaplan, 1964; Young, 1971, 1973).
In all societies, there are persons - Mannheim calls them the
'intelligentsia'- who take the status quo for granted and who provide
/
the ideology which is the interpretation of the world from the 
perspective of the politically dominant groups. If the dominance 
of the elite groups in society is unchallenged, the intelligentsia 
producing 'knowledge' for those powerful groups enjoying complete 
control in moulding the society's world view. When a uniformity of 
viewpoint bounds intellectual discussions, there is a tendency for 
intellectual controversies to become increasingly 'scholastic' and 
esoteric - arising from the need for 'systematisation' of the belief 
system of the intelligentsia. (Mannheim, 1936, p.ll) With respect 
to the 'scientific' testing movement Mannheim's observation seems 
apt. Up until twenty years ago a uniformity of viewpoint predominated 
and the literature evidenced scholasticism and a focus on statistical 
sophistication at the expense of addressing fundamental issues, such 
as the validity of the concept of 'general intelligence'. For example 
Eysenck describes those who challenge the 'genetic' explanation of IQ 
differences as being ignorant "alike of psychometric techniques of 
intelligence testing and biometric techniques of genetic analysis"
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and finds it unreasonable to "discuss the problem or write about it, 
when one cannot tell the difference between epistasis and meiotosis, 
reduce a Hessenberg matrix, or determine an Eigen-value" (Eysenck,
1972, p.6).
As we have seen in Chapter III, scientific knowledge incorporates 
values (Feyerabend, 1975; Young, 1971), and hence, is always 
selectively useful to certain groups (Martin, 1979). Attempts to 
develop value-free scientific knowledge are not only misguided, but 
results in the obscuring or ignoring of the values implicit in the 
knowledge. Rather than argue for, or strive to develop, value-free 
science the object should be to develop and promote scientific 
knowledge that incorporates preferred values, values which serve to 
promote desirable social and political structures. The natural 
science epistemology adopted by the 'scientific' testing movement 
obscured this important feature of science. Being portrayed as 
essentially ahistorical and acontextual this natural science paradigm 
(see Sampson, 1978) purportedly was used to describe the way things 
really 'were'.
Although all scientific knowledge is ostensibly concerned with 
the way things 'are' or could be, as opposed to the way they 'ought 
to beMartin (1979) contends that "...to say something is_ is to say 
it ought to be" (p.79). In other words, every scientific and 
pseudoscientific statement is implicitly an imperative. That this 
is the case in the research literature on intelligence and intelligence 
testing will be evidenced in this chapter.
More specifically, this chapter is devoted to exploring the 
questions asked by the 'scientific' testing movement, particularly 
with respect to intelligence testing, and to supporting the
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conjecture that the world view or paradigm within which the research 
was conducted, and which sanctioned the answers produced, was 
seriously defective. The result of adopting a defective paradigm 
it will be argued, is the inevitable generation of what we have 
labelled pseudoscience. This is the case because the central problems 
initially specified are themselves unsolvable given the available 
methods for seeking a solution. It will be shown that the history of 
intelligence testing is largely a chronicle of 'pseudoscience', with 
both defective arguments and false conclusions becoming institution­
alised. Although worthless as 'science', much of the resultant 
research did perform an important ideological service to the ruling 
elite. It will be argued that the psychometric intelligentsia 
participated in 'Lysenkoism' on a grand scale.
PSYCHOMETRIC PSEUDOSCIENCE
Every mature scientific field has an accepted paradigm - a 
consensually agreed upon modus opevandi, that specifies certain 
questions as worthy of study and suggests methods of investigation 
which can lead to appropriate answers (Kuhn, 1970). Most scientific 
research does not attempt to challenge those basic assumptions under­
lying the speciality or discipline, but works within the assumptions, 
elaborating the paradigm to cover more detailed and more diverse 
evidence. Within any paradigm there will inevitably be a certain 
amount of evidence apparently incompatible with, or unexplained by, 
the paradigm. These anomalies do not cause the paradigm to be 
rejected and superseded immediately. Rather they usually stimulate 
more detailed research. At other times, they are assumed to be 
incorrect or irrelevant and are therefore ignored (Kuhn, 1970).
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It was argued earlier that scientific knowledge is never unique, that 
there is always a large number of ways of explaining any feature of 
reality. The actual way of explaining reality that is chosen by a 
person or group will be suited more for some purposes and less for 
others. Thus all scientific paradigms are necessarily limited, but 
additionally they may be defective. That is, they specify questions 
without having available methods for scientifically validating the 
answers generated. Defective paradigms differ from superseded ones 
in that they never give rise to important scientific discoveries in 
their central area of concern. The superseded paradigm, while no 
longer seen as correct, at least at one time directed scientists to 
the solution of problems they viewed as important. Generally a 
superseded paradigm does not give rise to what would be labelled 
pseudoscience. In contrast, a defective paradigm is almost certain 
to generate pseudoscience because, to recapitulate, the central 
problems initially specified are themselves unsolvable given the 
available methods for seeking a solution. Consequently, the answers 
obtained are inherently suspect. When a defective paradigm is 
adopted by a community of scientists, individuals who subscribe to it 
continually face the dilemma of whether to admit failure and abandon 
the paradigm, or to bend the rules and adopt means normally 
prohibited in scientific inquiry. The more cautious scientists in 
this situation do not become eminent because they fail to provide 
solutions to the problems regarded as central. It was pointed out in 
the last chapter that many eminent spokespersons for the scientific 
testing movement boldly professed to having empirical verification
for the ideas.
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It is the contention of the author that the psychometric 
enterprise that has been directed at measuring differences between 
mental abilities, culminating in the widespread use of intelligence 
tests, is based on a seriously defective paradigm. Thus the leading 
scientific spokespersons for this enterprise have been in the business 
of promulgating a number of false solutions to major theoretical 
problems. Although their work has been criticised early in the piece 
(Haldare, 1938; Lippmann, 1976; Simon, 1953), social conditions were 
sufficiently auspicious for them to retain important academic posts, 
attract expensive funding and recruit a sizeable number of disciples, 
assistants and successors to maintain the paradigm. (These assertions 
will be supported below). Their work, while almost worthless as science, 
did perform important ideological services for the ruling elite, and 
this was sufficient to ensure the field's survival and growth 
(Henderson, 1976; Karier, 1972; Simon, 19.71).
Intelligence Testing
Contemporary pseudoscience in psychometrics (e.g. Eysenck, 1971; 
Herrnstein, 1971; Jensen, 1972; Shockley, 1972) can only be fully 
understood by examining the historical development of our understanding 
and attempts to measure mental ability - specifically intelligence. 
Intelligence is selected because of its almost unconditional accept­
ance and success, if one judges success by customary criteria of size, 
influence and profitability of the enterprise. Intelligence tests 
have a tremendous and pervasive power over the lives of young people; 
directly by stamping some of them 'qualified' and others 'less 
qualified' for tertiary study, and indirectly by acting to control 
social mobility through defining as worthy of high esteem (i.e. to
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define as intelligent) those skills that are held by one group in 
comparison with the skills held by others (Chomsky, 1972;
Henderson, 1976; Rose and Hambley and Haywood, 1973).
As students of psychology know the first usable intelligence 
test was developed in France by Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon in 
1905. Binet had been asked by the French Commissioner for Instruction 
to develop a testing procedure that would identify those students 
whose academic aptitude was so low that they might benefit from 
placement in special schools. What is not widely known is that 
Binet and his associates' approach to the task was essentially trial- 
and-error, to see what worked. They began by considering the kinds 
of anthropometric measures used earlier by Galton (1883) and Cattell 
(1890). When these proved unpredictive they next examined an 
extensive collection of photographs to determine whether facial 
features revealed probable success or failure in school. Again the 
results were negative; so were the results of the Parisian palmist 
hired to examine the hands of a hundred boys. What Binet and his 
colleagues eventually found to be the most predictive was performance 
on simple tasks like those they encountered in school. The performance 
on these test items could predict with some accuracy how children 
would do in school. Tasks appropriate for children aged from three 
to twelve were compiled, and these composed the Binet-Simon intelli­
gence test scale published in 1908.
This brief history, besides evidencing the complete absence of 
an explicit 'scientific' theory of intelligence underpinning Binet's 
research, highlights the presence of important a priori notions concerning 
'backwardness', 'feeblemindedness', 'mental retardation'. This 
critical aspect of test development is rarely acknowledged or the 
implications discussed, yet it is crucial to an understanding of the
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resultant pseudoscience. Who decides the criteria by which to judge 
intelligence will be discussed in more detail a little later.
The original Binet-Simon test was considered a practical 
diagnostic instrument; Binet never intended to make a distinction 
between 'acquired and congenital feeblemindedness'. Certainly Binet 
called his product an 'intelligence test' but his concept of 
intelligence differed greatly from that proposed by spokespersons 
*or the then popular eugenics movement based on Social Darwinism 
(e.g. Galton, 1892; Spencer, 1897). To eugenicists of that time 
intelligence denoted a relatively fixed, hereditary trait of 
individuals which was largely responsible for success or failure in 
most important spheres of life. In contrast, for Binet intelligence 
was a way of describing behaviour at a particular time in a particular 
setting. Scores on the test were seen as measures of how children 
had adapted to schooling - whether they were more advanced or less 
advanced than peers of their age. It did not explain developmental 
retardation.
In retrospect, the invention of the intelligence test constituted 
only a modest advance for the science of educational psychology. The 
test could predict fairly well how children would do in school but 
gave little information as to the reasons for the success. At the 
same time, the advent of the intelligence test constituted a 
tremendous, revolutionary advance for the development of Galtonian 
eugenics. The test was adopted as a scientifically legitimate method 
of measuring general intelligence - the basis of successful achieve­
ment in life. Prior to the advent of Binet's scales, Galton's 
contention that 'genius', 'mediocrity' and 'imbecility' and various 
categories between, were analogies in their statistical distribution
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through the population to certain physical characteristics of that 
population/ could not be scientifically advanced as none of the 
attributes measured in Galton's laboratory correlated positively 
with measures of 'genius', 'mediocrity' etc. Binet's test brought 
together eugenics advocates and key leaders of the testing movement 
under the name of 'scientific' testing.
The Transformation of Binet's Ideas
Binet's conception of intelligence was almost unrecognisably 
transformed when imported into the United States. When the intelli­
gence test was introduced into the United States, it was written in 
English language and designed to predict which persons would be most 
likely to succeed in American Institutions, primarily schools. New 
migrants, non-Anglos, and persons from lower classes made significantly 
lower scores on these tests. Leading spokespersons for 'scientific' 
testing (e.g. Terman, Goddard and Yerke) interpreted these lower 
scores to be the results of inferior heredity (Cronbach, 1975) and 
became active in the political movement to ensure continued 'Anglo' 
dominance through restrictive immigration laws and sterilisation of 
those found 'unfit' by their 'mental' tests. (Kamin, 1974, pp.5-72).
The major importers and promoters of Binet's intelligence test 
were either eugenicists or eugenic sympathisers (Marks, 1973). The 
three well known early American translations of the Binet-Simon test 
were authored by Goddard, Kahlmann and Terman. Interestingly,all 
three had studied with G. Stanley Hall at Clark University where 
Hall had professed a theory of inherited mental ability similar to
Galton's.
83.
Goddard introduced the test first, in 1908, and became a leading 
hereditarian spokesperson almost immediately. His work at a training 
school for the retarded gave him expert credentials in the area of 
feeblemindedness and carried him a place' on the Davenport promoted 
(Davenport, 1911) and Carnegie Institute of Washington-sponsored Eugenics 
Record Office 'Committee on the Heredity of the Feeble Minded'. He 
later wrote the infamous 'The Kallikak Family' (Goddard, 1912), a 
popular book which purported to demonstrate the all powerful influence 
of 'good and bad' heredity. Goddard's next book 'Feeble-Mindedness - 
its Causes and Consequence' gave further 'scientific' justification 
to the then popular notion of the relationship between feeble­
mindedness and moral character (Goddard, 1914).
Terman probably had a more significant impact on the course of 
intelligence testing by authoring the influential Stanford-Binet 
revision which became the prototype of most subsequent intelligence 
tests. He wrote that "of the founders of modern psychology, my 
greatest admiration is for Galton" (quoted in Haller, 1963) and as an 
index of his admiration Terman published a study in which he estimated 
Galton's IQ at around 200 (Terman, 1979). The close nexus between 
the Galton-Spearman eugenics movement and the burgeoning intelligence 
test movement was voiced by Terman:
"Intelligence is chiefly a matter of native endowment.
It depends upon physical and chemical properties of 
the cerebral cortex which like other physical traits, 
are subject to the laws of heredity. In fact the 
mathematical coefficients of family resemblances in 
mental traits, particularly intelligence has been 
found to be almost exactly the same as for such 
physical traits as height, weight, cephalic index, 
etc. ... The attempt to explain familiar resemblances 
by any other hypotheses than that of heredity have not 
been successful. All available facts that science has 
to offer support the Galtonian theory that mental 
abilities are chiefly a matter of original endowment."
(Terman, 1975, p.201).
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Besides his influential academic career, Terman was a leading 
member of the Human Betterment Foundation which promoted widespread 
sterilisation in California. Californian sterilisation law was 
based on race purification as well as criminology. Those who were 
'morally and sexually depraved' could be sterilised. Between 1907 
and 1928 a total of 6200 Californian residents were sterilised 
(see Karier, 1972).
Intelligence testing in the United States was given an invaluable 
boost by the decision to screen army recruits in 1917. Robert Yerkes, 
the psychologist chiefly responsible for convincing army officials 
to use the intelligence test was both president of the APA and a 
member of the Eugenics Records Office - he and Thorndike were members 
of the Committee on 'Inheritance of Mental Traits'. To construct the 
army tests Yerkes recruited Terman, Goddard and several other psycho­
metricians .
Two other important early researchers, Edward Thorndike and 
R.S. Woodworth who pioneered the use of twin studies to estimate 
the heritability of intelligence were both students of J. McKeen 
Cattell who in turn had been Galton's research assistant. An 
indication of psychologists' respect for eugenics is the fact that 
Hall, Cattell, Yerkes, Terman, Thorndike and Woodworth all became 
presidents of the APA.
In Britain, a similar story but on a less grand scale can be 
told. Intelligence tests were quickly adopted by eugenicists - most 
notably by the social psychologist William McDougaDl and by his 
student Cyril Burt and by Karl Pearson. Burt in 1913 became the 
country's first psychologist appointed to a local authority with
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special reference to educational matters. Burt went on to become 
the leading spokesperson for eugenics, and was instrumental in the 
introduction of the 11 plus examination. Britain is now just breaking 
free from an educational system that found ‘its rationale, or 
justification, precisely in theories about human capacities derived 
from mental testing. In the nineteen thirties and forties, when the 
system was being constructed, psychometricians maintained that 
intellectual capacity was wholly due to genetic endowment and was 
therefore fixed, unchanging and, in addition, accurately measurable 
by group intelligence tests. This was the advice tendered to, and 
accepted by, the Consultative Committee to the Board of Education whose 
series of reports (Hadow, 1926; Spens, 1938) underlay the structuring 
of the divided system of secondary education with its concomitant, 
streaming in the primary school and early selection at 11 plus for 
secondary education.
However, toward the end of his career Burt lamented the decline 
of interest in his field:
"With the advent of behaviourism, investigations 
(in eugenics) virtually ceased. Even to ask such 
questions is to incur the old jibe that we are 
'raising the discredited problem of nature versus 
nurture'. Nevertheless, let us hope a small band 
of enthusiasts will still come forward to explore 
this urgent and fascinating field of research".
(Burt, 1968, p.18)
Unbeknown to Burt, the American education psychologist, Arthur 
Jensen reported that a lecture of Burts "... was 'impressive indeed' 
and probably the best lecture (he) ever heard" (Jensen, 1972, p.8). 
Burt's lament may have been premature as Jensen's subsequent research 
interests attest. Early in 1969 Arthur Jensen published his now 
famous article, restating original nativistic views, in the Harvard 
Educational Review. In the American context this had relevance,
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particularly, to theories concerning racial differences in 
'Intelligence'. Jensen's views were propagated in Britain more 
specifically in the social class/educational context, as exemplified, 
in particular, by the contributions of Butt and others to the series 
of Black Papers on education from 1970 on. Intelligence testing is, 
therefore, once more, an important theoretical question in Britain 
and America and one having serious implications in terms of social 
policy.
In sum, the British and American early psychometricians, in 
effect, grafted Galton's theory onto Binet's instruments and by doing 
so, they transformed intelligence testing into a major form of 
pseudoscience. They successfully made it appear that the test 
measured intelligence as defined by Galton and Spencer, when the 
evidence never justified such a conjecture and Binet himself was 
not happy with this state of affairs; as late as 1909, he was 
challenging and criticising the misuse of his test by psychologists. 
Unfortunately, Binet died in 1911 without stemming the abuse to 
which his test was being subjected.
Thus the evolving paradigm embraced an array of false notions 
generated by efforts to construct a scientifically legitimate base 
for the practise of eugenics. Some of the more salient assumptions 
of the paradigm were:
(a) that mental capacity or intelligence is something 
inside the individual which has mediating, causal
properties;
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(b) that individuals differ in the amount (how much) 
mental capacity they have;
(c) that mental capacity can be inferred from performance 
on an intelligence test;
(d) that differences in intelligence are in part 
genetically determined (and the extent of this 
influence can be calculated);
(e) that by comparing test results one can determine the 
different capacities of various races, social class 
and ethnic groups and lastly,
(f) that intelligence tests measure the mental abilities 
needed for success in high level occupations.
Innate Difference in Intelligence
Terman's claim that differences in intelligence were innate 
and physiological, rested on an elaborate analogy with physical 
traits. He gathered and presented data in a way which made 
intelligence appear to be shaped by the same process as height.
Test scores were reported in units of 'mental age' which was a 
kind of mental status. Like a child's height, his/her mental age 
grew steadily until s/he was around sixteen, and then growth slowed 
down and stopped. There upon it remained constant through most of 
adulthood. Like measurement of height, IQ's approximated the bell- 
shape curve of normal distribution when examined in large numbers. 
But most important, a child's IQ remained roughly constant as s/he
passed through school. This was to be expected since children who
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were taller in one year usually would also be taller two or three 
years hence. The approximate constancy of the IQ gave the impression 
that it could not be altered by the environment, and that it was 
therefore shaped almost exclusively by heredity. Finally, there was 
Pearson's correlation showing that resemblance between siblings and 
between parents and children was almost the same for IQ as for height. 
All this taken together, Terman reasoned, was determined in the same 
way and to the same extent as the physical trait, e.g. height.
In retrospect it appears that this similarity was a kind of 
mirage. The normal distribution in and of itself means nothing (see 
e.g. Lippmann, 1976; Simon, 1968). The stoppage of mental growth 
at around sixteen was an illusion generated by the selection of test 
items appropriate for school children. The much-touted constancy of 
IQ scores turned out to be a fallacious argument since again it was 
largely a product of the manner in which test items were selected.
The constancy has been discovered only for children already in school 
and only appeared after a year or more of formal schooling (Hunt, 1961; 
Sharp, 1972). Terman's belief that he had substantiated Galton's 
theory was an illusion which he projected onto his own data.
Although Terman agreed that his test did not measure native 
intelligence precisely, he insisted that 'nearly all the psychologists 
believed that native ability counts very heavily' in determining 
scores (1916, p.311). This was a considerable distortion of Binet's 
insistence that:
(a) intelligence was not fixed biologically;
(b) mental orthopaedics be provided for children identified 
as developmentally retarded; and
(c) the resultant test score did not index mental capacity,
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and was perpetuated by both American and British psychometricians 
(Kamin, 1974, p.5). The transformation rendered the assessment 
instrument vulnerable to abuse.
The abuse of intelligence tests is not primarily a result of 
misuse by unprofessional practice, as proponents would have us 
believe (see e.g., Simon, 1953 ) but is intrinsic to the paradigm
which encourages hypostatisation, isolation and measurement of 
acontextual mental traits and ignores the historical-social setting. 
Nowhere in the history of intelligence testing has intelligence or 
mental capacity been independently validated, certainly not measured. 
Intelligence is not something which one has, but is instead an 
interpersonal judgement about the power of the way one does something 
(Fischer, 1973, p.16). Intelligence refers to the effectiveness, 
relative to age peers, of the individual's approaches to situations in 
which competence is highly regarded by the society (Fischer, 1969, 
p.665). Note intelligent behaviour always occurs in a concrete 
situation, must be judged to be effective, and the competence 
evidenced must be highly regarded. Thus judgements as to what 
constitutes intelligent behaviour presuppose valued ends - effective­
ness in accomplishing what and toward what further goal? In the 
established 'scientized' literature on intelligence the question of 
'who defines?' is seldom, if ever, addressed (i.e. where do the 
a pT'loV'i criteria for establishing genius and retardation come from) . 
Who select the criteria by which to judge intelligence? That is,
what is the social-political basis of the concept of intelligence?
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Who Defines?
Recall that the Binet scales were first validated against 
teacher judgements - an external criterion. Operating from an 
implicit Anglo-conformity perspective, the psychometric intelligentsia 
saw as self-evident that school and vocational success in the 'Angle? 
core culture were the only socially important criterion measures 
needed for external validation. But as has been argued earlier:
"The question, what is it really?" "What is its right name?" 
is a nonsense question ... one that is not capable of being 
answered ... The individual object or event we are naming, 
of course, has no name and belongs to no class until we put 
it in one ... What we call things and where we draw the 
line between one class of things and another depends upon 
the interest we have and the purpose of the classification." 
(Hayakawa, 1957, ppll5-116)
The question "who are the persons in our community who are really 
geniuses/mental retardates etc.?" is a nonsense question. The 
line we draw between one class of things and another is always 
socially arbitrated and depends upon our interests and the purpose 
of classification. Parenthetically, the difficulty in defining 
science and pseudoscience attests to the validity of this assertion.
Take, for example, Galton's 'Hereditary Genius': Where did Galton
draw the line between geniuses and others? What was his purpose? In 
his famous study (Galton, 1892) a sample of nine hundred and ninety 
seven eminent men (were there no female geniuses?) were drawn wholly 
from the established upper and upper-middle class strata. Precluded 
from the sample were the 'captains of industry and commerce' who had, 
for the most part, no background in the established class. Thus 
'eminence' for Galton was eminence within a certain specific range of 
activities. Galton, himself the nephew of Charles Darwin, and of
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definite upper-middle class background, was faithfully reproducing 
the judgements and biases of his own stratum as to what constitutes 
'true eminence1. A similar comment can be made of the work of 
Charles Spearman (1904).
Who are the mentally retarded and why do we draw a line between 
'them' and us? Do we seek to help or control by classifying.
Fernald (1912), a pioneer in the field, was unabashedly explicit in 
his description of 'them':
"...the feeble-minded are a parasitic, predatory class, 
never capable of self-support or of managing their own 
affairs. The great majority ultimately become public 
charges in some form. They cause unutterable sorrow 
at home and are a menace and danger to the community. 
Feeble-minded women are almost invariably immoral. We 
have only begun to understand the importance of pauperism, 
crime and other social problems ... Every feeble-minded 
person, especially the high grade imbecile, is a 
potential criminal, needing only the proper environment 
and opportunity for the development and expression of 
his criminal tendencies. The unrecognised imbecile is 
a most dangerous element in the community." (pp.90-91)
Intelligence Tests and Social Sanitation
Unfortunately Binet's test was seen as a scientifically validated 
and therefore unbiased way of recognising the undetected feeble-minded. 
Certainly Terman was excited by the prospective application of the 
intelligence test. "... in the near future intelligence tests will 
bring tens of thousands of these high-grade defectives under the 
surveillance and protection of society. This will ultimately result 
in curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in the 
elimination of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism and industrial 
inefficiency. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the high- 
grade cases of the type now so frequently overlooked are precisely 
the ones whose guardianship it is most important for the state to
assume. (Terman, 1916, p.6-7)
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There seemed to be little doubt in Terman's mind as to who the 
defectives were likely to be. He found that a low level of 
intelligence (IQ's in the 70 to 80 range) "is very, very common among 
Spanish-Indian and Mexican families of the South West and also among 
Negroes. Their dullness seems to be racial, or at least inherent in 
the family stocks from which they come." (1916, pp.91-92) Because 
of the lack of mental ability Terman argued that the feeble-minded 
were incapable of moral judgements and, therefore, could only be 
viewed as potential criminals. He said
"All feeble-minded are at least potential criminals.
That every feeble-minded woman is a potential 
prostitute would hardly be disputed by anyone.
Moral judgement, like business judgement, social 
judgement or any other kind of higher thought 
process, is a function of intelligence." (1916, p.ll)
The same thinking which guided Terman to find a lower morality 
among those of lesser intelligence had its mirror image in the 
work of Thorndike, who found a higher morality among those with 
greater intelligence. Thorndike was convinced that "To him that 
hath a superior intellect is given also on the average a superior 
character." (1920, p.233)
Szasz (1976) warned us that we should always look to the relation­
ship between the explainer and explained (In this case tester and 
testee). It is patently obvious that the explainer/tester in the 
above questions holds the explainee in contempt and metaphorically 
confines her by means of degrading imagery. It is easy to be 
shocked and chilled by the overt racism of the early advocates of 
scientific testing but since the paradigm that legitimated the 
hypothesis formation and testing that generated the false beliefs 
remains largely unchanged, it is feasible to suggest that similar
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racist answers are being given to contemporary questions (no doubt 
in a more sophisticated form). Evidence suggests that this is the 
case in our 'scientific' response to our 'surplus people'.
(Braginsky and Braginsky, 1971; Braginsky and Braginsky and Ring, 
1969; Mercer, 1973; Scheff, 1966). The naive, apolitical view of 
the world and science has been expressed by a well known psychologist 
as follows: "I don't see why people should be disturbed by unequal
representation of different groups in different occupations or 
educationally, if it should be found that there are real differences." 
(Neary, 1970). As Smith (1978) has recently commented, echoing 
Rychlak's (1968) earlier analysis, although the positive and natural 
science epistemology on which mainstream psychology rested has been 
essentially discredited, Neary's remark and even a cursory glance 
at the content of psychological journals is enough to indicate it 
remains the prepotent perspective. Psychologists have been slow to 
explore alternative epistemologies.
Psychologists have been equally slow to learn that 'differences 
are not deficits' (Dobzhansky, 1973)
"That is, what biology has shown is that all people 
are genetically diverse, every human being is genetically 
unique, an unrepeatable individual. It can not be 
reiterated too often that equality and inequality are 
sociological, similarity and diversity are biological 
concepts. A society can grant equality of opportunity 
to its members, or it can withhold such equality; 
genetic diversity is biologically given, and could 
not be stamped out even if this were desirable." 
(Dobzhansky, 1968, p.138)
The confusion of differences and deficits can lead to, albeit well 
intentioned, institutional racism (Baratz and Baratz, 1970; Edwards
and Hargraves, 1976).
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That is, people are different, not intrinsically superior or 
inferior; what people are called and where we draw the line between 
one group of people and another is socially arbitrated and then 
validated and always serves a purpose. The concept of intelligence 
has served an ideological purpose since illegitmately grafted on to 
the eugenics paradigm. The definition of intelligence in the sense 
of what is to be esteemed has been put forward by the dominant stratum 
in society to maintain its hegemony over social mobility (Henderson,
1976; Karier, 1972; Rose et al, 1973; Simon, 1971). The decision
as to what behaviour will be the datum from which to infer
intelligence arises from the power of certain sections of the ruling
elite to define as worthy of high esteem those skills that they
themselves hold relative to other groups. The dominant group have
the power to define certain characteristics, which they already
have (i.e. "white skin" or intelligence as they define it) as
necessary criteria for entry to their social position. It becomes,
from this point of view irrelevant to ask whether black skin
or intelligence is genetically acquired or learned. The important
and central question lies elsewhere, namely, who defines? Efforts
to correct the abuses of the psychometric pseudoscience must aim at
its foundation, not its content. For example, blacks will not improve
their situation by continuing to demand black norms and testers for
standardised intelligence tests. They must reject being judged as
deficient by virtue of being different. They must look not to psychologists
but politicians to rectify their devalued social situation.
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Defining Intelligence
It may seem surprising to conclude that 'Psychology has no 
established literature on intelligence' but this is what Constance 
Fischer contends (Fischer, 1973, p.12). She goes on to say:
"Our current scientific literature is about IQ, not intelligence.
IQ is an artifact of the psychometrics movement" (Fischer, 1973, 
p.12). Test makers have not shown a great interest in intelligence, 
the psychometric elegance of their procedures being apparently more 
worthy of pursuit (Bersoff, 1973). How tests are constructed is 
interesting and even germane, but how they work is critical. Thus, 
other questions like "who defines?", "what is the validity of the 
'general intelligence' concept?", and "what is the validity of the 
claim that intelligence tests measure 'intelligence'?" are too 
infrequently asked.
Unbelievably, psychometricians have no consensual agreed to 
definition of intelligence (see e.g. Weschler, 1975). They claim 
nevertheless that intelligence is a worthwhile scientific concept 
because it can be measured. If, however, the evidence indicates 
that no existing test can measure anything as broad as general 
intelligence, then the concept should be abandoned as scientifically 
meaningless at this time, since it can be neither defined nor measured. 
Intelligence is defined by Cleary et al (1975) as that behaviour 
labelled as intellectual by psychologists and exemplified in the 
Standford-Binet and Weschler tests. It is "the repertoire of acquired 
skills, knowledge, learning sets and generation tendencies considered 
intellectual in nature that are available at any one period in time." 
(p.19) The definition is essentially operational. Such definitions
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are in no sense a definition in the scientific meaning of the word 
(Simon, 1971) and are maximally conclusive to the development of 
pseudoscience (Blum, 1978) in that they discourage investigators 
from questioning the validity of the concept.
The unstated assumption of most operational definitions is that 
intelligence tests measure a person's capacity for intellectual 
achievement and professional success. However, Jackson (1975) 
considers erroneous the "assumption that scores on these 
tests measure intellect when, in fact, what they might be measuring 
to some extent is the appropriateness of the subject response in 
relation to the cultural configuration of the white Anglo-Saxon 
middle class population that dominates American society" (p.89)
Thus,the greater sociocultural distance between the individual and 
the dominant core culture, the lower his or her score will be 
(Mercer, 1973, 1975; Mercer and Brown, 1973).
The only way to validate the construct scientifically would 
have been to demonstrate consistent high positive correlations 
between IQ and reliable ratings of performance in a wide variety 
of artistic, scientific, and professional activities (the class 
bias is apparent here - why isn't criminal activity or union organising 
included? For example, Williams (1974, p.34) argues that "actual 
intelligence covers a broad range of human abilities that IQ tests 
do not even attempt to measure. For example, no test has formally 
assessed the many verbal and non-verbal skills required to survive 
in the black community". Such validating data were rarely obtained, 
whereas a number of negative results have (see e.g., Blum, 1978 
pp.69-84).
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The Validity of the General Intelligence Concept
In line with the thesis being presented, McClelland concluded 
a recent review by stating - "it is my contention that the evidence 
for their validity [intelligence tests] is by no means so over­
whelming as most of us, rather unthinkingly, had come to think it was. 
In point of fact, most of us just believed the result that testers 
gave us" (1973, p.46). In fact there has never been strong evidence 
that intelligence tests measure intelligence, or in psychometric 
parlance external validity of the tests has not been adequately 
established. External validity is concerned with prediction to real- 
world performance. It is usually expressed in terms of a correlation 
between test scores and actual performance in some social role.
Claims that external validity had been established rested on two 
kinds of correlations:
(a) between IQ and performance in schools (i.e. role of 
student), and
(b) between IQ and occupational status (i.e. role of 
worker).
(a) Tests and Grades in School
Grades in school are determined primarily by performance on 
tests and examinations most of which are somewhat similar to 
intelligence tests. It is scarcely surprising that a positive 
correlation between IQ and school grades is found since they 
both depend on similar cognitive skills, stores of knowledge 
and motivational variables. However, the correlation would
support the validity of the construct only if ability (grades)
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in school provided a good index of ability in subsequent 
intellectual endeavours. Such outcomes have been documented 
carefully by many researchers (cf. Hoyt, 1965) -both in 
Britain (Hudson, 1960) and in the United States (Berg, 1970). 
Generally studies show that neither the amount of education 
nor grades in school are related to vocational success in a 
wide variety of occupations, including research scientist 
(Mahoney, 1976).
Using school performance as the external criterion to validate 
tests was first seriously questioned by Eells and Davis 
(Eells, Davis, Havinghurst, Herrick and Tyler, 1951). They 
protested that existing tests underestimated the abilities of 
lower-class children. Cronbach (1975) accurately perceived the 
controversy as an early attempt by a politically 'rising' group 
to assert their definition of the situation as opposed to the 
definitions of the intelligentsia. In the light of the 
discussion thus far it is interesting to note Cronbach's 
evaluation - "The Davis campaign failed for several reasons.
He challenged the testers when they were in public favour.
He concerned himself with 'persons of low status' and there 
were no militant voices to take up that cause. And if it were 
true that his new tests identified potentially able children 
for whom someone ought to invent better schooling, that advice 
was too abstract for public debate or action"(1975, p.8). So 
much for 'let the data talk'.
It was pointed out in Chapter III that there is always a large 
number of ways of explaining any feature of reality. This is 
graphically evidenced by comparing two diametrically different
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views of schools and intelligence testing. For example, Galton 
(1907) saw schools as proving grounds where natural ability 
would inevitably lead to different performance. Henderson (1976) 
saw schools of the same period as the principal arena 'in which 
the class contest' was fought over access to position of high 
status in wider society. For Galton measured intelligence 
explained success whereas for Henderson the intelligence test 
constituted a powerful weapon used to justify and perpetuate the 
existing stratification system.
(b) Test and Occupational Success
Claims that intelligence tests measure capacity for competence 
in different level occupations rest similarly on tenuous 
ground. Correlates between IQ and occupational status could 
be interpreted in several ways. In general, scientific testers 
embraced the meritocracy interpretation which attributes the 
correlation to different intellectual demands of different 
status jobs. This position, stated broadly, maintains that 
certain people in our society, because they are intelligent, 
come to find themselves in privileged positions and the positions 
are privileged or disproportionately remunerated because of the 
scarcity of such people. It seems equally possible that it is 
because of the privileged position that some people are 
'intelligent'. That is,certain groups within society are able 
to restrict entry to their positions, and thus to make or keep 
their ability 'scarce'.
The basic problem with many job proficiency measures for 
validating intelligence tests is that they depend largely on 
the credentials the person brings to the job - the habits, values,
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accent, interests, etc. - that means s/he is acceptable to 
the employing agent. Since we know that social-class back­
ground is related to getting higher-test scores (Nattall and 
Fozard, 1970), as well as having the right personal credentials 
for success, the correlation between intelligence tests scores 
and job success often may be an artifact, the product of their 
joint association with class-status (McClelland, 1973) .
Recall that the Binet scales were first validated against teacher 
judgements, an external criterion. Operating from an implicit Anglo- 
conformity perspective, the psychometric intelligentsia saw as self- 
evident that school and vocational success in the Anglo core culture 
were the only socially important criterion measures needed for 
external validation. For example, in their recent review Cleary et 
al state that "intelligence and other ability tests are useful to the 
extent to which they are correlated with socially relevant and 
important criteria" (1975, p.23). Nowhere do they explain who decides 
which performances are 'significant', 'relevant' or 'important'.
Such decisions are political, not scientific.
It is crucial to note that once the Binet scales were accepted as 
'valid' subsequent tests were validated by correlating them with 
socres on the Binet scales. Such correlations are measures of 
internal validity. (Tests of internal validity have little to do 
with predicting real-life performance rather they focus on rational­
ising and systematising the knowledge system itself). During the long 
period in which the psychometric belief system was all but unchallenged, 
intellectual discourse became increasingly 'scholastic'. Studies of 
test validity were preoccupied with the internal systematisation of 
the psychometric belief system. Publications concerning test validity
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focused primarily on measures of internal validity, factor analysis 
of test items, and so forth (see e.g. Büros, 1940-72). Relatively 
little energy was expended on problems relating to external 
validity, and what data was available was equivocal.
SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS AND SOCIAL VALUES
Psychologists, like other scientists, have been, until recently, 
incredibly naive about the role of power and interest in social 
outcomes (Blackburn, 1972). Social scientists need to recognise 
the social substructure of values, beliefs, and ideologies implicit 
in their research and activity (Buss, 1975; Martin, 1979) and 
acknowledge the historical-social processes that generate 'knowledge'. 
In the case of intelligence testing powerful interests have provided 
the definitions, that is, controlled the criteria against which 
psychologists have validated their tests. Belonging to the power 
elite not only helps a young person get into tertiary institutions 
and get jobs through family contacts, but it also gives access as a 
child to the credentials that permit access to certain occupations.
But over and above this, the power elite are able to select the 
criteria by which to judge intelligence and they do this 'in their 
own image' as it were. This does not imply any conscious manipulation 
or 'plot' on the part of the particular class. Any group in a relation 
of dominance to another will tend to set up entrance requirements 
that are in class correspondence with their own standards of accepta­
bility. Notwithstanding this, McClelland (1973) concludes that it is 
very hard to find 'a good carefully controlled study of the problem 
(validity) because testers simply have not worked very hard on it.
They have believed so much that they were measuring true competence
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that they have not bothered to try to prove that they were'. (1973, 
p. 56)
Within or Between Paradigm Debate
What is required is not necessarily more carefully controlled 
research but critical appraisal and rejection of the defective 
psychometric paradigm. That is, effort should be directed at exploring 
and evaluating the conceptual framework rather than its content. The 
legitimate work of criticism between paradigms consists of offering 
an alternative view point which is an adequate representation of 
the phenomena and which is discontinuous in the sense of being 
incompatible with the other position (Overton, 1973). Kuhn (1970) 
has suggested the characteristic of this paradigm clash is that each 
side disputes the legitimacy of the central assumptions of the other 
and repudiates the meaningfulness of its approach. This has been 
the aim of this review, and although it would have been possible to 
marshal much more evidence, the risk of doing so is to unwittingly 
enter into a within paradigm debate: the risk being that such
discourse inadvertently legitimates the contested paradigm by 
debating specific issues without challenging its assumptive base. 
Consequently the foregoing should be seen as a conceptual critique 
rather than a detailed empirical evaluation. As Mannheim pointed 
out, there is a multitude of realities and 'the problem is not how 
we might arrive at a non-perspectivistic picture but how, by 
juxtaposing the various points of view each perspective may be 
recognised as such as a new level of objectivity attained" (1936, 
p.226). A more detailed empirical evaluation of the 'attribute model'
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of assessment of which intelligence testing is a prestigious example 
will be presented in Chapter vi .
In conclusion, during the half-century in which the psychometric 
intelligentsia have been unchallenged, a uniformity of viewpoint has 
bounded intellectual discussion concerning tests. The traditional 
paradigm and accompanying assumptions were regarded as self-evident.
The resulting psychometric research and theorising represents an 
example of 'grand' pseudoscience. The major results of this movement 
have been a highly exaggerated notion of what intelligence tests 
measure; a widely subscribed~to belief that variations in mental 
abilities are determined largely by genetic differences, the belief, 
also widely held, that certain races are demonstrably more intelligent 
than others; and, a maintenance of the doctrine that social 
inequality is caused by variations in the biological fitness of 
individuals. These conjectures while put forward as scientifically 
validated facts are, on close examination far from that (Chomsky, 1972; 
Layzer, 1972; Kamin, 1974; Blum, 1978). Although strong supporters 
of the idea of rigorous science, proponents of psychometrics have 
departed from the rules of science. When valid objections have been 
raised against their work, they have sought repeatedly to circumvent 
and dismiss these objectives which could not be refuted. This pattern 
of apparently deliberate distortion has appeared in Terman's response 
to Lippmann (Terman, 1976) as well as more recently in Jensen's 
evasive use of the terms covariance and interaction, in the attempt 
to dismiss Kamin's critique, and in the refusal to cite studies with 
evidence contradicting the meritocracy interpretation (Jensen, 1978). 
More flagrant deception is found in the fabrications in Sir Cyril 
Burt's work (see e.g. Lawler, pp.159-173). Like Lysenkoism in Soviet
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genetics, the British and American psychometricians had important 
patrons both from private funds (e.g. Galton and Mrs. E.H. Harrisson) 
as well as private foundations like the Carnegie Institution and the 
Commonwealth Fund. The importance of selective funding of scientific 
research programmes and the resultant development of certain types of 
paradigms has been highlighted by the Roses and others (Rose and 
Rose, 1974; Rose and Rose, 1971; Marcuse, 1967). The comfortable 
congruence between their research program and the status guo was 
sufficient for the chief proponents to retain important academic posts, 
attract expensive funding and recruit a sizeable number of disciples 
and successors to maintain the enterprise. The enterprise has not 
as yet been widely recognised for what it is - pseudoscience on a 
grand scale.
On the surface, the dispute over testing appears to be an academic 
discourse between two opposing factions of intellectuals. In fact, 
as has been demonstrated, the issue of test validity and test fairness 
deals with matters of critical importance in a society which is relying 
increasingly on the results of tests to make important life chance 
decisions and to decide ultimately who will achieve positions of wealth, powe 
and prestige in Western society (Mercer, 1978-79). In fact, unbelievably, 
the first sentence in a recent publication reads "IQ is the yardstick
A
by which your children will be judged throughout their lives". (Wilson 
and Grylls, 1977, p.l) Very little appears to have changed in the
last five decades.
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CHAPTER V: PSYCHOLOGICAL ALCHEMY: II - FREUDIAN PSEUDOSCIENCE
In the last chapter it was argued that the scientific enterprise 
should be intrinsically subversive (Carey, 1972; Russell, 1953).
This is not to say that all scientific enquiry necessarily have 
immediate or important social consequences. The work of astronomers, 
geologists and physicists only rarely has significance that could 
conceivably bring them into conflict with the dominant values and 
ideology of their society. However, the furor and invective which 
arose when Corpernicus banished the earth from its honorific position 
as the centre of the universe, or when Darwin dared to demonstrate 
our affinity through evolution, with wart-hogs and monkeys attests 
to the potentially revolutionary nature of even the natural sciences.
It should be noted that as soon as the subversive import of these 
ideas was recognised the scientists concerned (namely, Corpernicus, 
Galileo, Darwin and Huxley) found themselves in savage embattled 
confrontation with not only hostile social institutions but also with 
incredulous fellow scientists. For example, the Artistotelians refused 
to look through Galileo's telescope to see the four moons of Jupiter 
and Goss (a Christian biologist) in response to Darwin's theory, 
postulated that God had deliberately planted fossils so as to separate 
true believers from doubters. This explicit practice of isolationism 
was recently documented by Krantz (1971) in the area of behavioural 
psychology. In fact, in his autobiography, B.F. Skinner sounds almost 
proud of the fact that he never even bothered to read the criticism 
against him by Chomsky and Scriven.
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Social scientists by contrast, are continuously concerned with 
questions about human nature and human behaviour, questions which, 
if answered one way, may challenge the existing system of values and 
privileges and, if answered another way support and strengthen this 
system. In the last chapter it was argued that the 'scientific' 
testing movement arrived at answers comfortably congruent with the 
power elites'perspectives and thus justified and strengthened the 
status quo through the practice of grand pseudoscience. (see e.g. 
Lawler, 1978; Simon, 1971) This accusation could certainly not be 
made with respect to Freudian pseudoscience.
Both as a thinker and therapist, Freud has had a remarkable, 
even revolutionary impact on the people of the twentieth century 
(see particularly Jacoby, 1975). His insights, like those of Copernicus 
and Darwin have penetrated the very underpinning of our culture and 
have become a part of us in far more ways than are usually realised.
In keeping with the history of truly subversive science, Freud is 
often portrayed as having courageously proposed his theories in the 
face of violent public and scientific opposition and as having suffered 
personal and professional isolation as a consequence (see e.g. Brill, 
1948; Jones, 1953). Certainly, Freud in his correspondence with 
Fliess complained about his lonely struggle against a world hostile 
to his ideas in the first decade of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1948). 
However, he also refers to the period as one of 'splendid isolation'.
Today, the accounts of the early opposition and hostility to 
Freud's ideas are seen to have been greatly exaggerated (see, e.g.
Bry and Rifkin, 1962; Ellenberg, 1970); so much so that they 
completely obscured the fact that Freud was very much a 'man of his 
times' (Elkin, 1972; Whyte, 1962). Notwithstanding the many signs
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of recognition and extraordinary respect accorded Freud, even in 
his early years, and the convincing demonstration that virtually 
every single idea of Freud's had been conceived by somebody else 
before him (see e.g. Ellenberg, 1970; Whyte, 1962) his revolutionary 
impact can not be underestimated or attenuated. But can the impact 
of Freud be legitimately compared with that of Copernicus or Darwin?
Is the Freudian revolution an example of scientific subversion par 
excellence, or 'one of the greatest hoaxes of the century' (Sargent, 
1964, p.89). Pinckney and Pinckney (1965) subscribe to the hoax 
conjecture and suggest that 'probably the biggest factor contributing 
to the psychoanalytic hoax is that analysts strive so deliberately to 
call their exploitation as a science without fulfilling any of the 
postulates set down and accepted by scientists the world over which 
would qualify it as being truly scientific' (p.70).
Critics, doubtful of the validity of psychoanalysis, have created 
the impression that Freud simply and arrogantly asserted the truth 
of his statements without bothering to consider the all important 
questions of validity (see e.g. Cioffi, 1970, 1974; Eysenck, 1963; 
Jurjevich, 1974). Such a view is not only naive but ill-informed. 
Nothing could be further from the facts. There is much evidence, 
both direct and indirect, in Freud's writing of his desire to discover 
ways in which the validity of psychoanalysis could be established 
(see particularly Jahoda, 1977, Chapter 7). Further, Freud was 
adamant that his theories were inferred from 'good, hard' clinical 
observations yielded by the application of a scientifically legitimate 
method. According to Freud psychoanalysis was a natural science,
"what else could it be?" (Freud, 1925) . There can be no doubt about 
Freud's desire to be scientific but there are grave doubts about the 
adequacy of his approach.
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The aim of this chapter is not to challenge Freud's incontestable 
status as an innovator, nor to thoroughly evaluate the scientific 
validity of his ideas, rather it is to argue that his contribution 
should not have been accorded the 'status' of scientific knowledge; 
and that his pretense to science has been a major contributing factor 
to the popularity and pervasive impact of psychoanalysis. This 
process of false persuasion by scientific pretense has, in earlier 
chapters, been called pseudoscience. It will be argued that many 
professionally popular beliefs about personality and psychopathology 
are largely shaped by such a process.
THE IMPACT AND STATUS OF FREUD'S IDEAS
The impact of Freud's ideas has already been alluded to by 
comparing their social import with the ideas of Copernicus and Darwin. 
However, unlike the contributions of the great scientists, Freud's 
'correct' place in our intellectual history is far from consensually 
established. Despite the passage of over three quarters of a century 
since the publication of 'The Interpretation of Dreams', consensus 
as to his status is conspicuously absent. Freud has astonishingly 
been accused of everything from immorality to unscientific dilettantism, 
yet his ideas remain the essential starting point for much theoretical 
and clinical innovation in Western psychiatry (Elkin, 1972; Jahoda, 
1977).
That there is almost complete disagreement on Freud's scientific 
status has not apparently ameliorated his social significance. No 
one could seriously doubt the ubiquity of the influence of his ideas, 
not just within professional and academic psychiatry and psychology 
but as a basic part of our cultural substance. Writing in 1932
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Franz Alexander summarised the situation well: "All these concepts
are today not only generally accepted, but they have already become 
emotionally assimilated and like the theory of evolution or the 
cosmological doctrine of the planetary systems are now an integral 
part of modern thinking"(1932, p.65).
The Freudian omnipresence has all kinds of practical consequences. 
It not only influences the way in which we 'talk about' and respond 
to problematic behaviour but at a 'day-to-day' level it regulates 
the behaviour of parents with respect to their children for example.
For years the spectacular mind-expanding nature of Freud's announce­
ments have overshadowed the question of their 'scientific' validity 
for most people, professional and lay. It was as if a new psycho­
logical world had been discovered; people were fascinated with the 
novelty of its sights, rather than their 'reality'. The perspective's 
apparent efficacy as evidenced by its ability to explain everything/ 
won many converts. In these terms, Freud's models have already 
proven themselves to be spectacularly successful. It is impossible 
to look into any major journal dealing with research in the area of 
personality or psychological dysfunction without finding important 
segments of his thought represented. His concepts relating to 
repression, unconscious motivation defense mechanisms, and character 
development are everywhere imprinted. Overall, it is reasonable to 
say that Freudian concepts have already achieved the important 
objectives of opening up new phenomena for study and introducing 
additional ways of interpreting old issues.
Although there can be little dispute over the profundity of 
Freud's influence, much doubt remains as to our 'final' judgement 
regarding his intellectual contribution to a science of human
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behaviour. That Freud has a prominent place is attested to by his 
social significance evidenced above but as Jahoda questions:
"Where?" Jahoda (1977) points to the seemingly unending flood of 
publications that provide "contradictory answers: a scientist or
a charlatan; the founder of a new psychology or a poet; a 
philosopher or a philosopher manque; a moralist or a libertarian; 
an original thinker or a clever propagandist of other people's 
ideas; an organiser of a movement or a lonely pioneer; a cure 
or a blessing for science and morality" (p.l). Given that the 
important, basic 'discoveries' of psychoanalysis were all made 
and published before 1906, and given the successful social 
penetration of his ideas, why haven't scholars been able to agree 
on Freud's rightful status?
Obstacles to the Accurate Evaluation of Freud's Contribution
In short, Freud and his followers must bear most of the 
responsibility for the manifest lack of clarity as to the scientific 
worth of their contribution. For unlike the proponents of other 
subversive belief systems (e.g. Darwinism and Marxism) who took 
an offensive, confrontational stance vis-a-vis their antagonists, 
in the case of Freud, the psychoanalytic movement took predominantly 
a defensive stance. Most Freudians restricted themselves to their 
professional practice and emerged from their 'sect-like' existence 
(Fisher and Greenberg, 1977) only occasionally to answer some new 
accusation. Their truly prolific literature (The Index of 
Psychoanalytic Writings (Grinstein, 1975) lists over 100,000 books, 
articles and monographs) is directed primarily to other psychoanalysts
(Jahoda, 1977) .
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A further index of their defensive posture was their recourse, 
in the early stages, to argue that:
(a) any opposition to their ideas was a form of resistance -
a mechanism of defense against the unpalatable truth; and
(b) a true test of psychoanalytic ideas could be made only 
by those qualified to practice psychoanalysis.
As Medawar (1969) has recently pointed out, such postures are 
contrary to all the canons of scientific investigation and he 
consequently dismissed the whole theory as unscientific. He went 
on to suggest "The opinion is gaining ground that doctrinaire 
psychoanalytic theory is the most stupendous intellectual confidence 
trick of the twentieth century and a terminal product as well - 
something akin to a dinosaur or zeppelin in the history of ideas, 
a vast structure of radically unsound design and with no prosperity" 
(Medawar, 1977, p.125). Although these defensive arguments have 
been thoroughly debunked, at least from the perspective of the 
natural science paradigm, (see e.g. Eysenck and Wilson, 1973;
Fisher and Greenberg, 1977; Glover, 1952) and are rarely seriously 
advanced by psychoanalysts in response to criticism, their legacy 
is a lingering doubt about the willingness to 'play the science 
game'. Obviously there is no imperative on psychoanalysts to play 
the science game. There are other, equally legitimate ways to 
approach the understanding of our fellows. Understanding of an 
'empathic'1 kind, called Verstehen may be more appropriate. This 
procedure which involves careful observation of the individual, 
combined with a putting oneself in his/her position may make valid 
the so-called defensive postures described above. This issue will 
be discussed further towards the end of this chapter.
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A second important reason for the uncertain scientific status 
of the psychoanalytic system is Freud's occasional explicit assertion 
to the effect that 'psychoanalysis did not need outside validation'. 
This claim has recently been echoed by Kubie (1960) and Ramzy (1962, 
1963) in their contention that each psychoanalytic hour is a miniature 
controlled experiment in its own right. Initially Freud made the 
claim cited above in response to a report of an instance of 
laboratory support for his concept of repression. Freud went on 
to say: "I can not put much value on these confirmations because
the width of reliable observations on which these assertions rest 
makes them independent of experimental verification" (Freud, 1934 
cited in Mackinnon and Dukes, 1962, p.702). Parenthetically it is 
interesting to note that a comprehensive recent review of the 
attempts to experimentally validate the Freudian concept of repression 
concluded that 'surprisingly, it was found, that none of the 
investigations provided support for the predictions' (Holmes, 1974, 
p.632). This disparity illuminates the different logic and notions 
of validity that may be adopted in evaluating research.
In a similar vein, other experienced analysts have asserted 
that their complex concepts cannot be adequately studied within 
experimental guidelines because they force too much artificial 
simplification (see e.g. Rapaport, 1960) . Thus the subject matter 
prohibits experimental investigation as usually practised. The 
scientific validity of these claims will be evaluated subsequently 
but it suffices to say that the 'defensive ploys', the explicit 
rejection of experimental evidence, and the rejection of experimental 
methodology has made it relatively easy for Eysenck to build a case 
to justify his iconoclastic conclusion that "...psychoanalysis is
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a myth; a set of semi-religious beliefs disseminated by a group 
of people who should be regarded as prophets rather than scientists" 
(1963, p.32). It is probably timely to point out again that 'differences 
are not deficits'. The aim of this chapter is not to show that 
Freud's theories are 'wrong' but merely that they should not be 
labelled 'scientific' if we subscribe to the narrow, natural science 
definition of science. This point will be taken up later
A third and equally important obfuscatory influence is 
intimated in the quote above, namely, Freud's promotion of 
psychoanalysis as a proprietary dogma (see also Jurjevich, 1974;
Szasz, 1963). Elkin (1972) asserts that whether or not Freud 
intended to "he created a 'school' in the classical sense and his 
most devoted followers still believe that in his writings one can 
find the answers to most pressing contemporary problems" (p.56). 
Reinforcing this assertion Ellenberger (1970) rather disparagingly 
described this as Freud's most striking novelty, that is "the 
founding of a 'school' according to a pattern that had no parallel 
in modern times but is a revival of the old philosophical schools 
of Greco-Romano antiquity ... and this is no doubt a noteworthy 
event in the history of modern culture" (p.550). The noteworth­
iness of this aspect of Freud's contribution is more than offset 
by its negative aspects to be discussed below.
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT
According to Szasz (1963), Freud's adoption of a highly mono­
polistic attitude towards psychoanalysis and early developed
a restrictive and coercive organisation (namely The International 
Psychoanalytic Association) to restrict its use to those whom he
114.
considered loyal disciples. This when coupled with the later development 
of a training regime derived from the guild concept acted (in 
concert) to effectively perpetuate his hegemony. Szasz claimed that 
Freud failed to evidence the kind of leadership we associate with 
the progress of science (i.e. the active encouragement of the 
creation and testing of new ideas) and instead evidenced the kind of 
leadership typical of big business or of imperial nationalism (1963, 
p. 146).
In looking over the literature, Johnson (1948) remarks: "one
often has the feeling that the Freudian analyst is less concerned 
with results than with the fact that he is solely in possession of 
the one system of psychodynamics which purports to be thorough 
goingly scientific" (p.321). Indeed Freud wrote to Ferenczi, in 
1913: "We possess the truth; I am as sure of it as fifteen years 
ago". According to Szasz (1963), in scientific leadership Freud 
gave an example of what to avoid. By way of example Freud wrote:
"Adler's 'Individual Psychology' is now one of the many schools 
of psychology which are adverse to psychoanalysis and its fuller 
development is of no concern of ours" (Freud, 1914 cited in Szasz 
1963, p.156). According to Szasz "people who advocate this sort 
of discrediting of the investigation of their colleagues sever their 
loyalty to science and condemn themselves as propagandists" (1963, 
p.155).
Unfortunately, despite the pseudodemocratic, pseudoscientific 
atmosphere created by Freud, the realities of the Psychoanalytic 
movement were manifestly coercive and restrictive (Ellenberger, 1970; 
Jurjevich, 1974; Szasz, 1963). The medico-political, rather than 
scientific aims of the association were identified early by Bleuler.
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One of Freud's earliest non-Viennese adherents, Bleuler refused 
to join the newly constituted International Psychoanalytic 
Association. One of the episodes which troubled Bleuler was the 
exclusion of a psychiatrist called Isserlin from attendance at the 
psychoanalytic meetings because of his persistent criticism. Bleuler 
was unpersuaded by Freud's claimed open-mindedness and persisted 
with his conviction that 'the introduction of the closed door 
; olicy scared away a great many friends and made some of them 
emotional opponents' (Bleuler, 1910 cited in Alexander and Selesnick, 
1965) .
History has vindicated Bleuler as the subsequent smearing, 
vilification and estrangement of Adler, Jung, Rank and others 
attests. The later snubbing of Horney and Fromme further evidences 
the closed door policy. Puner nicely depicts the contradictions 
expressed by Freud: literalism in verbalisations, ruthless
dogmatism in behaviour. He wrote:
"He himself recognised the shortcoming of his theorising 
and painstakingly and consistently worked on ... (its) 
improvement. When he spoke this way, with a voice of 
reason, he spoke accurately and well. But his psycho­
analytic children reacted not so much to what he said 
as to what he did. He spoke of freedom to amend, revise 
and change his doctrine, but the emotional atmosphere 
that he generated for his followers was one of rigid, 
watchful authority under which any attempt to deviate 
was treated as heresy. So his followers have inter­
preted every tentative work he wrote as the ultimate 
crystallisation of God-given truth. A pedantic and 
strictly defined conceptual system is exactly what has 
grown up among orthodox Freudians around the body of 
Freudian literature." (Puner, 1947, p.216)
The end result of Freud's proprietary dogmatism was an organisation 
referred to by Keen (1972) as the '... psychological establishment -
the Freudian Mafia' (p.44). The impacts of the 'Freudian Mafia' in
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developments in psychiatry and to a lesser extent psychology are 
myriad.
The charges range from:
(a) arrogance, evidenced in Jones' (then the president of the 
British Psychoanalytic Society) response to Glover's 
suggestion 'that every candidate (psychoanalytic student) 
should be instructed in the systems propounded by the 
then important psychoanalytical schismatics, Jung,
Adler and Rank'. His reply was "Why waste their time?"
(b) usurpation of power and consequent 'brainwashing' of 
trainees (Brody, 1971; Eysenck, 1963; Glover, 1952; 
Marmor, 1968; Sargent, 1964; Shakow, 1967); and
(c) clandestine censorship of professional journals and 
books (Jurjevick, 1974; Kaplan, 1964; Pinckney and 
Pinckney, 1965; Samra, 1969).
On this last point it is interesting to note that Thomas Szasz' 
most influential paper 'The Myth of Mental Illness' was submitted 
to every major psychiatric/psychoanalytic journal between 1957-60 
only to be repeatedly rejected. Ultimately it was published in 
probably the most hostile journal to psychiatry, the American 
Psychologist. Szasz sardonically described the course of events 
in the following way: "They all said it was no good, they rejected
it. After that there came the second line of defense. There are 
the psychiatrists, the high priests, the bishops, then comes the 
psychologists, the local clergy. So I had to send it to the American 
Psychologist". (Szasz, 1974).
117.
Religious symbolism vis-a-vis psychiatry and psychology is 
not new. White, for example, in response to early anti-German 
feelings proposed that 'the time had come to free American psychiatry 
from the domination of the Pope at Vienna' (White cited in Oberndorf, 
1964, p.135-36). Similarly Kazin remarked that 'psychoanalytical 
literature has replaced the Bible as the place to which people turn 
for an explanation of their suffering and a source of consolation' 
(1958, p.15).
The point being made here should not be lost in the symbolism. 
Recall it was argued earlier, in Chapter III (pp.64-66) that science 
has to a large degree assumed the authority previously given to 
religious teachings, and further, that psychiatrists and psychologists 
have recently assumed some of the roles previously ascribed to the 
elders in the church. In the Braginsky's words, psychiatrists 
and psychologists have become the "high priests of the middle class" 
(1973, p.15). Thus, in his conclusion to the chapter entitled 
"The Nuisance of the Freudian Establishment" Jurjevich asserts that 
in American psychiatry and clinical psychology it is clear that the 
'high priests' who determine scientific 'truth' at this time are 
the members of the Freudian establishment. They do so without 
warrant (1974, p.67).
The tension between scientific responsibility and the pseudo­
religious aspects of psychoanalysis has been recognised for many 
years. Friedlander voiced most of the contemporary concerns and 
objection to Freud's theories when he spoke before the international 
medical congress held at Budapest in 1909. Friedlander argued:
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"First, instead of the quiet demonstrations usual 
with scientists in their discussions, psychoanalysts 
make dogmatic affirmations punctuated by emotional 
outbursts; psychoanalysts are unique in equating 
Freud with such men as Kepler, Newton, and Semmelweiss, 
and for the vigor of their attacks on their adversaries. 
Second, instead of proving their assertions in a 
scientific manner, psychoanalysts content themselves 
with unverifiable statements. They say: "We know
from psychoanalytic experience that ..." and lay 
the burden of proof on others. Third, psychoanalysts 
do not accept any criticism nor even the expressing 
of the most justified of doubts, terming these 
'neurotic resistance'. Friedlander quoted from 
Sadger: "The prudery of physicians in their 
discussions of sexual matters is due less to principle 
than to psychological background ... Rather than accept 
themselves as hysterics, they prefer to be neurasthenics. 
Even if they are neither, they prefer to declare the 
whole theory invalid and condemn it a priori". Fried- 
lander agreed with Aschaffenburg that such argumentation 
was unacceptable among scientists. Fourth, psycho­
analysts ignore what has been done before them, or by 
others, thereby claiming to be innovators. It is as 
if, before Freud, no hysterical patient was ever cured, 
and no psychotherapy ever practiced. Fifth, sexual 
theories of psychoanalysis, are presented as scientific 
fact, though unproven, as when Wulffen says: "All
ethical powers in the interior of man, his sense of 
shame, his morality, his worship of God, his esthetics 
his social feelings, originate from repressed 
sexuality". Wulffen reminds one of Weininger when he 
said: "Woman is a born sexual criminal; her strong
sexuality when successfully repressed easily leads her 
to illness and hysteria, and when it is insufficiently 
repressed, to criminality; often it will lead her to 
both". Sixth, Friedlander objected to the practice 
of psychoanalysts of addressing themselves directly to 
a wide lay public, as if their theories had already 
been scientifically proven; by so doing, they make 
those who do not accept the theories appear ignorant 
and backward." (Friedlander cited in Ellenberger, 1970, 
p.802-3)
In an attempt to clarify the nature of the opposition to Freud, 
and hopefully remove some of the barriers to accurate evaluation, 
Alexander and Selesnick (1965, chapter 13) proposed the merits of 
distinguishing between 'psychoanalytic thought' and the 'psychoanalytic 
movement', their point being that much of the opposition to 
psychoanalysis, as the previous pages evidence , is due to the 
dubious organisational features of the psychoanalytic associations
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rather than wholesale hostility to psychoanalysis itself. Freud's 
assertion that psychoanalysis was his personal discovery and his 
attempts to make something special and sacred has obscured and all 
but prevented dispassionate evaluation of-his ideas. Szasz contends 
that insofar as Freud, Freudians and post-Freudians have shown a 
special loyalty to psychoanalysis itself, as something other than 
a part of the study of persons, "they betrayed their faith in 
science and in humanity. Such loyalty can be purchased only at 
the cost of disloyalty to the ideal of the open society" (1963, 
p.156).
FREUD'S PSEUDOSCIENCE
Because most people see 'science' as good and 'pseudoscience' 
as bad they imagine that the two are diametrically opposed. They 
assume that there is a natural hostility between the two. That 
this is not the case was indicated in Chapters III and IV. The 
inability of scholars to satisfactorily arbitrate on the scientific 
status of psychoanalytic theory further attests to this difficulty.
In the previous section some of the obstacles to evaluation erected 
by the psychoanalytic movement were discussed. Although important, 
these hindrances are peripheral to the central issue of the 
scientific status of Freud's theories. In this section support for 
Cioffi's assertion that psychoanalysis is most appropriately labelled 
pseudoscience will be presented.
Cioffi (1970, 1974) cogently argues that psychoanalysis is an 
example of pseudoscience; this he defines as being constituted 'not 
merely by formally defective theses but by methodologically defective 
procedures ... This notion of a pseudoscience is a pragmatic and not
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a syntactic one' (1970, p.474). He goes on to argue that underlying 
all of the defects of psychoanalytic theory is 'the same impulse: 
the need to avoid refutation'. The relevance of Popper's writings 
in judging the scientific merits of such 'a posture should be patent. 
With respect to Freud's and Adler's theories Popper stated:
"The two psychoanalytic theories were in a different class. They 
were simply non-testable, irrefutable. There were no conceivable 
human behaviour which could contradict them." (1963, p.37).
With respect to Cioffi's accusation there can be no doubt that 
Freud was very sensitive to, but resistive of, demands from others 
that he revise his formulations. Note Bleuler's comments in a 
letter he sent to Freud concerning the intolerance of psychoanalysis 
towards dissent or criticism:
"Scientifically I still do not understand why for you 
it is so important that the whole edifice [of 
psychoanalysis] should be accepted. But I remember 
I told you once that no matter how great your 
scientific accomplishments are, psychologically you 
impress me as an artist. From this point of view it 
is understandable that you do not want your art product 
to be destroyed. In art we have a unit which cannot 
be torn apart. In science you make a great discovery 
which has to stay. How much of what is loosely 
connected with it will survive is not important."
(Bleuler cited in Alexander and Selesnick, 1965, p.6)
In the discussion to follow,psychoanalysis will be evaluated against 
several criteria currently used to differentiate 'genuine' from 
'fictitious' science. But first it will be shown that Freud not 
only aspired to have his theories recognised as science but was 
adamant that they were scientific. This is a key issue in labelling Freud's 
theories examples of pseudoscience.
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Freud's Assumption to Scientific Status
In our technological age, one of the most successful promotion 
tricks is to get under the scientific penumbra. Earlier (Chapter III), 
the ready acceptance of many preposterous ideas offered in the 
name of 'science' was documented (see MacDougal, 1968; Gardner,
1957). The status of science is evidenced by: "Science of Hotel
Management", the Institute of Sartorial Science; Christian Science 
and Spiritual Science, to name a few. The Communists call their 
doctrines 'Scientific Socialism' supposedly to distinguish their 
teachings from the bourgeois tainted socialism which has departed 
from 'science'. La Pierre (1959), a sociologist, draws a parallel 
between the status of Marxist 'science' and that claimed by Freud.
"The Marxian doctrine of social evolution was not, as 
Marx and all his disciples since have believed, derived 
from the empirical study of social history. Like 
Freud's doctrine of man, it was imposed upon facts, 
not deduced from them. Marxianism is therefore, 
unscientific in the same sense that Freudianism is 
unscientific." (p.60)
However, like the scientific socialists, Freud was at pains to 
emphasise in his lectures and articles that what he stood for 
was 'science'. Writing in 1925 about the scientific development 
of psychoanalysis, Freud unhesitatingly compared his troubles to 
the persecution Galileo suffered for the sake of promoting 
scientific 'truths' (Freud, 1959). On another occasion he 
proposed that his work was more worthy of admiration than that 
of Einstein since "He had the support of a long series of 
predecessors from Newton onward. While I had to hack every step 
of the way through a tangled jungle alone" (Freud cited in 
Hartmann, 1959, p.17). That this was patently not the case has 
been graphically documented (see particularly Ellenberger, 1970)
and will be taken up in a later section.
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Freud was, of course, trained as a natural scientist and was 
disturbed, as he indicated in his response to Bleuler's criticism 
cited earlier, that his case studies did seem to lack 'the serious 
stamp of science'; he grudgingly admitted that they sounded more 
like fiction (Freud, 1911 cited in Alexander and Selesnick, 1965, 
p.7). Nevertheless he was adamant that psychoanalysis was science 
like physics and chemistry and further he vehemently disclaimed 
the purported similarity between psychoanalysis and philosophy.
He wrote:
"Psychoanalysis is not like a philosophical system 
which starts from a few strictly defined fundamental 
principles, uses them to embrace the totality of the 
world and, once perfected, has no room for new 
discoveries or improvement. On the contrary, it 
remains linked with the facts which are produced in 
its field of activity, it tries to solve the 
immediate problems of observation, tentatively 
continues its experience, it is always incomplete, 
always ready to correct or modify Lts theories. Like 
physics and chemistry it allows that its fundamental 
concepts are vague and its assumptions provisional.
It does not expect a more rigorous definition than 
future work ..." (Freud cited in Marthe, 1966, p.173)
Freud was not alone in his claim to scientific status, Bailey (1964) 
has shown that Freud's followers continued to emphasise the 
scientific nature of their beliefs. He contests that 'psycho­
analysis is certainly not a 'natural science' (Naturwissenshaft).
Its followers, however, try desperately to make it appear so, 
because of the prestige our society attaches to science (1964, 
p.63) . In contrast, an influential follower of Freud, Fenichel 
proposed that 'science is its [psychoanalysis] strong suit ...
Its virtue of virtues of which all analysts are proud and which 
belongs to psychoanalysis alone, is that it is built upon 
scientific insight' (1945, p.14). In a recent lecture Hartmann
123.
asserted that psychoanalysts' 'objectivity is scientific 
objectivity, his [her] truth is scientific truth' (I960, p.10).
As a concession to the critics, he added cautiously 'This attribute 
has frequently met with misunderstanding'. ■ As a last example, 
Ernest Jones' belief in the scientific significance of Freud is 
revealed in the following:
"The future world may well speak of a Pre-Freudian 
and Post-Freudian era of thought. Man's conquest 
of nature has been proceeding for many thousands 
of years, and fumbling attempts have often made in 
his more difficult task of self-conquest, but Freud's 
life work represents the first serious endeavour to 
apply to it the methods of science. After all, Freud 
has been educated, not as a psychologist or mythologist, 
but in the tenets of orthodox neurology. Undeterred by 
this bias, however, Freud determined to examine the 
facts themselves and let nothing but their evidence 
influence his conclusion." (1956, p.121, 124).
If one believed Jones it would appear that what Copernicus and 
Darwin started, Freud has finished!
La Pierre, in his book 'The Freudian Ethic' (1959), suggests 
that the persistent claim to science would no doubt have been 
brushed aside if it had not been sponsored by '...men [women] 
of medicine ... Since they were Doctors of Medicine before they 
became Freudians, and since they did not abandon their status of 
physicians in assuming that of Freudian psychoanalysts, they gave 
to the practice and advocacy of Freudianism the traditional 
authority of medicine' (p.42). Such faith (unconditional) in 
professionally qualified people was poorly founded as the empirical 
research on suggestion and diagnostic judgements indicates (Masling,
1960; Temerlin and Trousdale, 1969).
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Masserman elegantly demonstrated the gullibility of physicians 
when he told a learned audience about a new psychosomatic syndrome 
of 'onychoneurosis' (the stubbed toenail neurosis). To his surprise 
the audience had taken his playfulness sefiously and were convinced 
that they had heard a new revelation (Masserman, 1953). Recent 
research, to be introduced in Chapter VIII indicates that professional 
scientists and statisticians generally think as unscientifically and 
non-probabilistically as the lay population (see e.g. Johnson-Laird 
and Wason, 1977; Mahoney, 1976). There is no reason to think that 
physicians would be any different. Indeed many argue that psycho­
analytic training in fact promotes a decline in the scientific 
ability of trainees (Brody, 1971; Marmor, 1968; Shakon, 1967).
Psychoanalysis Ought to Become Scientific
After the insistent and sometimes passionate claims to 
scientific status by Freud and his followers, and after the 
passage of seventy-five years, a recent friendly reviewer concluded 
that psychoanalysis 'can be and ought to become a science'
(Rapaport, 1968, p.32). Similarly Fisher and Greenberg in the 
conclusion to their mammoth survey of experimental literature 
pertinent to Freud's theories express their optimism that 'it 
is possible to approach Freud's work in a scientific spirit'
(1977, p.396) and that the time 'has come to face up squarely 
to the sparseness of what has generally been offered as support 
for Freudian formulations' (p.6). They recognised that many of 
the Freudian principles have been and are currently perpetuated 
by faith and authority.
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Glover (1952) also highlights this. He suggests that most 
disputes within psychoanalytic circles are settled by invocation 
of authority rather than examination of the pool of scientific 
evidence. Invariably looking back at Freud's original statements 
and case illustrations replaces data induced conflict resolution 
and decision making. Glover describes the common way in which 
'new facts' are established in psychoanalytic circles: "An
analyst, let us say, of established prestige and seniority produced 
a paper advancing some new point of view or alleged discovery in 
the theoretical or clinical area. Given sufficient enthusiasm 
or persuasiveness, or even just plain dogmatism on the part of 
the author, the chances are that without check, this view or alleged 
discovery will gain currency, will be quoted and requoted until it 
obtains the status of an accepted conclusion" (1952, p.403). Thus 
what change manages to occur reflects the power, status, persuasive­
ness or plain persistence of the innovating proponent. The early 
response of the psychoanalytic 'establishment' to Eric Fromm reflects 
this process graphically. Fisher and Greenberg (1977) suggest that 
the discarding of ideas is also informal and equally unscientific.
They use as an example some of Freud's ideas (e.g. inherited 
dispositions, death instinct) that have, for all practical purposes, 
been rejected by the psychoanalytic establishment, yet this occurred 
without explicit testing of their validity and subsequent rejection 
or without a direct statement that they would no longer be given 
serious weight.
Speaking before the American Psychiatric Association in 1965 
Engel asserted that psychoanalysis had not even begun to assume the status of 
a science; that it was still at a level of pre-science.
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Incidentally this was the conclusion arrived at by Popper in the 
early 1930's. Engel asked: "What are the reasons that psycho­
analysis as a science has failed in seventy-five years to progress 
significantly beyond the stage of an observation, data collection 
and theory building ... Theoreticians and would-be theoreticians 
we have in abundance but no more than a handful of scientists 
skilled in and dedicated to the critical examination of natural 
phenomena" (1968, pp.214-215). In a response to Engel's address 
Walter Stein admitted that he had touched 'a raw nerve of the body 
psychoanalytic, the state of crisis in psychoanalytic research ... 
our collective failure to line up to the enthusiastic overselling 
of our therapeutic promise that ushered in our sweeping acceptance 
by educated America ... Psychoanalytic research has never really 
gotten off the ground' (Engel, 1965, p.216).
Notwithstanding Silverman's (1976) recent presentation of 
several sound research programs, the general absence of an ongoing 
research program could be held responsible for what Ford and Urban 
(1976) called the stagnancy in psychoanalytic literature. In their 
review of Freudian therapy for the 'Annual Review of Psychology' 
they conclude that 'there is little substantive novelty in these 
writings ... the innovative stream is gone out of the psychoanalytic 
movement. Major theoretical and technical advances will probably 
come from other orientations' (1976, p.33). Psychoanalysis it 
appears has failed to avail itself of the subversive nature of 
scientific examination to rid itself of that which is defective 
and redundant. Jurjevich suggests that future historians in their 
summing up as to the status of Freudian science will conclude that 
'they talked big, they promised a lot, they wrote copiously, but it 
is hard to find scientific grains on the piles of chaff' (1974, p.263).
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PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Participants in the debate about the scientific standing of 
psychoanalysis rightly refuse to accept the ex cathedra assertions 
of Freud and his followers. But as we have seen before, the issues 
do not lend themselves to easy, black or white decisions. Whether 
one accepts or rejects Freud's claim is as was mentioned earlier 
inextricably enmeshed with one's definition of the concept 'science'. 
Science may be conceived of broadly or narrowly. The broader 
concept accepted by most European thinkers sees it as any productive, 
factual investigation which has theoretical significance. The 
narrower concept, expressed by most Americans, identifies science 
with an experimental or quasi-experimental procedure in which general 
theories produce specific hypotheses to be tested against predictions 
made with reference to a set of quantitatively tabulated data. Most 
critics of Freud use the narrower conception and, besides Eysenck, 
tend to be primarily American.
Freud's Theories - Progressive and Degenerating Program
Surprisingly, many of the leading philosophers of science are 
unanimous in their judgement that psychoanalysis is not in fact a 
scientific theory. We have already seen that Karl Popper (1963), 
who is regarded by some as the world greatest living philosopher 
(e.g. Magee, 1974), considers that because Freud's theories can 
explain everything, can predict nothing and are therefore judged to 
be prescientific since falsification is impossible. "What makes a 
theory, or a statement, scientific" according to Popper, "is its 
power to rule out, or exclude, the occurrence of some possible 
events - to prohibit, or forbid, the occurrence of these events"*
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Thus, the more a theory forbids, the more it tells us (Popper,
1976, p.92) . To briefly recapitulate on Popper's position, he 
asserts that all theories are ultimately false and can not be 
proved right but will ultimately be proved wrong. Thus he suggests 
instead of dividing scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones 
we should rather divide scientific method from pseudoscientific 
method: scientific method being characterised by the criteria
of falsifiability. Thus, if a theory specifies experimental 
conditions which could lead to disproof of the theory (as Einstein 
so elegantly and courageously did) then, and only then, that theory 
is scientific, if not, not. Consequently, a proposition may 
petrify into pseudoscientific dogma or become genuine scientific 
knowledge, depending on whether we are prepared to state observable 
conditions which would refute it. Using this reasoning and criterion 
Popper decided that both Marxism and Freudism are pseudoscientific 
theories (Popper, 1963).
There is much support for Popper's judgement. For example, 
Ernest Nagel (1959) also concluded that psychoanalysis is not a 
science since its concepts and formulations are so vague that they 
can not be tested. Yet, contradictorily he went on to reject 
psychoanalysis on a second account, namely, that some experimental 
evidence and anthropological data failed to support it. (This point 
will be developed subsequently.) Farrel (1964) is another to 
conclude that psychoanalytic theory is not scientific. He agreed 
with Nagel's comment that the Freudian theories are not sufficiently 
determinant, logical or empirical but in addition suggested that the 
data yielded to the psychoanalytic method was of doubtful scientific 
validity. And lastly, Thomas Kuhn whose international standing is
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comparable to that of Popper, concurs with him with respect to the 
scientific status of psychoanalytic theory. He stated that in 
"Examining the vexing case, for example, [of] psychoanalysis or Marxist 
historiography, for which Sir Karl tells us his criterion was 
initially designed, I concur that they cannot now be properly 
labelled 'science'" (1970, p.
Unfortunately, but as one would expect and as was alluded to 
in Chapter III, there are serious difficulties connected with 
Popper's view. At a conference called to discuss his and Kuhn's 
conjectures, it became very apparent that falsification theory 
itself had significant weaknesses (Lakatos and Musgrove, 1970).
The problems were made apparent by studying the success of Newton's 
theory of gravitation for although shown to have been literally 
riddled by anomalies and contradictions, its proponents did not 
give up the theory: paradoxically they behaved very much like
convinced Marxists and Freudians. Lakatos speculated that 'had 
Popper ever asked a Newtonian scientist under what experimental 
conditions would he [she] abandon Newtonian theory, some Newtonian 
scientists would have been exactly as non-plussed as some Marxists 
and Freudians' (Lakatos cited in Eysenck, 1976, p.343). Incident­
ally, Kuhn's views have also been found to be wanting as the 
change from one paradigm to another as described by Kuhn, is not 
supported by historical evidence (see e.g. Chalmer, 1976; Weimer, 
1979). The historical evidence refutes both Popper and Kuhn: 'on
close inspection both Popperian crucial experiments and Kuhnian 
revolutions turn out to be myths: what normally happens is that
a progressive research program replaces degenerating ones'
(Lakatos op cit, p.345).
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Imre Lakatos' answer to the demarcation issue is now perhaps 
the most widely accepted view among contemporary philosophers of 
science. To a considerable extent Lakatos' view combines and 
transcends those of Popper and Kuhn, and 'importantly bears directly 
on the matter under discussion. That is, is psychoanalysis an example 
of a progressive or degenerating research program?
Lakatos (1970) introduced the notion of research programs that may 
take decades before they get off the ground and become empirically 
progressive. Each program has a 'hard core' (i.e. a set of 
assumptions, laws, conjectures or in Kuhn's terminology a paradigm) 
that is tenaciously protected from refutation by a vast 'protective 
belt' of auxiliary hypotheses. But even more importantly, research 
programs have a 'heuristic', that is, a powerful problem-solving 
machinery which, with the help of sophisticated techniques, digests 
anomalies and even turns them into positive evidence.
According to Lakatos, Newton's theory of gravitation, Einstein's 
relativity theory, quantum mechanics, Marxism and Freudism, are all 
research programs, each with a characteristic hard core that is 
stubbornly defended, each with its more flexible protective belt 
and each with its elaborate problem-solving machinery. Each of 
them, at every stage of its development has unsolved problems and 
indigested anomalies. He points out that all theories, in this 
sense, 'are born refuted and die refuted'. But all theories are 
not necessarily equally 'good'. Some theories are scientific or 
progressive programs whilst others are pseudoscientific or 
degenerating. But how does one tell the difference?
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Lakatos answers that a progressive research program theory 
leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts. In 
contrast degenerating program theories are fabricated only in 
order to accommodate known facts. To use Newtonian physics as 
an example, advocates were able to predict the existence and exact 
motion of small planets which had never been observed before. 
Equally Einstein's program predicted novel facts that are only 
now being corroborated. With respect to Marxism, Lakatos (a 
confessed Marxist) , concedes that it never successfully predicted 
a stunning novel fact. On the contrary; it had some monumental 
failures to predict (i.e. the absolute impoverishment of the 
working class, the first socialist societies would be free from 
revolution).
"To sum up: the hallmark of empirical progress is
not trivial verification. Popper is right that there 
are millions of them. It is no success for Newtonian 
theory that stones, when dropped, fall towards the 
earth, no matter how often this is reported. But 
so-called 'refutations' are not the hallmark of 
empirical failures, as Popper has preached, since 
all programs grow in a permanent ocean of anomalies. 
What really counts, are dramatic, unexpected, stunning 
predictions: a few of them are enough to tilt the
balance, where theory lags behind the facts, we are 
dealing with miserable degenerating research 
programs." (Lakatos, ibid, p.345)
What then of Freud's theories - progressive or degenerating program? 
Eysenck sarcastically suggests that the claims made by Freud and 
his followers are certainly stunning, but he adds, there is a 
complete lack of empirical support for the predictions (Eysenck, 
1976). Before evaluating Eysenck's claim, the predictive strength
of psychoanalysis will be discussed.
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Prediction and Freud's Theories
It is important to note that Freud himself claimed that the 
psychological determining factors can be established retrospectively 
only, and once discovered cannot be used predictively in other 
cases. His explanation for what he called "this disturbing state 
of affairs" was rather simple: we cannot yet measure exactly the
relative strength of psychological factors with the result that in 
a circular fashion "we only say at the end that those which succeeded 
must have been the stronger” (Freud 1901, cited in Jahoda, 1977, 
p.15). Analysis can therefore recognise causality retrospectively 
with certainty, whereas prediction is impossible. Empirical evidence 
tends to support this conjecture. To restate this important point, 
"Freud 'felt that psychoanalysis could reconstruct the patients' 
pattern of defenses from events that had already occurred but that 
it was not able to plot them in advance" (Fisher and Greenberg, 1977, 
p.8) .
Notwithstanding Kaplan's (1964) defence of reconstructive or 
postdictive models as an appropriate research methodology for 
clinical research, postdiction and ad hoc explanations are generally 
eschewed by empirical psychologists. Although after-the-facts 
accounts of an observed phenomenon may illustrate some of the assets 
of a particular inference or construct and may be suggestive, they 
also invite conceptual 'cop-outs'. For example, theorists can 
isolate themselves from the corrective feedback of empirical evidence 
by equipping their theory with an ever-ready supply of ad hoc 
explanations. The Freudian defence mechanism of 'reaction formation' 
like the 'divine paradox' effectively produces a closed philosophical 
system. That is, Freud postulated reaction formation in order to
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account for the fact that observation occasionally revealed exactly 
the opposite sort of effect to that derived from the theory. Such 
a construct provides an effective way of 'avoiding refutation'.
Returning to the question of Freud's theories vis-a-vis 
Lakatos' definition of science in terms of a progressive program and 
pseudoscience in terms of a degenerating program, there is little 
doubt that Eysenck is correct in concluding that Freud must join 
Marx in the latter category. However, philosophical considerations 
make up but one of the many aspects of the problem: equally 
important is the empirical literature. It was noted earlier that 
many critics of psychoanalysis dismissed its claim to scientific 
status because they judged the Freudian system insufficiently 
determinant to permit testable hypotheses to be deduced. Such a 
stance has been empirically shown to be a myth. In fact Fisher 
and Greenberg claim the quantity of research data pertinent to 
Freudian theories grossly exceeds that available for most other 
personality and development theories. They conclude: "We have
actually not been able to find a single systematic psychological 
theory that has been as frequently evaluated scientifically as has 
Freud's" (1977, p.396).
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
The quantity of research literature certainly attests to the 
amenability of Freud's theories to experimental scrutiny. However, 
quantity is no guarantee of quality. To attempt to arrive at a 
position with respect to the quality of the vast literature is 
beyond the scope of this essay - in the limited space available only
the briefest overview is possible.
134.
There have been only a few large-scale attempts to judge whether 
Freud's theories are empirically corroborated. An early example 
was the study by Sears (1943). He concluded that "other social and 
psychological sciences must gain as many hypotheses and intuitions 
as possible from psychoanalysis but that the further analysis of 
psychoanalytic concepts by non-psychiatric techniques may be 
relatively fruitless as long as those concepts rest in the theoretical 
framework of psychoanalysis". Obviously Sears' work is quite out of 
date and since his advice was not taken - research has continued to 
burgeon as is evidenced by the recent publication of Fisher and 
Greenberg's (1977). They concluded, after consulting approximately 
1500 research reports, that a considerable scientific literature 
supports Freud's fundamental view that motives, feelings, and 
fantasies may exist in an individual without her/his awareness of 
them and that they may significantly influence his/her behaviour. 
However, their conclusion must be tempered by a consideration of 
the criteria applied in the selection of articles to be included. 
Although they excluded case histories they decided not "to rule 
out studies that had defects in their experimental design or that 
were based on over simplistic notions concerning Freud's model"
(1977, p.15). Their rationale was to propose that it "seemed more 
sensible to make a sweep of the total empirical data, flawed or 
otherwise, and to draw conclusions from overall trends" (1977, p.15). 
The wisdom of this decision seems questionable. Research to be 
discussed in Chapter Vlllwill evidence the difficulty of the task set 
by Fisher and Greenberg in evaluating such a vast literature without
employing explicit a priori decision making criteria.
135.
A third large scale study described by Fisher and Greenberg 
as a 'particularly dedicated effort', by Jahoda as 'meticulous', and 
by Eysenck as 'conscientious, scholarly and well-documented' was 
published by Paul Kline in 1972. After reviewing some 500 research 
reports, Kline concluded that "far too much that is distinctively 
Freudian has been reported for the rejection of the whole psycho­
analytic theory to be possible"(1972, p.350). However, after a 
'searching examination' of the evidence presented by Kline, Eysenck 
(1972) retorted "that the marshalled evidence for Freudian theories 
leaves the reader little option but to conclude that if this is the 
best that can be offered by way of support, then the only conclusion 
can be that there is no evidence at all for psychoanalytic theory" 
(1972, p.321). According to Eysenck and Wilson (1973) it did not 
seem that "he (Kline) was entirely impartial in looking at the 
studies being surveyed, but tended to overlook reasonable alternative 
hypotheses, accepted tests of poor reliability and no proven 
validity, paid little attention to problems of sampling, and was 
rather naive in considering the adequacy of the statistical treat­
ment given to the results" (1973, p.386).
The last study to be discussed was instituted in response to 
the publication of Kline's 'Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory'
(1972) . Eysenck and Wilson (1973) undertook to evaluate a limited 
number of articles which were widely believed to be the most 
convincing, the best designed and the most conclusive amongst those 
which confirm Freudian theories. They adopted and applied the same 
evaluative criteria as Kline had and claimed that they did not 
apply these more stringently than is normal practice in experimental 
psychology in other fields: 'if anything, we have been inclined to
bend over backward to temper the wind to the shorn lamb' (1974, p.386).
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Their 'dispassionate' conclusion was that the studies scrutinised 
gave little, if any support to Freudian concepts and theories.
In fact they postulate:
"There is not one study which one could point to 
with confidence and say: "Here is definitive
support which is not susceptible of alternative 
interpretation, which has been replicated, which 
is based on a proper experimental design, which 
has been submitted to proper statistical treatment, 
and which can be confidently generalised, being 
based on an appropriate sample of the population." 
After three quarters of a century this is a 
serious indictment of psychoanalysis, whether it 
can be interpreted as an overall disproof is of 
course another matter" (Eysenck and Wilson, 1973, 
P-392)
It would be difficult to attribute impartiality to Eysenck when 
it comes to evaluating Freudian concepts - nevertheless his 
conclusion should be responded to not with emotion and polemic 
but with data. This has not been forthcoming, although as 
mentioned earlier, Silverman's (1976) report on some contemporary 
research programs looks promising.
By way of a tentative conclusion one must agree with Eysenck; 
but to emphasise that refutation alone never disproves a theory.
As has been seen, whether a theory is subscribed to and survives 
depends not on the empirical data alone but on the balance between 
positive and negative instances, on the ability of the problem­
solving machinery to digest anomalies, and on the ability of the 
theory to predict novel facts. Against these criteria Freudian 
theory does not hold up well. Its survival seems due more to the 
vagaries of the Zeitgeist and the perceived absence of a viable 
alternative paradigm.
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CHARGES OF DELIBERATE SCIENTIFIC PRETENCE
One of the less attractive features of the debate about the 
scientific status of psychoanalysis has been the occasional 
vitriolic personal attack on Freud. To this point the argument 
has not suggested that psychoanalysis was the idiosyncratic product 
of Freud's wilful, deliberately deceptive charlatanism. Such 
claims have, however, been made. Despite Freud's convincing 
display of sincerity, cogent arguments have been advanced that 
his pseudoscience contains important elements of wilful pretence 
to science. These propositions will be examined below. By way 
of a palliative for those who find ad hominem argument obnoxious, 
it is only fair to say that they were also used by psychoanalysts 
and were a frequent ploy of Freud (as evidenced by his discrediting 
of Adler, Jung, Stekel, Rank and others who refused to abide by 
the original 'revealed' truths).
The Sources of Freud's Ideas-Observation or Literature
Much controversy surrounds Freud's claim that he learned all 
he knew from his patients. Twenty years ago Bakan (1958) suggested 
that Freud's inferences,rather than stemming from clinical 
observation, were surreptitiously imposed on them by Freud, the 
source of inspiration being the mystical fantasies of medieval and 
ancient Kabbalists, and particularly the esoteric, mystical and 
sexualised fantasies of Zohar. To substantiate his claim Bakan 
produced some amazing parallels between Kabbalistic thought and 
psychoanalytic ideas, particularly with regard to the role of 
sexuality. Rabbi Grollman (Grollman, 1965) agreed with Bakan that
138.
Freud unmistakably utilised many of the quasi-insights of mystical 
medieval Jewish dreamers to form some of the central propositions 
of his theories and practice (i.e. alleged sexual character of 
psychic energy, the exegetic method of dream interpretation).
Bakan leaves it open as to whether Freud deliberately disguised 
Talmudic teaching as clinical observation or whether Freud perpetrated 
a 'sort of reversed Piltdown hoax in psychology'(p.12). To use 
Jahoda's (1977) words, Freud never admitted publicly to his 
ideological indebtedness to Jewish mysticism, but in his private 
correspondence with Fliess, Abraham and Pastor Pfister he did 
speak of the Jewishness of his doctrine. In fact, publicly Freud 
denies in print any knowledge of Yiddish or Hebrew, although Jones 
(1953) informed readers that Professor Hamenschlag taught Freud 
the 'Scriptures and Hebrew'. Bakan considers such a dismutation 
strange. Equally strange is the reported absence of Zohar from 
Freud's library in New York even though a Jewish visitor had seen 
it among Freud's books in Vienna (Bakan, 1958).
Suspicion about Freud's claim for the data-dictated nature 
of his inferences has more recently been suggested by Cioffi (1970,
1974). Cioffi undertook the most meticulous textual analysis of 
Freud's various statements of his account of how he arrived first 
at and later rejected the theory that hysteria was the result of 
a childhood sexual seduction. The results of this scholarship was 
the explicit accusation of pseudoscience, more specifically, that 
Freud engaged in the 'habitual and wilful employment of methodologically 
defective procedures' (Cioffi, 1970, p.474). As was mentioned 
earlier, he went further to argue that underlying all the defects 
of psychoanalytic theories is the same impulse - the need to avoid
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refutation.
By way of example Cioffi examines the hypothesised link between 
adult neurosis and infantile sex life. He.suggests that such 
a link may be justified and corroborated by the accuracy of those 
portions of the reconstructions which are held to characterise 
childhood in general, thus being capable of 'confirmation' by the 
contemporary observations of children. Freud seemed to concur when 
he wrote "I can point with satisfaction to the fact that direct 
observation has fully confirmed the conclusion drawn from psycho­
analysis" (Freud, 1958, p.594). Indeed he claimed that the 'facts' 
of infantile sexuality were so obvious to the naked eye, once they 
had been stated boldly that it was a sheer miracle that they had 
not received full recognition before. Freud regarded the various 
manifestations of infantile sexuality as 'facts' but 'facts' in 
science alas are not as straightforward as he would have us believe.- 
An event (fact) does not have a unique interpretation, as Geertz 
(1973) has emphasised. You cannot literally see the difference 
between a wink and an involuntary twitch. As Jahoda (1977) high­
lighted, facts and inferences are often difficult to disentangle 
in Freud's work, but testing the inferences as a way of approaching 
- the factualness of infantile sexuality is, of course, a legitimate 
procedure.
Several empirical psychologists have collected relevant research 
together on the issues that were the focus of Cioffi's analysis and 
generally found little support for Freud's conjectures. For example 
Orlansky (1949) surveyed the research on infantile sexuality and 
concluded that there was no supportive evidence. Similarly, in the
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Sear's (1947) survey little support for the Freudian construction 
of infantile sexuality was forthcoming. A further negation of the 
primacy of sexual factors in early childhood came from Valentine 
(1942). He reported no evidence in support of the supposed 
Oedipus complex and went on to conclude:
"Whether the ideas of infantile sexuality reported 
by patients are indeed (a) suggested by psycho­
analysts - as Freud at one time himself suspected - 
or (b) are entirely or partly the patient's own 
interpretation of and exaggeration of relatively 
slight sensations and impulses, or (c) whether they 
are largely true but only in a few abnormal cases, 
this is not the place to discuss. But the fact 
that the reports of patients, which Freud himself took 
at first to be facts, proved to be mere fantasies, 
is very significant (1942, p.351)
Cioffi does not rest his case there, he goes on to point out the 
way in which Freud retreated to the esoterically observable (i.e. 
analytic observations) when he was faced with disconfirmatory 
evidence. Obviously such a retreat renders the direct observations 
of children futile for the purpose of validating psychoanalytic 
method and renders the theory impervious to refutation. It is 
not being suggested that analytic observations are intrinsically 
deficit or invalid, but to evoke them as a ways of avoiding dis- 
confirmation in the natural science paradigm is not legitimate - 
given Freud's insistence on the natural science nature of psycho­
analysis.
Cioffi also takes up a point made by Farrell (1964) and 
others (Escalona, 1952; Flowerman, 1954; Ludwig, 1947; Stuart, 
1970) that Freud wrote in such a manner as to make disproof difficult 
if not impossible. His writings they claim are often contradictory, 
curiously indecisive and generally abstruse. Flowerman (1954)
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has offered some striking examples of how Freud could at times 
formulate an idea in such a temporizing way that it was truly 
impossible to test its validity. Similarly Escalona (1952) 
describes the potential complexity that might be involved in 
corroborating the existence of Oedipal conflicts:
"Thus, if the child gives daddy a good night hug 
and insists that he, rather than mummy, tuck him 
in, his behaviour may also confirm our original 
hypotheses. His desire to have father put him to 
bed rather than the mother could be the result of 
a fearful state, i.e., as long as the father is 
with him the little boy can be sure the father is 
not doing anything to harm him. On the other 
hand, or also simultaneously, it may be an act 
of aggression towards the father in that it 
separates him from mother for the time being.
Or yet again, it may be because the little boy 
fears that if mother puts him to bed her seductive 
powers will prove too much for him ..." (p.16).
That Freud wrote in a manner that effectively erected barriers to 
refutation can not be denied. Whether it was deliberate is 
inconclusive.
Free Association - The Methodological Key
Freud's claim that psychoanalysis is a natural science rests 
to a considerable extent on the psychoanalytic method of observing 
the unconscious. He believed that most important source of data 
in psychoanalysis was made available through free association which 
was 'the methodological key to its results' (Freud, 1950, p.403). 
The analyst was seen to be an impartial scientist who took utmost 
care not to interpose on the flow of data from the patient. Freud 
claimed to have taken up the position behind the couch to create 
an immaculate experimental situation: "Since while I listen, I
resign myself to the control of my unconscious thoughts, I do not
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wish my expression to give thepatient indication which he may 
interpret or which may influence him in his communications" (Freud 
cited in Campbell, 1957, p.146). How well Freud achieve this non­
directive posture and how honest was his image is evidenced by 
his comment to Fliess on how gullible some of his patients were 
in their acceptance of sexual etiological speculation. Meanwhile 
things have grown livelier in the usually struggling medical 
practice. The sexual business attracts people, they go away 
impressed and convinced, after explaining: No one ever asked
me that before". (Freud cited in Bonaparte et al, 1954, p.354).
Unfortunately for Freud and his 'methodological key'fit has 
been shown that psychoanalysts (like all psychotherapists) are not 
detached observers; they influence what the client says and 
do so in all sorts of uncontrolled and unintentional ways. The 
subtlety of this influence is graphically evidenced by recent work 
on non-verbal communication (see e.g. Henley, 1977; Scheflen,
1974) . Haley (1963) goes as far as to suggest that the insistence 
that clients lie on the couch places the client in an inferior, 
manifestly sick role which may serve to heighten the psychoanalyst's 
indirect, suggestive power. Be that as it may there are grounds 
for considerable doubt that the analytic hour approximates in any way to 
a controlled experiment (as claimed by Kubie, 1960, Ramzy, 1962,
1963). Data suggests that psychoanalysts who witness the events 
of an analytic session have evidenced difficulty agreeing in their 
interpretation of these events (see e.g. Marmor, 1955; Seitz, 1966)
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Interpersonal influence in psychotherapy is ubiquitious as 
Frank (1968) has pointed out and this applies to all forms of 
therapy. Frank argues that "Evocative therapies may influence 
patients as much as directive ones. The powerful influencing 
effect of psychoanalysis and other 'permissive' therapeutic 
methods have long been rated ... To recapitulate, the content 
of the patient's utterances on non-directive therapy follow the 
therapists' unwitting leads, and patient's values shift toward 
those of the therapist in the course of successful treatment"
(p.22).
Contemporary psychoanalysts would benefit from reading the 
vast literature on experimenter induced biases and demand character­
istics (Orne, 1962; Rosenthal, 1963). The importance/ 
subtlety and robustness of these influences are convincingly 
documented in a recent publication entitled 'Self-fulfilling 
Prophecies' by Jones (1977). Barber's (1976) recent elucidation of the 
ways (ten in all) in which the behaviour of the experimenter may 
threaten the internal validity of an experiment seems particularly 
relevant too. For as Pinckney and Pinckney contend: "Although 
it is vigorously denied today, Freud admitted that the process of 
psychoanalysis puts thoughts as well as words in the patient's 
mind and mouth. You cannot apply the scientific method to test 
a hypothesis where you create your own evidence out of words, 
discard whatever evidence displeases you, and then say that your 
concept is correct simply because you say so" (1965, p.76).
144.
In short, evidence suggests that this 'methodological key' 
is so permeated by the analysts' comments and influences that it 
destroys the scientific validity of psychoanalysis. 'It makes 
Freud's findings of dubious scientific value"; the contaminating 
variables of the analysts' overt and covert suggestion render 
Freudian 'finding' scientifically worthless" (Jurjevich, 1974, 
p.283-284).
Along with free association, a frequent bone of contention 
was the apparent arbitrariness of Freud's interpretation and his 
employment of symbolism in particular. Writing in 1912 Wells 
referred to symbolism as the phase of psychoanalysis to which 
most legitimate objections are raised (Wells cited in Cioffi,
1973, p.18). The accusation is that Freud and his followers make 
symbols mean what they want. Thus it is claimed that although Freud 
was aware of the influence of suggestion and instituted rules 
designed to minimise its occurrence, his insistence that the 
latent dream thought was outside the suggestive power of the 
analyst is untenable. The skepticism about the interpretation of 
this content is captured by Aldous Huxley:
"It was the machinery of symbolism, by which the 
analyst transforms the manifest into the latent 
dream content, that shook any faith I might possibly 
have paid in the system. It seemed to me, as I read 
those lists of symbols and other obscure allegorical 
interpretation of simple dreams that I had seen this 
sort of thing before. I remember, for example, that 
old-fashioned interpretation of the Song of Solomon 
... I had never, even in infancy whole-heartedly 
believed that the amorous damsel in the Song of 
Solomon was, prophetically the Christ, and her lover 
the Saviour. There are no better reasons for 
believing that walking upstairs or flying are dream 
equivalents of fornication than for believing that 
the girl in the Song of Solomon is the Church of 
Christ." (1928, pp.316-17)
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Once again, the evidence seems to point overwhelmingly to the 
conclusion that the foundation of Freud's claim to science, namely, 
the psychoanalytic method of observing and interpretation, is 
seriously flawed. This is not to say that Freud consciously 
perpetrated a bias by ignoring the serious weaknesses in his 
methodological key but it is suggested that this weakness was a 
major constituent in the Freudian pseudoscience, irrespective of 
Freud's motives.
ALTERNATIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES
There are other issues and controversies, serious and trivial, 
which will not be discussed here as the case seems well established 
But before leaving the issue it should be restated that the 
ascription of the label pseudoscience to Freud's theories is not 
meant to demean his contribution to our understanding of ourselves. 
It should be restated that science is only one of several ways of 
gathering knowledge and is not intrinsically better or worse than 
other methods. Judgements depend on the purpose and criteria used. 
And as has been evidenced, science is an ambiguous and value laden 
term and cannot be clearly defined. In the foregoing discussion a 
narrow or,in Maruyamas'(1977) terminology, a hierarchical and non­
reciprocal causal definition of science was used where as many 
supporters of Freud's ideas suggest that this conceptualisation of 
science cannot be appropriately applied to psychoanalysis (Habermas 
1971; Jahoda, 1977; Ricoeur, 1970).
Even though Freud claimed that 'psychoanalysis is a natural 
science - "what else could it be?" (i.e. Naturwissenshaft) others 
propose that psychoanalysis is better seen as hermeneutics (see
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particularly Habermas who takes psychoanalysis as an outstanding 
example of a hermeneutic science). Psychoanalysis as hermeneutics 
belongs to the Geisteswissenschaft, for which the term humanistic 
science is the only available term. It is' argued that like history 
or literacy criticism, psychoanalysis should not be expected to 
establish its validity in the manner of the natural sciences by 
prediction from theory. Rather psychoanalysis should above all 
evidence coherence of part and whole interpretation, using emerging 
evidence from 'factual' events (Habermas, 1971).
There has been a much criticised (see e.g. Giorgi, 1970;
Koch, 1961; Rychlak, 1977) tendency in psychology, and the social 
sciences in general, to see the natural science epistemology as 
being the only 'scientific' approach to studying phenomenon. 
However, this is not the case. In a recent paper Maruyama (1977) 
delineated five different epistemologies available and currently 
employed in scientific research. More recently, Sampson (1978) 
has called for psychology to embrace an alternative to the natural 
science paradigm, in particular, a paradigm that recognises the 
impact of sociopolitical and historical factors on knowledge 
generation and validation. In light of the obvious relativity of 
the concept of science Freud may have been mistaken to identify 
with the Naturwissenshaft rather than the Geisteswissenschaft, for 
it appears that in dealing with the person, rather than with part 
psychological process, the former approach has been fairly 
unsuccessful. O'Neil (1972) has argued that "Those of us who 
have to deal with persons in our day-to-day work seem to be much 
more helped by a humanistic approach with its intuitive judgements 
of the concrete situations and its empathic judgements of what 
follow from there" (pp.88-89). Had Freud explicitly identified
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with the Geisteswissenshaft this 'legit'imate approach to understanding 
persons may have been further developed at this stage in history, 
notwithstanding,the powerful arguments of Habermas (1971) and others 
(Jahoda, 1977; Ricoeur, 197G) . Hebb (1974'), has suggested that 
attempts to make science simultaneously scientific and humanistic 
is misguided, if not impossible. In accord with what has been said 
above, he claims that what occurs is the confusion of two different 
ways of knowing human beings; one is science, the other is art. 
Science imposes limits on itself and makes progress by attacking 
only those problems it is fitted to attack by existing knowledge 
and methods. The other way of knowing about humans is the intuitive 
insight of the poet, novelist, historian and biographer. This 
alternative way of understanding people is a valid and deeply 
penetrating source of insight into ourselves and others but it is 
not 'scientific' and would be pretentious if-it claimed to be.
In a recent paper, Farson (1978) reviewed the progress of 
'humanistic psychology' and illuminated a marked disparity between 
the early claims and current practice within this orientation.
Farson highlighted the dearth of scholarly scientific work conducted 
by humanistic psychologists and suggests that it will be unlikely 
to make a serious contribution to the discipline. However, the ideas 
of Rychlak (1968, 1977), particularly as expressed in his recent 
book 'The Psychology of Rigorous Humanisms' are an obvious 
exception to Farson's disparagement.
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It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss and evaluate 
the dilemma which besets psychoanalysts vis-a-vis their choice of 
self-definition (see Salter, 1972, for a neat delineation of the 
alternatives) . The aim of the chapter was s'imply to substantiate 
the claim that Freud's theories cannot be legitimately called 
'scientific': if science is defined as a conventionally accepted
narrow, natural sciences sense. The inappropriate labelling of 
Freud's theories as scientific has been costly for the development 
of an efficacious approach to psychodiagnosis. It has lead to the 
widespread acceptance of the assertion that behaviour is relatively 
independent of the situation in which the person interacts. 
Consequently, personality was perceived as a set of needs, drives, 
psychodynamic structures or trans-situational traits, that initiate 
and guide behaviour. Thus the function of psychodiagnosis is to 
accurately measure these dispositions and to translate them into 
classificatory descriptions. The adequacy of these notions will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAFTER VI: THE ATTRIBUTE MODEL OF PSYCHQDIAGNOSIS
Historically, it has been demonstrated that clinical psychology, 
as a viable profession in the mental health field, emerged at the end 
of World War II and began to bloom thereafter. However, as we have 
seen, because of the restrictive policies of the 'psychiatric 
establishment' of the time, psychologists were not permitted to en­
gage in the prestigious practice of psychotherapy but were relegated 
to the auxiliary assessing function. Their subsequent development 
of exclusive expertise in the administration of esoteric measuring 
devices facilitated the demarcation of an area of influence within 
the mental health profession. It was suggested in Chapter III that 
because of the professional exigencies psychologists uncritically 
adopted and routinely applied measurement devices without questioning 
the purpose of the exercise. Using indirect projective tests and 
objective personality inventories containing disguised properties 
(i.e. MMPI, California Personality Inventory ) clinical psychologists 
ended up performing a role analogous to an X-ray technician. Whether 
the fruits of their labour had any impact on the ensuing decision 
making and treatment plans sadly seemed immaterial. Their role was 
that of assessor.
In embracing this role early, clinical psychologists took over 
the objective assessment devices that have been shown in Chapter IV 
to be the product of research and development conducted within a 
seriously defective paradigm - at least against the criteria adopted. 
It was argued that the resulting psychometric theory and research 
represented an example of 'grand' pseudoscience. Further, they also 
took over the Rorschach ink blocks, Murray's TAT and other projective
and associative techniques that were designed to provide inferential
150
evidence of the state of the examinees' unconscious motives and con­
flicts. These techniques were a direct outgrowth of Freud's own 
assessment technique of free association (Goldberg, 1975). Many- 
clinical psychologists became quite proficient at describing clients 
in psychoanalytic jargon, using a maximum of inference and a minimum 
of data and were highly valued by their psychiatric confreres for 
this reason (see Yates 1970). Thus, although they did not presume 
to take over the psychoanalyst's couch, they did become pseudo­
psychiatrists, "preaching and practising Freudians without encroach­
ing upon the psychoanalysts' preserves" (La Pierre, 1959 , p.46). The 
scientific status of Freud's theories and practice was evaluated in 
Chapter V and found to be wanting - again against the criteria 
adopted.
In retrospect, Bersoff's (1973) claim that psychoanalytic and 
psychometric theory provided a faulty foundation for the emergence 
of clinical psychology, more particularly psychodiagnostic practice, 
seems justified. The practice of psychodiagnosis, like any other 
area of technology, rests not only upon a varied assortment of 
learned skills, experiential expertise, and special procedures 
devised empirically from practice, but also upon various assumptions 
about the nature and function of the field. This latter domain of 
understanding can be thought of as the philosophical basis of 
assessment. Such assumptions are of tremendous influence in 
determining aspects of practice; yet they are rarely examined in 
detail.
The objective of this chapter is to undertake an analysis of 
the underlying assumptions and conceptual model of the traditional 
dispositional approach to assessment and to evaluate the empirical 
support for some of its central assumptions. This will lead to an
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examination of the model of causality that is implicit to the 
approach. It will be argued that the quasi-medical model of abnormal 
behaviour represents the logical extension of the dispositional 
model to the explanation of grossly deviant' behaviour. Lastly the 
way in which this approach to deviance leads to the medicalization 
of .ocial problems will be discussed, with special attention given 
to the politics of clinical judgements.
THE ASSUMPTIVE BASE OF THE ATTRIBUTE MODEL
The theoretical structure underlying an approach to psycho­
diagnosis can be delineated in the form of a conceptual model that 
reflects the data to be obtained and the uses to which they are to 
be put. Traditionally, psychodiagnosis has been conceptualised in 
terms of what McReynolds (1970) refers to as the 'attribute model'. 
Both j^oj'Choanalytic and psychometric theory are encompassed under 
this label. According to McReynolds (1970) assessment theory 
typically has been developed and presented as if this were the only 
possible model; as if it necessarily reflects the fundamental 
nature of assessment. This, however, as Cronbach and Gleser (1965) 
have reminded us is not the case: indeed there are various possible
assessment models that could be put forth, depending on the function 
that assessment is concerned to serve. Arthur (1966) was able to 
conceptualise five distinctly different models. There is little 
doubt, however, that the attribute model is the classical and con­
ventional approach to assessment. The model is founded on "Darwin's 
emphasis on differences among individuals, and all theoretical work 
behind test scores has attempted to conceptualise differences in 
abilities and traits" (Cronbach, 1971, p.440). The current
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dominance of the attribute model is illustrated by Kelly's (1967) 
introduction to his text, in which assessment is defined as "any pro­
cedure for making meaningful evaluations or differentiations among 
human beings with respect to any characteristic or attribute" (p.l).
The length of its lineage does not necessarily imply that the 
field has not been dynamic and innovatory. Goldfield (1977) 
suggests that one of the clearest barometers of the field's progress 
over the years is the ever-changing title of the journal specifically 
devoted to psychological assessment. The journal, launched in 1936 
was entitled the "Rorschach Research Exchange"; eleven years later, 
primarily as the result of the expanded scope of assessment devices 
the journal title changed to "The Rorschach Research Exchange and 
Journal of Projective Techniques". Research and development on 
objective assessment devices led to the next name change and in 
1963 the title became the "Journal of Projective Techniques and 
Personality Assessment". And finally, in the light of disappointing 
research findings on the reliability and validity of projective 
techniques the journal changed again, this time to its present title 
the "Journal of Personality Assessment". Goldfield speculates that 
the next name change may reflect the growing interest in behavioural 
assessment (1977, p.3).
Central Assumptions
Despite the apparent innovations in assessment evidenced above, 
the central assumptions remained protected and unchanged. its 
assumptive base was probably first articulated nearly a hundred years 
ago by Galton (1883). Essentially the aim of the approach was to 
measure given attributes of a given individual with the purpose of
153
either
(a) assigning the individual to a given category; or
(b) placing the individual at some point in the continuum 
represented by the attribute. This enterprise is given 
meaning through subscription to the shared common assumpt­
ion that what is measured are certain relatively stable and 
interrelated motives, characteristic traits and dynamics 
that are causally responsible for the individual's overt 
actions. Thus, in order to fully understand why an 
individual behaves in a particular way, one needs to 
obtain a comprehensive understanding or picture of the 
underlying states and traits.
From this vantage point, to simply observe and describe overt 
behaviour in various life situations is inadequate in that the causal 
essence of the person is deeper and more inferential than that which 
may be directly observed. Assessment must therefore focus on the 
structural or dynamic components assumed to make up the individual's 
personality structure. This may be done by means of pen-and-paper 
questionnaires or by projective tests that presumably enable 
skilled personnel to infer the latent content of the manifest 
behaviour. The implicit assumption in the administration of such 
tests is that the salient variable is the 'personality' of the 
examinee. Thus any differences in the Rorschach protocols, for 
example, produced by two different people are presumed to reflect 
differences in their personalities, preoccupations and concerns.
The model is predicated as an additional three assumptions that 
can be stated with respect to a given attribute of given individuals. 
Firstly, it is assumed that all individuals in some sense 'have' or 
car. ■>e characterised by the attribute, disposition or trait in
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question. Secondly, it is assumed that individuals differ among 
themselves with respect to the attribute. Thirdly, it is assumed 
that for each individual there is a true placement (score) on the 
attribute continuum, or correct categorical label, which is only 
approximated by assessment techniques. In a general sense, the 
assessment judgement is composed of the 'true' characteristic of 
the individual plus an error component or deviation of the observed 
score from the true score. This represents a Platonic perspective 
on the philosophy of measurement, that is - to take the view that 
scale scores are imperfect representations of psychological properties 
that exist in a pure form elsewhere (in this case inside people).
Although Hogan, DeSoto and Solano (1977) suggest that few 
contemporary personality researchers would endorse this Platonic 
view, in practice the view, although inarticulated, seems pervasive.
In fact in 1959 Kogen represented the relationship with the equation 
X=T+E in which X is the observed score or rating, T is the individual's 
'true' characteristic and E is the difference between the observed and 
'true' score. In line with this, the attribute model conceptualises 
the assessment device (tests, interview, etc) as a measurement ins­
trument and stresses the importance of accuracy of measurement, 
emphasising particularly the concept of reliability and validity.
The attribute model does not assume that the traits and states 
being assessed are ephemeral or situationally specific. Quite to 
the contrary, the inferred dispositional attributes are seen to 
determine behaviour in a consistent, at least at a covert level, 
way over time and across different situations or settings (see e.g. 
Cattell, 1950, Sanford, 1963). Whether one uses the language of 
factors, or of habits, or of basic attributes, or of dynamics and
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character stimuli, this fundamental assumption is pervasive. Our 
persistent belief in personality traits, and stubborn adherence to 
the view that there are pervasive cross situational consistencies 
in an individual, are ancient convictions (see eg Allport, 1937) .
And despite Hogan's et al assertion that "no one believes that 
speedometers 'really' measure speed or that the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale measures intelligence, nor do we think that 
personality scales measure traits", (Hogan, De Sotto and Solano,
1977, ps.256-257) in practice this important distinction is lost.
Test Responses as Signs or Samples
The attribute model is characterised by what Mischel (1972) 
refers to as a 'sign' approach to assessment. This applies to the 
assessment of states and traits. Goodenough (1949) is accredited 
with first distinguishing between the 'sign' and the 'sample' 
approaches to test responses. She suggested that when test responses 
are viewed as signs, an inference is made about the performance as 
an indirect or symbolic manifestation of some unobserved characteristic. 
In the trait approach, test responses are viewed as direct signs of 
the personality trait, with the strength of the trait determined by 
the number of signs. Importantly, the trait label is considered not 
merely a descriptor, but rather is seen as an underlying determinant 
of the observed behaviour, i.e. the signs (Allport 1937, 1966). Of 
course, not all trait theorists ascribe a causal role to traits, 
some see traits as terms to denote stylistic consistencies in 
behaviour (see e.g. Hogan, De Soto and Solano 1977). But un­
fortunately again this important point is often lost is practice - 
resulting in reification.
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In the more psychodynamic approaches to assessment, responses 
to the assessment stimulus are seen as indirect signs (or symbols) 
of an underlying personality organisation and dynamic forces. Any 
aspect of behaviour, for example expressed fears or obsessive thoughts, 
may be a sign that reveals important underlying conflicts but are in 
themselves of only trivial significance. Not only is the overt 
behaviour secondary, but it may be misleading, distorted and dis­
guised by protective defenses.
Thus the primary objective of psychodiagnosis is the discovery 
and accurate measurement of the individual's underlying dispositional 
structure or pervasive motivational system, i.e. their essence 
(Wallace, 1966). Since these attributes are not directly observed 
but are inferred from the assessment performance either directly or 
indirectly, the language used to describe the individual is pre­
dominantly 'genotypic' (Stuart, 1970).
The Language of Assessment
Genotypic language is essentially concerned with explaining 
behaviour in terms of sub-surface factors where as the alternative 
language system, referred to as 'phenotypic', focuses more on 
describing the surface diversity of behaviour. That is, phenotypic 
language stresses what a person does in quantitative terms whereas 
genotypic language stresses what a person 'is' or 'has'. The 
question of what is meant by statements to the effect that an 
individual 'has' certain attributes (e.g. introversion, inferiority 
complex, high need for achievement) is a thorny one.
Mac Corquodale and Meehl (1948) in a useful discussion of
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psychological inferences distinguished between two classes of inferred 
variables :
(a) those which are presumably potentially observable but are 
to date unobserved they referred to as 'hypothetical 
constructs', (i.e. traits in Allport's 1937 and Cattell's 
1946 systems), and
(b) that other type of inferred variable they called an 'inter­
vening variable' and is not seen as being even potentially
observable - it serves purely as a conceptual convenience 
(i.e. traits in Gough's (1969) Holland's (1973) and Welsh's 
(1972) systems).
If these distinctions are not kept clearly in mind the ever 
present danger of reification may be realised.
In an attempt to ameliorate this danger Tyler (1965) distinguished 
between traits and 'dimensions' - with the former supplying differences 
in amount and the latter implying difference in distance on a scale.
The danger of reification of concepts is a major disadvantage of 
the attribute model and is clearly enhanced by the use of genotypic 
language and the assumption of 'true' scores.
Qualitative Differences Between People
Genotypic assessment relies upon postulated qualitative difference 
between individuals. When applied to psychodiagnosis it is assumed 
that individuals who are 'mentally healthy' are qualitatively different 
from the 'mentally ill' and that the 'schizophrenic' is qualitatively 
different from the 'neurotic'. These qualitative differences are 
purportedly codified in the current Kraepelinean typology used by 
the mental health profession to classify clients. A major function
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of psychodiagnosis is the accurate arrival at a categorical label 
for the examinee. It is imperative in this process to note that 
the dispositions are derived by inference from the behavioural data 
and they are not isomorphic with this data.' That is, dispositions 
are logical rather than empirical entities.
Dispositional diagnosis draws both on 'signs' which are objective 
indicators of 'abnormality' and 'symptoms' which are indirect 
descriptions of subjectively perceived abnormalities (Holmes, 1946) 
in classifying clients. The traditional model of psychiatric 
classification relies almost exclusively on a genotypic approach 
which describes the inferential dynamics of the individual whose 
behaviour is problematic. The resultant categorical label presumably 
conveys information indicating the conditions associated with its 
origin (i.e. etiology), the planning of intervention or corrective 
strategies, and the generalised predictors of therapy and post­
therapy behaviour. These assertions may be readily analysed as 
there is a plethora of empirical research concerning the validity 
of genotypic diagnosis. This will be undertaken a little later.
Reliability and Validity
Because of the assumptive base of the attribute model, the 
concepts of reliability and validity are part and parcel of the 
associated assessment theory. ReZ'icib'il'ity is related to the 
correlation between the obtained and true scores. In a sense, 
reliability is conceptually a synonym for consistency. Psychometric 
reliability means that the measurement device can be expected to 
consistently discriminate between individuals from one occasion to
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the next. The variance of the test scores has a great deal to do 
with this type of consistency - the less the variance the more 
likely the discrimination will change across occasions. Psychometric 
variance is properly estimated in terms of error variance, product 
moment reliability coefficients, and standard errors of measurement.
All of these statistics are dependent on variance, if there is no 
variance then by definition there can be no psychometric reliability.
Validity 3 on the other hand, is related to the correlation bet­
ween the obtained score and some other estimate whether obtained or 
inferred, of the attribute. To evaluate empirically the psycho­
metric validity of a device, individual differences in the device 
may be compared with individual differences on another variable that 
is assumed to be highly related to the attribute being measured. If 
the device discriminates between individuals in approximately the same 
manner as the criterion variable, then this is positive evidence of 
the validity of the device. These interpretations of reliability 
and validity are not wholly applicable to other models (see for 
example the debate between Nelson et al (1977) and Cone (1977) vis a vis 
their application to behaviour assessment). The highly sophisticated 
development of these concepts has done much to enhance the dominance 
of the attribute approach (McReynolds, 1971) but as Bersoff (1973) 
has indicated quite often the psychometricians appear to have spent 
too much time focusing on statistical niceties at the expense of 
evaluating the external validity of many devices.
DISPOSITIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOUR
Implicit in the attribute model, at least as usually carried 
out, is a theory of human behaviour, namely, that behaviour is
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essentially determined by intraorganismic factors. The attendant 
assumption is that if we understood the individual well enough, we 
would be able to predict her/his behaviour without detailed knowledge 
of the contextual milieu. Hence MischelLs criticism of the tendency 
in psychodiagnosis ' ... to use a few behavioural signs to
categorise people enduringly into fixed slots on the assessor's 
favourite nomothetic trait dimension and to assume that these slot 
positions were sufficiently informative to predict specific behaviour 
and to make extensive decisions about a person's whole life* (1979 
p.146). Although the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this 
assumption has been occasionally questioned (see for example Lehman and 
Witty, 1934; Newcomb, 1929; Thorndike, 1906; Vernon, 1964) the major 
figure in the current round of the debate has been Walter Mischel 
(1968, 1969, 1972, 1973, 1977, 1979).
A little over a decade ago Mischel published 'Personality and 
Assessment' in which, after reviewing both past and current research 
in a very considered way, he argued that personality attributes are 
constructs of the observer which may have little or nothing to do 
with generalised, trans-situational behavioural patterns of the 
observed. The stubborness of our adherence to the concept of 
personality traits reveals the pervasiveness of 'magical' thinking 
and its power in influencing our perception of reality. Everyday 
personality traits (e.g. dependent, aggressive, friendly) are not 
correlational patterns to be found in conduct : they are clusters of 
meaning evoked by conduct (Shweder, 1975).
Personality traits are symbols or interpretative categories 
that link together items of behaviour and are linked to each other
by conceptual relationships that have little to do with frequency or
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correlation (Shweder, 1977 p.452). Mischel (1968) went further 
to assert that the predictive utility of an attribute based approach 
to personality remained undemonstrated and that situational specif­
icity of behaviour appeared to be the rule rather than the exception. 
Although evidence was available to signify temporal stability there 
was much evidence for the discriminativeness and ideographic organ­
isation of behaviour patterns. Summarising his review, Mischel 
concluded 'Although behaviour patterns often may be stable, they 
usually are not highly generalised "across situations"' (1968, p.282).
Mischel's Critique of the Attribute Model
Although other contemporary authors have drawn similar conclusions 
(see e.g. Fiske 1974, Peterson 1968, Shweder 1973, 1975) it was 
Mischel who provoked the most controversy by arguing that the 
commonly observed +.30 cross situational correlation coefficient 
probably reflected 'true' behavioural variability rather than an 
artifact of imperfect methodology, as has often been claimed. It 
remains to be seen to what degree the erratic and uneven relation­
ship, typically found when cross-situational consistency is studied, 
reflects methodological problems (as Block, 1977 recently suggested) 
or the actual discriminativeness of social behaviour across psycho­
logically non-equivalent situations (Mischel, 1977). 'In my view, 
better measures will surely provide better support for the existence 
of meaningful organised behaviour patterns. It should be noted that 
discriminative behaviour and ideographic organisation implies neither 
chaos nor unpredictability'(Mischel, 1977, p.742).
In his early review Mischel (1968) clearly announced that the 
data was sorely lacking that would corroborate the notion that 
personality dispositions were important components of an individual's
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behaviour which are consistent across situations. Since personality 
tests like the MMPI, the CPI and the TAT are commonly assumed to 
measure such traits, the relevance of these tests for the development 
of psychological theory was questioned. Evidence marshalled by Mischel 
was clearly an embarrassment to trait theorists (see below) but, as 
we have seen, research programmes are relatively indifferent to 
anomalies and contradictory evidence. The 'protective belt' has 
staved off the lethal blows. Exactly when the accumulating refut­
ations will promote disenchantment appears to be an individual matter. 
Several notable researchers have expressed the disillusionment, for 
example, early on Peterson expressed his dissatisfaction in the 
following way :
the generality of these (personality) measures over method 
and situation was still not high enough to justify perpetuating 
the traditional concepts of personality. The findings required 
abandonment of a line of research to what I had devoted ten 
years of my life as a psychologist. The results also required 
a change in beliefs about the nature of personality. This 
research, per se, did not say which way the conceptual shift 
should go, but it suggested very strongly that traditional 
conceptions of personality as internal behaviour dispositions 
were inadequate and insufficient (1968, p.23).
As one would have expected, very few of Peterson's confreres 
imbued in the traditional paradigm allowed the data to induce 
similar renunciations. Rather the perceived attack on personality 
gave rise to a lively 'between paradigm' debate (as e.g. Alker, 1972; 
Bern, 1972; Block, 1977; Wachtel, 1973) and an acceleration of relevant 
research (see e.g. Bern, and Allen, 1974; Epstein, 1979; Olweus, 1977).
It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to review the contempor­
ary debate, or even to attempt to adequately summarise it. The sub­
sequent discussion will instead restate Mischel's central argument 
and briefly discuss the major sources of data. A more detailed
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review of the reliability and utility dispositional diagnosis will 
be undertaken in the next chapter.
Mischel's original book (Personality .and Assessment, 1968) was 
often mistakenly perceived to be a situational manifesto aimed at 
undoing the role of dispositions. This was far from his intent. His 
self-professed aim was to 'defend individuality and the uniqueness 
of each person against what I saw as the then prevalent form of 
clinical hostility' (Mischel, 1979, p.742). To do this it was 
necessary to cogently document the flimsiness of evidence available 
to support the vitality of ascribing global dispositiona"* labels.
The central finding was that, with the exception of cogn tive 
variables, the utility of inferring personality disposit on from 
behavioural signs is underscored by the data. To recrpi ulate :
Response patterns even in highly similar situations often 
failed to be strongly related. Individuals show far less cross- 
situational consistency in their behaviour than has been assumed 
by trait-state theories. The more dissimilar the evoking 
situation, the less likely they are to produce similar and con­
sistent responses from the same individual. Even seemingly 
trivial situational differences may reduce correlations to 
zero (Mischel, 1968, p.177) ... with the possible exception
of intelligence, highly generalized behavioural consistencies 
have not been demonstrated, and the concept of personality 
traits as broad dispositions is thus untenable (Mischel 
1968, p.146).
Empirical Evidence for the Consistency Position
The attack on the assumed cross-situational consistency of 
state/trait theories rested primarily on three major sources of 
empirical evidence. Most important was the large number of studies 
that were unable to produce correlation co-efficients greater than 
+.30 when behaviour in one situation was correlated with behaviour
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in another situation. As Mischel (1969) noted ' ... a correlation
of +.30 leaves us understanding less than 10% of the relevant variance. 
And even correlations of that magnitude are not very common and have 
come to be considered good in research on the consistency of any non- 
cognitive dimension of personality' (p.1012). Certainly to predict 
individuals with reasonable accuracy, correlations of the vicinity 
of .80 or .90 are required.
Although a few studies have reported correlations of such 
magnitude when behaviour was averaged over many days (see e.g. Epstein 
1979) the vast majority of studies have yielded meagre correlations.
So consistent are the correlations less than .30 that Bern (1972) 
contends that the issue of stability in personality cannot be re­
solved by dispute but only by data : specifically, correlation co- 
efficents in excess of .30. He suggested that when personologists 
are able 'to predict behaviour across situations better than +.30, 
Mischel will fold up his tent and steal away' (Bern, 1972, p.18).
Bern went further to suggest that :
There was nothing silly about the initial assumption of 
personologists that everything was glued together until 
proved otherwise. But since it has now proved otherwise it 
seems only fair to give a sporting chance to the counter­
assumption that nothing is glued together until proven other­
wise. Instead of assuming cross-situational to be +.1.00, 
let us begin by supposing them to be 0.00 until we can 
explicitly construct them to be otherwise (Bern, 1972, p.28).
A second source of evidence consists of findings from the 
apportionment of variance in analysis of variance designs. This 
procedure was independently introduced into the assessment of 
stability of personality research by Raush (1965) and by Endler and 
Hunt (1968, 1969). The research strategy purports to yield the 
relative separate quantitative contributions of the person and
165
situation, as well as the person and situation interaction. Early 
results of this line of investigation suggested that the variance 
attributed to individual differences was usually much smaller than 
the variance attributable to the situation and to the interaction of 
the situation and person (Endler and Hunt, 1968; Moos, 1968, 1969). 
Later, however, in an influential position paper Bowers (1973) 
challenged this conclusion but was forced to concur that too little 
of the total variance was due to the person to justify a thorough­
going trait position.
It may be pointless to analyse the research further as it is 
now evident that the procedures for partitioning variance are so 
severely flawed that they render interpretation meaningless (see e.g. 
Golding, 1975; Olweus, 1977). In addition to the misuse of analysis 
of variance in the studies, the very nature of the question is 
questionable and more likely to create a pseudocontroversy that 
pits the person against the situation, than clarify the issue. The 
assumption is implicating the question in direct contrast with 
Mischel's (1968) aim of calling attention to the specific reciprocal 
interactions between persons and contexts. It also obscures the 
fact that the answer must always depend on the particular situation 
and person sampled. Presumably studies could be designed to demon­
strate almost any answer - this was Moos' (1972) contention. He 
recognised that a study could be designed so that :
any result is possible. I think that all one can say is that 
given relatively real life situations (e.g. patients in wards, 
or in outpatient psychotherapy, or your (Mischel's) delay of 
gratification studies) that the major proportion of variance 
simply does not appear to be accounted for by individual 
difference variables. One could certainly, however, easily 
design studies in which the major portion of the variance 
would be accounted for by individual differences variables.
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Frankly, this is why I have stopped doing studies of this 
sort. It seems to me that the point has now been amply 
demonstrated, and it is time to get on with other matters 
(Moos cited in Mischel, 1973, p.171).
The last source of evidence to be cited is the tendency to 
attribute more stability to individuals across situations than is 
objectively warranted (see e.g. Jones 1979; Shwedler 1975). 
Additionally, earlier reference was made to as the 'fundamental 
attribute error : a tendency to underestimate the importance of
situational determinants and overestimate the degree to which actions 
and outcomes reflect the actor's disposition' (Ross, 1977, p.193-194). 
There are many persuasive reasons postulated by person perception 
researchers to explain the apparent stubborn adherence to untenable 
beliefs. Rather than briefly introduce the relevant research here, 
it will be discussed in Chapter VIII. It should be noted, however, 
that the presence of overestimations of stability does not establish 
that there is no stability in behaviour apart from such bias.
The Categorization of People
It is probably timely to recall that in marshalling negative 
evidence Mischel's aim was not to demonstrate an absence of stability 
but rather that specificity is the case; that specificity more 
accurately reflects our impressive discriminative faculty. Mischel 
(1968) argued not against the concept of traits but that, when the 
relationship between the observed behaviour and the attributed trait 
are relatively direct, traits serve essentially as summary terms 
for the behaviour that has been integrated by the observer. As 
such they may serve a useful purpose. Global characterisations of 
salient personal qualities and broad, highly abstracted categories 
may be useful with minimal moderations or specific situational
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qualifiers. But Mischel was adamant that : for the purpose of more 
specific communication; for explaining the phenomena of personality; 
for making statements about individual behaviour; and for predicting 
specific behaviour in relation to specific conditions, careful dis­
criminative limits must be included.
Eleven years after the publication of 'Personality and Assessment' 
Mischel contends that 'although temporal stability in the patterning 
of individual lives, in self-perceptions, and in how others view us 
is not in dispute, there is serious disagreement about the nature, 
degree, and meaning of cross-situational breadth of behaviour assessed 
by objective measures of the behaviour as they unfold (1979, p.742).
The challenge remains essentially unchanged, namely, that global dis­
positional labels are inadequate causal explanations and lack clinical 
utility. Obviously "when the consistency issue is viewed in terms of 
the utility of inferring broad response tendencies from behavioural 
signs and not in terms of more metaphysical questions of the existence 
or validity of personality dispositions, the answer must depend upon 
the particular objective or purpose for which the inference is made" 
Mischel's original treatise, is oriented primarily on current psycho­
diagnostic assessment practices. It was in this context that Mischel 
cautioned that even though the statistically significant relationships 
found in personality research are :
"sufficient to justify personality research in individual and 
group differences ... their value for making statements 
about an individual are severely limited. Even when statistically 
significant behavioural consistencies are found, and even 
when they replicate reliability, the relationships usually are 
not large enough to warrant individual assessment and treatment 
decisions except for certain screening and selection purposes" 
(1968, p.38).
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Even though there are occasional discussions of the difference 
between clinical and statistical differences in the published 
literature (Lick, 1973) the importance of this topic is not apparent 
in much discussion of research. Many investigators appear content to 
rest on their, statistical laurels and not to worry overly about the 
actual practical value of their results. This difference is at the 
heart of Mischel's critique, and the more general assault on the 
utility of dispositional approaches to personality that has come 
to be known as the 'situationalists' position. Both these critiques 
have been much misunderstood.
The critiques generally do not imply that people show no con­
sistency, that individual differences are insignificant, or that 
situations are the most important determinant of behaviour. The 
real issue is the clinical utility of decisions and predictions 
based on global trait/state inferences. The critique questions 
the traditional personality paradigm that promotes traits/states as 
the intrapsychic causes of behavioural consistency (and occasional 
phenotypic inconsistencies). It is argued that such a perspective 
obscures the impressive discriminative faculty and sensitivity of 
individuals to the subtle nuances of their contexts.
THE QUASIMEDICAL MODEL
It has been stated several times that Mischel's critique of 
the attribute model of assessment was provoked by the aversive 
consequences of its application (see e.g. Stuart Chap 5, 1970) to 
the identification and categorical labelling of individuals who 
threaten the normative penumbra. In this section the implications
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of construing deviance from the perspective of the attribute model 
will be delineated. Or, alternatively, the attribute model's 
answers to the question "who is normal"? will be discussed. The 
threatening antiquity of mental disorders (who is mad? Who is sane?) 
leads us to take our system of perceiving 'mental illness' for granted 
when it is just that system which should be the object of study 
since it defines our experience of 'mental illness'.
The Clinical Definition of Normality
Because the attribute model represents a union of psycho­
dynamic and psychometric beliefs in the one system, not surprisingly 
it provides two definitions of normality. The first answer to the 
question of who is mad comes from the disease theory perspective 
and was primarily the result of Freud's influence. The second an­
swer, was contributed by the psychometricians and is based on the 
statistical probabilities of differences occurring in specific 
characteristics. Unfortunately, the two approaches are quite often 
used interchangeably and clinicians may think in one system while 
operating in the other with unfortunate consequences for the client.
(a) The Pathological Model of Normality
The disease theory or pathological model of normality was developed 
in medicine as a conceptual device for comprehending and controlling 
disease processes and organic malfunction. Medical concern has 
traditionally been aroused when conditions occur which interfere 
with biological functioning and homeostatic processes of the 
organism. Consequently, the focus of the pathological model is
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the presence of pathology and its removal. Bordua (1967) has 
suggested that the model appears to have six principal elements :
(1) There is an underlying pathological condition in the 
sick person which can usually be diagnosed by a syndrome 
of physical symptoms;
(2) An effective or ameliorative treatment is known for many 
types of cases;
(3) Treatment involves doing something to the sick individual;
(4) The disease condition may get worse, leave permanent 
damage, or take an inordinately long time to return to 
a healthy condition without treatment;
(5) In most cases the treatment has little or no harmful 
side effects; and
(6) A principle of medical diagnosis asserts that it is 
generally preferable to treat a well person erroneously 
diagnosed as sick than to leave a sick person untreated.
The implications of these assumptions will become apparent as 
discussion proceeds.
A clinical diagnosis based on the pathological model begins 
with an abstract concept of the nature of symptoms that constitute 
a particular disease syndrome, and then detection of whether the
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pathological symptoms are present in the individual case. If they 
are, the person is sick, if not, then the person is well. The path­
ological model is thus conceptually a bipolar construct. At one 
pole is normal, which is equated with health and absence of path­
ology. At the other pole is abnormal, defined by the presence of 
pathological signs and equated with disease. To be abnormal is 
unhealthy, or in the light of the principles listed above, is 
'bad' and should be prevented or alleviated. To be normal, that is 
healthy/is 'good' and should be sought after and maintained. It 
can be seen from this that the pathological model is essentially 
evaluative.
(b) The Statistical Model of Normality
In contrast a non-evaluative definition of normal is provided 
by the statistical model. Unlike the pathological model which 
defines the symptoms of pathology by functional analysis, the 
statistical model defines abnormal according to the extent to which 
an individual attribute varies from the mean of a particular 
population of measurement. The definition rests on the assumption 
that an individual's attributes can be gauged by his/her relative position 
in a frequency distribution of other persons. Consequently 
normality is defined as the zone range of one standard deviation 
either side of the arithmetic mean - this comprises approximately 
68% of the population.
Again, unlike the bipolar pathological model, the statistical 
model defines two types of abnormal - those who have unusually 
high and low measures of the characteristic in question. Thus 
there are gradations of abnormality depending upon the frequency
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of occurrence or distance from the mean. The model is non- 
evaluative or neutral in that the desirability or otherwise of 
being abnormally high or low depends on the characteristic being 
measured and is socially arbitrated. The statistical model is 
not restricted to establishing norms for biological characteristics 
but is also used to establish behavioural norms.
Initially the pathological model was directly applied to the 
understanding of deviant behaviour, as it had been earlier by the 
ancient Greeks and Romans (Rosen, 1968), but by the end of the nine­
teenth century it was becoming apparent that psychopathology could 
not be adequately accounted for in terms of the prevailing model 
of underlying organ disease. To satisfactorily account for many 
of the troublesome behaviours for which no organic cause could be 
found, Freud reformulated the medical model. Retaining the central 
notions of an underlying disease to which the symptoms can be 
attributed, Freud suggested that the disturbed behavioural symptoms 
were the result of psychological disorders. The supposed causal 
agents underlying 'abnormal' or deviant behaviour in this 'medical 
analogue' theory (Ullman and Krasner, 1975) is a set of diseased 
personality attributes (Buss, 1966).
We have already recorded that this extrapolation of the 'genuine' 
medical model, which utilizes the model but not its content has 
been called the intrapsychic or quasimedical model. This extra­
polation and reasoning by analogy, in which the model is taken for 
empirical truth, without considering how well it applies almost 
inevitably results in the generation of ideology (Leifer, 1969).
The history of the transplantation of the medical model into
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the field of problematic behaviour has been described by Ullman 
and Krasner (1965, pp.2-45) and others (Foucault 1965, Rosen 1968, 
Rothman, 1971) and need not be repeated here. That the model 
worked well in the treatment of physical ailments is probably the 
chief reason for its ready acceptance by psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists. However, the influence of psychoanalysis and the 
early dominance of the clinical arena by medically trained 
psychiatrists should notbe under emphasised. Irrespective of the 
reasons postulated, the end result was the "transplantation of 
concepts and methods of proven usefulness in physical illness into 
the fields of 'mental illness'. Thus, disorders of behaviour have 
been regarded as diseases for which an etiology must be found, 
which will ultimately lead to a specific treatment. Hence the 
stress on the importance of diagnosis and the belief that specific 
causes would be found for specific mental illnesses" (Yates, 1970, 
P- 4) .
In order for the model to be legitimately applied to clinical 
psychological practice, it must be shown to be appropriate and 
useful. "There is", according to Stuart (1970, p.7) "good reason 
to believe that it is neither". Certainly, a number of the assumed 
parallels between physical and mental illness simply do not material­
ise (see e.g. Cowen, 1973; Schofield, 1964). And although the 
treatment of 'mental illness' by psychotherapists and psycho­
analysts has been nominally isomorphic with this medical model, in 
practice, some elements of the model are inappropriate for dealing
with social behaviour (Turner and Cuming, 1967).
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The Transformation of Behavioural Differences into Signs of Pathology
The problems elucidated above are compounded when the genuine 
or quasimedical model is used in conjunction with the statistical 
model and the two definitions of abnormality are coupled, as in, for 
example, the official nomenclature for defining mental retardation 
(Braginsky and Braginsky, 1971; Mercer, 1973). When a diagnostic 
evaluation is conducted using both models as is the case in most 
psychodiagnostic situations - there is a tendency to think in terms 
of one model while assessing within the other. That is, behavioural 
differences (particularly relatively infrequent behaviour) may be 
illicitly translated into a pathological sign. An example of the 
elicit logic that underlies this transformation is spelt out by 
Mercer (1973, p.6) as follows : Low IQ is undesirable and 'bad' in 
Western cultures; Bad equals the presence of pathology in the medical 
model; thus a low IQ indicates pathology. Through this implicit 
process IQ which is not a biological manifestation but a behavioural 
score becomes conceptually transformed into a sign of pathology 
carrying all the implications of the disease theory outlined 
above. Psychodiagnosis is replete with examples of this illicit and 
faulty reasoning that results in the transformation of differences 
into signs and symptoms. It is almost inevitable given the two 
definitions of normal outlined above which are intrinsic to the attribute 
mode.
An important result of the existence of these two definitions 
is the ever present opportunity for psychodiagnosticians to serve 
politically conservative ends by taking the behavioural norms of 
the dominant culture (WASP) and construing gross deviation from
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these as signs of pathology. This is only possible if psychologists 
fail to acknowledge that the statistical definition of normal is 
not trans-society (as the medical model is) . When the statistical 
model is used to define normal performance, the emergent norms can 
not be legitimately generalised beyond the population sampled. 
Equally important is the requirement that the characteristic being 
measured is distributed normally. Not infrequently psychologists 
should remember Boring's (1920) assertion that there is nothing 
normal about Normal Distributions - that they don't inhere in nature, 
or as Simon (1968) conjectures "its occurrence [Normal Distribution] 
is entirely caused by the researcher and its appearance 'means' 
that the researcher may consider that his(her) research work is 
complete" (p.436). And lastly, when the statistical model is used, 
if a minority group is included in the sampled population they 
will be abnormal - it is intrinsic to the model. Whether this 
abnormality will be valued positively or negatively, and whether 
it will be taken as a sign of pathology will depend on socio­
political factors.
FROM SINNER TO SICK DEVIANT
The attribute model by combining together two definitions 
of normal - one evaluative and trans-societal and the other neutral 
and population specific - readily lends itself to the medicalization 
of deviant behaviour (Conrad, 1975; Divoky and Schräg, 1975;
Szasz, 1971). Attendant with this medicalization of social 
problems is the rise of a rationale of 'treatment' in reaction to 
deviant behaviour; this phenomenon has been referred to as the 
therapeutic state (Kittrie 1971, Szasz 1970). Examples of the
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pervasiveness of this ideology can be found in all areas of social 
deviance. Kurpas for example states that "The criminal is a sick 
person, crime is a disease; a symptom of mental aberration" (1954, 
p.218) and similarly Lindner asserted that‘crime is not an act against 
the law, nor against 'nature', nor necessarily anti-social but "crime 
is a symptom, actually expressed, of internal maladjustment and 
conflict" (1946, p.38). Designating undesirable conduct as illness 
rather than crime has been a major hallmark of this century's 
rise of the therapeutic state. The measure of the transition from 
a penal to a therapeutic model is dramatically illustrated in a 
report which concluded that "racism is the number one public health 
problem facing America today" (cited in Kittrie, 1971 p. XVI).
The Social Impact of a New Label
The question of whether a person who, say, transgresses a civil 
law should be called criminal or mentally ill is not merely an aca­
demic question. Kittrie evidences this by stating : "The clients 
of the therapeutic state increasingly recognise it as a two-edged 
sword. They fear that the label of treatment engenders in the 
public as much suspicion and hostility towards the one who is being 
treated as does the criminal label, they fear that in the name of 
therapy society seeks to impose controls over people and behaviour 
that should be free of societal intervention; and they fear, finally 
that the therapeutic state possesses tools of human control that 
far exceed in their threat to individual liberty the sanctions 
possessed by the criminal model (1971, p.XVII).
On this score Sarbin offers an interesting observation, which 
fits in nicely with Scheff's (1966) notion about the reactions of
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others helping to stabilize mental illness. Sarbin (1967) notes 
that " ... because of the inherent vagueness in the concept of mind, 
its assumed independence from the body, and its purported time­
lessness (derived from the immortal soul), there is a readiness to 
regard this special kind of sickness as permanent" (p.451). It does 
appear that people react to those labelled mentally ill as if they 
are permanently disabled. This is attested by the recent Eagleton 
affair. Eagleton was proposed as vice-president of the United 
States by McGovern only to have his nomination withdrawn after 
evidence of three treated occurrences of depression was reported.
The disabling aspects of Eagleton's history was not so much that 
he had been depressed, but that he had seen a doctor who 'treated 
the mind'.
Along a similar line, Szasz (1970) argues that in criminal 
cases, when a successful insanity plea results in commitment to a 
mental institution, the deviant would have been better off not to make 
that plea - if being better off is spending less time incarcerated. 
Reinforcing this assertion Chu and Trotter (1974) revealed that in 
1965, 94% of all prisoners in federal prisons of the United States 
had been incarcerated for five years or less. In contrast, over 
half of the patients of a large mental hospital surveyed had been 
inpatients for 10 years or more, and 37% had been inpatients for 
20 years or more. Further, the evidence indicates that 'mentally 
ill' persons are still regarded quite negatively by lay persons, 
therapists and other psychiatric patients (see, for example,
Rabkin, 1977; Wills, 1978).
Notwithstanding the view expressed above, therapeutic 
correction has been advocated by professionals not only for formal
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law breakers but for drug abusers, school truants, homosexuals, 
political activists, lonely homebased parents, prostitutes ... the 
list seems infinite.
The 'Insane' as Patient or Victim
Today there is an active contest between two fundamentally 
different and conflicting approaches to explaining grossly deviant 
behaviour. On the one hand there are those who subscribe to the 
attribute model with its emphasis upon the individual nature of 
mental illness. From this perspective the 'mentally ill' are con­
strued to be the carriers of a 'disease' that leads them to become 
patients. On the other hand there are those that subscribe to a 
psychosocial perspective (variously called 'labelling theory' the 
'societal reaction model', 'interactionist theory') with its emphasis 
upon the communal nature of mental illness. From this perspective 
the mentally ill are seen as victims of external contingencies that 
lead them to be ascribed a new social role as an institutional 
inmate or as psychiatric patients. (See e.g. Goffman 1961; Perrucci, 
1974; Scheff 1966).
Superficial reading of historical accounts of social reactions 
to mental illness suggest genuine progress from prescientific periods 
of ignorance and inhumane treatment justified by recourse to super­
natural and demonological theories, through the enlightenment to 
the modern scientific era of informed and humane treatment. Most 
historical accounts emphasise and dwell upon the different ways in 
which the mentally ill have been treated in different periods. 
However, most histories of abnormal psychology are written from the 
viewpoint of the medical model, they give detailed descriptions of
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the long struggle of medicine to gain its 'rightful' dominance in 
the field of 'sick' behaviour (see for example, Spanos 1978; Zilboorg 
and Henry, 1941). Although our beliefs about mental illness have 
changed dramatically, the change is not related solely, or even 
predominantly, to the history of medicine but rather to the history 
of culture, societies, theologies, philosophies, jurisprudence, 
politics, economics and the sciences (see Foucault, 1965; Szasz, 1961, 
1971; Ullman & Krasner, 1975).
When one looks beyond the assertions of change and progress 
there appear to be relatively consistent and stable features of 
'madness' in a social context. The very obvious difference between 
the ancient practice of expelling unwanted mad people from the 
community and the modern practice of committing unwanted mad people 
to mental hospitals should not blind us to the similarity of the 
ultimate objective - to cast the mentally ill out of the community 
and to separate them from their society.
The Social Construction of Mental Illness
A close examination of the historical accounts of our response 
to abnormal behaviour justifies the assertion that the concept of 
abnormal behaviour is a human creation and that models, labels and 
deductions are human acts that are maintained because of social 
contingencies. A model or paradigm will, as we have seen, continue 
to be used until it breaks down under the burden of inconsistent 
data or until a new paradigm is demonstrated to be more effective 
at solving problems. Sociological analysis has highlighted the ways 
in which modern psychiatry 'reflects' the values of a larger society
(Bastide, 1972; Opler, 1967). Others have more explicitly depicted 
how psychiatry and the mental health establishment fulfil a social 
control function in contemporary society (Goffman, 1961; Myers &
Bear 1968; Scheff, 1966). The various ways of thinking about 
psychiatry pursued by these authors suggest that the study of mental 
illness should not exclusively focus on cataloguing differences be­
tween the healthy and ill or between different kinds of mental illness, 
but should also focus on the field of psychiatry itself which is re­
sponsible for the definitions and treatment of mental illness.
In part, the intuitive appeal of the historical accounts of 
the rise of scientific psychiatry and its inadequacy seem to arise 
for the same reason : they are based on a frame of reference for 
conceptualising behaviour that is taken for granted and is therefore 
unexamined. In psychiatry formulations, the everyday social reality 
of the literate, industrialised, modern person is usually unexamined. 
Many social rules are so embedded in our every activity that they 'go 
without saying'. Behaviour is more or less automatically deemed to 
be symptomatic of some mental aberration to the extent that it is 
not readily understandable in terms of this socially constructed 
reality (Coulter 1973). That is, there are some rules that seem as 
much part of our conceptions of reality that violations of these seem 
strange and uncanny. Partly because such rules are central to our 
conceptions of what reality ought to be, our vocabularies for labelling 
violations of these rules are relatively underdeveloped. Scheff 
(1966) refers to the breaking of these rules for which we have no 
clearcut labels as 'residual rule-breaking'and argues that we tend 
to lump various sorts of residual rule-breakers into the category
'mentally ill'.
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The Latent Function of Psychiatric Help
In our enlightened, humane society it would be totally unaccept­
able to just expel the unwanted mentally ill - instead we help them.
But the salient question is, is the ultimate objective of both 
strategies the same? On this point Thomas Szasz (1973, p.97-98) 
asserts that :
"Mental illness is a myth whose function is to disguise 
and thus render more palatable the bitter pill of moral 
conflict in human relations. In asserting that there is 
no such thing as mental illness I do not deny that people 
have problems coping with life and each other."
The moral dilemma is resolved by converting the deviant into 
a sick person and the agent of social control into a helper. Parsons 
(1951) refers to illness as not merely a 'condition' but also a social 
role and as Stainbrook (1959) noted our society has transformed the 
locus of the sick role from the family to the centrally located 
hospital. He asserts that today "the modern hospital has become 
increasingly the social system in which the sick role as a meaningful 
mode of participating in society is lived out". (Stainbrook, 1959, 
p.152). Our contemporary image of the mentally ill person and the 
helping role of the healer are superimposed on an existing role 
structure which had been developed to deal with physical rather 
than behavioural problems.
Within the illness model behaviour may be discounted, and 
neither the patient nor the labeller need be responsible. Secondly, 
if the person is sick, his/her incarceration may be called his/her 
own good and the 'good' of society. The use of sick role concepts 
permits social control over deviance without guilt concerning deprivation 
of civil liberties (Szasz, 1963, 1965; Leifer, 1969). Lastly, the 
latent socio-political function of the model is highlighted by Leifer
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(1971) who states that :
"To abandon the medical model and view mentally ill persons 
as social deviators instead of diseased would expose the 
structure and quality of our social 'life to criticism. To 
say that so-called mental illness is one of the most important 
public health problems today ... means that there are many more 
deviating persons in our society than we have publicly acknow­
ledged and it means that there are many more unhappy people 
than we have admitted."
In a thought provoking lecture Thomas Szasz (1976) addressed 
the question : "Medicine - Cure or Control?" He asserted that 
ultimately what justifies treatment in physical illness is not disease 
but consent. Therefore, if the mentally ill were 'really' ill - in 
that 'real' pathogenes were detectable - then a similar posture 
would apply to them. That is, the right to refuse treatment. As 
things stand in contemporary society, the hypothesised presence of 
mental illness may justify involuntary diagnosis, hospitalisation 
and treatment, whereas someone suffering from a physical illness, 
even a lethal one, is free to disregard medical advice, refuse 
treatment, and risk his own life in the process. Yet Birley (1973) 
in contrast contests that :
"Compulsory psychiatric care is not a threat but a right.
Every citizen should have the right to be admitted against his(her) 
will to the care of a first-class psychiatric service".
It was pointed out earlier that Szasz alerts us to look at the 
relationship between the explainer (psychodiagnostician) and explained 
(client) and asserts that "explaining a person's behaviour against 
their will, especially when one holds him(her) in contempt, is, albeit 
ostensibly an explanation, actually a metaphorical confinement ... 
Confining by means of a contemptuous and degrading imagery" (Szasz,
1974 audio tape).
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In his earlier work Szasz (1961) highlighted the abuse 
ordinary language has suffered as a result of the medicalisation 
of deviance. He argues that as a result the language of the 
psychiatrist is no longer serviceable for the proper description of 
abnormal behaviour and our reaction to it. The language is being 
debased by systematic fraudulence, by the overwhelming effort on 
the part of the mental health establishment to impose its own image 
of the world on others, and by justifying any means used to achieve 
this end (for an excellent example of professional dominance of a 
definition of normality| .see Winkler, 1977).
By way of example of the way the language of the medical model 
is used to differentiate ostensibly identical processes Szasz asks :
Who defines grand-mal seizure a disease (epilepsy) and electro­
convulsive therapy (artifically induced grand-mal seizure) a treat­
ment? Who defines heroin taking as a disease and methodone (a synthetic 
opiate) taking a treatment? And who defines a surgeon operating on 
a perfectly healthy brain a psychosurgeon? Szasz argues that the 
fundamental problems of psychiatry centre around a struggle for 
definition. For example, the 'patient' says he is Jesus; the 
psychiatrist says he is not Jesus, but a schizophrenic. Although 
the contest sometimes looks like a debate, it is actually a bitter 
fight, and like all such struggles, it is decided not by logic, but 
by power. Terms like mad, mentally ill, etc refer to a particular 
form of ongoing relationship. Laing and Esterson (1964) make this 
point in their presentation of the cases of supposed schizophrenics 
in each of their cases the actual behaviours of the individual 
diagnosed as schizophrenic make eminent sense when viewed in relation 
to the covert and overt behaviours of the individual's entire
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family. With reference to the interview material collected from 
the family of one of their patients, Laing and Esterson (1964) 
comment that, once the attribution of illness is made, it comes " ... 
to be taken as a fact, and ... she is treated accordingly. Such 
is the spell cast by the make-believe of everyone treating her as 
if she were ill, that one has constantly to pinch oneself to remind 
oneself that there is not evidence to substantiate this assumption, 
except the actions of the others" (p.203).
It appears that the behaviour of an individual engaged in social 
interaction cannot be interpreted except as part of a system, a 
system which is in part composed of the behaviour of the other 
person or persons with whom the individual is interacting. Once 
this is clearly understood - that a behaviour can only be studied 
and interpreted within the interaction or context in which it occurs - 
then, as Watzlawick et al. (1967, P-46) point out, terms such as 
sanity and insanity or mental illness and deviancy become meaningless 
as attributes of individuals. Or, to put it another way : "Behavioural 
events do not speak for themselves; they evoke meanings that are 
not to be found in the behaviour itself. The meaning may seem to 
be inextricably part of the event once an interpretation is made, 
but this phenomenological illusion of inherent meaning should not 
mislead us into thinking that meanings are discovered. The tempt­
ation to confuse one's interpretive categories with the events they 
describe is at the basis of magical thinking ..." (Shweder, 1977,
P *455) .
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CHAPTER VII: STEREOTYPING AND PSYCHODIAGNOSIS
As we have seen, and as Claire (1976) has clearly indicated :
"The concept of mental illness appears to permit a bewildering 
number of interpretations. Is it a label for socially un­
acceptable behaviour behind which the deviant is permitted 
to take refuge and thereby evade the consequences of his 
antisocial activities? Is it an arbitrary concept which 
only serves to mislead people, by virtue of its medical 
connotations, into believing in 'mental sickness' when, 
more often than not, what it describes consists of dis­
ordered, interpersonal relationships wherein one person is 
scapegoated to carry the responsibility for the disturbances 
of the group? Is it merely a political expedient which 
enables those who hold power within society to devalue and 
degrade the dissenter and, by defining him as mentally ill, 
to violate his freedom and destroy his dignity? Or is it 
a concept, analogous to physical illness, which is applied 
to a patient who manifests not physical pathology but 
'psychopathology', who experiences psychic rather than 
physical suffering, exhibits disturbances in his psycho­
logical rather than his physical functioning, and who, in 
some instances at least, suffers a serious impairment of 
his judgemental capabilities and his personal responsibility?" 
(P.l)•
In recent years, several authors have analysed the relation­
ship between psychiatry, psychology and mainstream values (Haley, 
1967; Leifer, 1969; Sarbin, 1967) exploring especially the 
'correctional stance' towards deviance. Laing (1967) and Szasz 
(1960) have contended that the essential function performed by 
the mental health establishment is a political one; that of 
preserving the status quo by discrediting persons whose behaviour 
does not conform to social expectations. Still others (Goffman, 
1967; Halleck 1972) have stressed the moral political outcomes 
of the determinations rendered by psychologically oriented ad­
ministrations and practitioners. Similarly, Mowrer (1960) has 
suggested that the latest function of therapy is moral re­
socialization .
186
Over the past decade, the value ladder nature of the mental 
health enterprise has been starkly illuminated by the invective 
of the 'anti-psychiatry' movement. The central belief of the 
'movement' is that mental illness is a reductive smear that 
obscures and defiles the despairing cries of the downtrodden and 
exploited against an alienating and dehumanized society.
Psychiatric intervention is portrayed as a violent assault 
perpetrated under the guise of treatment, and the psychiatrist is 
deemed to be an agent of the dominant political order, and an agent 
of repression and of power. Anti-psychiatrists demand the 
abolition of existing psychiatric institutions and insist that 
psychiatrists either acknowledge their true role as society's 
thought police or become agents of personal and social change.
Given the fractious and acrimonious debate which has raged 
over the interpretation of the concept of mental illness it is not 
surprising that it has been difficult to reach a reasoned, 
consensually agreed to view on the function of psychodiagnostic 
assessment and classification. However, today, probably as a 
result of the debate, few mental health professionals would argue 
that psychodiagnosis and treatment can be value free but few 
subscribe to the 'Szaszian' concept of the latent socio-political 
function of the enterprise and the clinician's covert social 
mandate. Certainly few would agree with the Braginsky's (1974) assertion 
that psychodiagnosis is nothing more than a translation of social 
stereotypes and prejudices into the scientific sounding labels of 
mental illness.
However, we have seen earlier that perceptions of clients 
develop rapidly and stabilize somewhere between the first and
-187
fourth interview (Meehl, 1960; Parker, 1968). And that there is 
much anecdotal and experimental evidence indicating the contempt 
and derogatory attitudes held by many of the 'helping profession' 
towards their clients (Rabkin, 1972; Rosenhan, 1973; Wills,
1979). It will be argued that a picture emerges which supports 
the Braginskys' assertion that psychodiagnosis represents a 
transformation of stereotyped thinking and social prejudices 
into clinical descriptions that then serve as the basis for 
'diagnosis'. In this way the 'attribute model* converts un­
desired 'differences' into 'deficits' and 'symptoms' and facilitates 
the medicalization of everyday deviance.
By translating a society's important stereotypes, under the 
guise of science, into categories of psychopathology the mental 
health profession not only legitimates arbitrary stereotypes as 
scientific knowledge but also assists society maintain its normative 
structures by identifying and labelling those who threaten the 
boundaries. As the Braginskys point out:
" The diagnostic enterprise does not end with the assignment 
of labels. Indeed, the label is but the first step in help­
ing to keep societies' house in order. The identification 
and classification of deviants is not an academic exercise, 
but, instead, starts the rather elaborate process of social 
sanitation of removing the deviant from mainstream society.'1 
(1974, p.132).
But rather than debate the issue further, in the discussion 
to follow empirical evidence of the value bias in the drawing of 
clinical inferences will be presented. This aspect of clinical 
judgement is typically unacknowledged. Clinicians are seen to 
base the decisions solely on impartial and 'objective' evaluation 
of relevant client behaviour. It will be argued that assessment 
and categorisation is an interpersonal process in which many non-
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relevant aspects of the client inevitably influence clinical 
judgement.
THE POLITICS OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC LABELLING
To put the point bluntly - psychodiagnosis, even in extreme 
cases, is susceptible to distortion as a function of extraneous 
personal attributes such as sex, social class and political 
ideology. Several writers (c.f. Szasz, 1970, 1971; Scheff, 1966) 
have extended this charge to the commitment process, suggesting 
that it is equally influenced by all sorts of irrelevant inter­
personal and intrapersonal variables, resulting in, as Chu and 
Trotter (1974) phrase it :
"In general, admissions to State mental hospitals come 
from a large 'residual population' made up of the poor, the 
aged, the abandoned, the members of minority groups, and 
others who are brought for psychiatric treatment not because 
they have been diagnosed according to any medical or psycho­
logical criteria but because they have disturbed, bothered 
or shocked the sensibility of someone or some group", (p.43).
The Influence of Task Irrelevant Client Characteristics in Psychodiagnosis
Demographic studies have clearly shown that 'lower class' people 
are far more likely to receive severely pathological diagnosis for 
conditions which are diagnosed as less severe in middle class 
patients (Dohrenwend & Döhrenwend, 1969; Holling & Redlich,
1958). Analogue research also clearly attests to this assessor bias.
'Lower class'individuals are clinically devalued more constantly 
than are other minority persons, women or social non-conformists 
(Abramowitz, Curtiz and Dokecki, 1977; Efren, 1970; Lee, 1968). Although 
there is evidence of diminution in the size of this effect (Trachtman,
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1971) a recent study still evidenced a sizeable bias (Di Nardo,
1975).
A second set of client characteristics that may be in­
fluential in determining the diagnostic conclusions drawn about 
the client are his/her attitudes towards being examined or tested 
(Wilcox & Krasnoff, 1967). The Braginskys (1974) cite some of 
their unpublished data which indicated a strong reversal from 
negative to positive impressions of clients following the 
utterance of statements to the effect of the helpfulness, kindness, 
competence, etc of the examiner. And in reverse, a spectacular 
change in the assessor's perception of the client occurred when the client 
directed derogatory remarks to the mental health assessor.
Individual differences in the tendency to say what is socially 
desirable (Edwards & Walsh, 1964) and to seek the approval of 
others (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) no doubt produce bias in assess­
ment. More subtle influences have also been found to be operating.
For example, Couch and Kenniston, (1960) showed that the general 
tendency to say 'Yes' and 'No' may influence test results.
Other extraneous variables thought to influence clinical 
judgements are the sex, and race of the client. Although Caucasian 
clinicans have for the most part shown immunity to negative racial 
expectations, both analogue and correlational data offer evidence 
of a negative halo (Satter, 1970; Siegel, 1974). In a recent study 
Abramowitz and his colleagues (Abramowitz,Abramowitz, Jackson and 
Gomes (1973)) found left oriented politically active women were 
unfairly sticrmatised in clinical evaluations. This lends exper­
imental credence to the claim of women liberationists regarding 
the existence of such bias (e.g. Chester, 1971) and casts in sharper
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relief the assertion that 'the sex orientation of this society is 
not only shared, but also promoted by its clinical personnel' 
(Neuberyer, 1968, p.554).
Wenger and Fletcher observed and took notes on admission 
hearings of 81 persons against whom petitions had been filed for 
incarceration in a State mental hospital in the United States.
The purpose of each of these hearings was to determine if the 
individual was 'sane'. The median time for the hearing was 5.03 
minutes. But more importantly for our present purpose, of those 
individuals who did not retain a legal counsel, over 92% were 
admitted, whereas of those who did retain a lawyer, only 27% were 
admitted. It is, of course, possible that the 'saner' individuals 
were more likely to hire a lawyer, as Gove (1970) has noted, but 
Wenger and Fletcher had independent observers categorise each 
patient as to whether or not the legal criteria for insanity were 
met. "The patients classified as borderline or as criteria-not- 
met, and who had legal counsel, were more likely to be released 
than similar patients not represented by a lawyer" (1969, p.7). 
Parenthetically if Szasz and Sarbin are even partly correct in 
their assertion of the permanence of the disability associated with 
being labelled mentally ill, the time devoted to hearing this grave 
charge in Wenger and Fletcher's study must cast serious doubts on 
the fairness of this procedure - to put it mildly.
It is clear, although only a small sample of the research has 
been examined (see the reviews of Abramowitz & Abramowitz 1977; 
Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1974; Wills, 1978), that psychodiagnosis 
is extremely susceptible to bias and distortion as a function of 
irrelevant personal attributes such as social class, political
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attitudes, skin colour and sex. These findings lend support to
the assertion that diagnostic labels do not necessarily reflect salient
characteristics of the person that differentiates him/her from
other persons but inevitably reflect the ideology and value
premises of the observer. "As such, diagnosis is nothing more than
a translation of stereotypes and prejudgements about other people".
Braginsky & Braginsky, 1974, p.129).
IMPRESSION FORMATION AND PSYCHODIAGNOSIS
The Braginskys (1974) were quite blatant in their charge that 
psychodiagnostic categories are little more than scientific sound­
ing social stereotypes (see also Stuart, 1970 Ch.5). Their 
critique specifically focussed on the content of the psychiatric 
categories and the characteristics of the people labelled by 
psychodiagnosticians. It is possible, however, to suggest that 
psychodiagnosis is a form of stereotyping in a different sense; 
namely, that the psychological processes involved in both social 
stereotyping and psychodiagnosis are similar and amenable to 
similar situational and information processing sources of bias 
and distortion.
Stereotypes and Implicit Personality Theories
Adinolfi (1971) draws an explicit parallel with his suggestion 
that it is just as easy and tempting to apply the same cognitive 
strategies for stabilizing the clinicians' world as it is to stabilize 
the lay person perceiver's world and that it is done with the same 
results. That is, the parsimony and establishment of stability 
and consistency brought about by the extension of physiognomic 
apprehension, for instance, to personality trait attribution is
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enormous and is not limited to untutored or underdeveloped percept­
ions of others. The accusation is that the inscrutable Orientals, 
sensual Mediterraneans, and coldly efficient Nordics find their 
clinical inferential counterparts in the analogical interpretation 
of the Rorschach, the Walter Mitty extension to active voice and 
the creative implications of 'proper1 associative networks (Adinolfi, 
1971, p.173).
Notwithstanding the evidence of extraneous client variables 
affecting clinical judgements it may seem inappropriate, and even 
provocative, to discuss social stereotyping in the same breath as 
psychodiagnosis - after all psychodiagnosis is conducted by trained 
experts, professionally committed to their clients'welfare.
Certainly, neither the commitment nor the integrity of most clinicians 
is under question here, rather the focus is.on the conceptual and 
empirical adequacy of their assessment theory and behaviour.
However, it will be argued that if a stereotype is defined as "... 
a region of one's implicit personality theory to which access is 
gained by a small number of cues, within which the correlations 
among components approach unity and which has relatively few 
connections with other regions" (Jones, 1977, p.54; see also 
Cauthen, Robinson SKrauss, 1971, p.118) then it is possible to 
show that the psychological process used by lay or intuitive 
psychologists in arriving at social stereotypes is similar to those 
used by many clinical psychologists who operate within the 
attribute model.
Social stereotypes are a special case of interpersonal know­
ledge and are usually simple, overgeneralised, and widely accepted. 
However, social stereotypes are no different in principle, from
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other types of interpersonal expectations and include those 
interpersonal expectations arrived through psychodiagnostic 
assessment and codified in the currently used psychodiagnostic 
labels. In this section it will be demonstrated that the process 
of psychological assessment and categorization carried out by 
professional clinicians is influenced by the same variables that 
influence our day-to-day perceptions and expectations about 
others. Subsequently, in Chapter VIII, it will be shown that 
psychodiagnosis - being essentially an interpersonal encounter - 
is an inevitably fallible endeavour : the human element in psycho­
diagnosis make this irrefutably the case. Both the fallibility of 
clinical judgements, and paradoxically, the illusion of validity 
are understandable given the nature of the judgemental task, the 
ways in which most of us code and process information and the 
heuristic principles used in judgements under uncertainty.
Professional Training and Clinical Judgement
It was mentioned a little earlier that the commitment and 
integrity of the professional clinician was not under scrutiny 
but claims to professional training and the use of arcane 
language do not amount to evidence in favour of special skills 
or exemption from the human tendency to fall prey'to pervasive 
subjective biases and distortions that characterise everyday 
personal perception (see, for example, Ross, 1977). In fact, it 
is apparent that the extent of professional training and experience 
does not necessarily increase predictive accuracy.
For example, an early publication by Luft (1950) reported two 
studies designed to determine if professionally trained clinical
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psychologists and psychiatrists had an expertise about the 
behaviour of others that is not shared by equally 'intelligent' 
lay persons. In both studies the experts proved to be no more 
accurate in predicting from known behaviour (part of a case 
history) to behaviour not known (another part of the same case 
history) than the non-clinicians. Similar results have been recorded 
by others (see, for example, Breland, 1959; Grigg, 1958; SOskin,
1959). In a review of the literature in the area Sarbin, Taft and 
Bailey (1950) found that of the fourteen studies included that 
compared the accuracy of clinical psychologists and psychiatrists 
with various groups of non-professionals, six showed no difference, 
five favoured the trained professionals and three favoured the 
non-professional. Luft conjectured on the basis of his study that 
"Prediction from such material may therefore call for general 
intelligence rather than special clinical understandings"(1950,
P-757) .
Alternatively, it could be argued that the judgements and 
predictions based on the cues contained in 'such material' tap 
into shared aspects of the implicit personality theories of the 
judges (Jones, 1977) and the utilization of similar heuristics 
governing intuitive prediction and judgement (Tversky and Kahnemann, 
1973). These conjectures form the central thesis of this section 
and will be discussed in detail subsequently.
Recourse to professional training cannot be accepted as a 
substitute for empirical evidence in support of the reliability 
of diagnosis based on the attribute model. In the discussion to 
follow data will be presented to refute the assumption that the 
salient, if not the only, variable that determines psychodiagnostic
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judgements is the personality of the client. Rather it will be 
argued that the assessment situation is more accurately construed 
as an interpersonal encounter in which situational, clinician and 
client variables interact in an intricate reciprocal influence 
processes. If the attribute model is used to construe this inter­
action human error is augmented and bias and distortion are almost 
inevitable. Some of the error will be attributable to character­
istics of the clinician, some to the characteristic of the situation 
(including the assessment devices), and others, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, to task irrelevant characteristics of the 
client. The data to be presented below indicates that mistakes 
and differences in psychodiagnosis are common and that the process 
of diagnosis is afflicted by many of the same biases, distortions, 
preconceptions and expectations as our everyday person perception 
that often results in stereotyping.
RELIABILITY OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS
The traditional methods of assessment, as we have seen, include 
the administration of psychological tests, taking social histories, 
and the 'mental-status' examinations; all of which are primarily 
designed to match the individual's symptomatology with a categorical 
descriptor or syndrome. A central question in evaluating psycho­
diagnostic practice is to ask how consistently do different diag­
nosticians place the same people in the same category, or alternatively 
what is the rater reliability of psychodiagnostic labelling? While 
occasional criticisms and reanalysis of data obtained by studies 
assessing reliability do appear (e.g. Levy, 1972) and challenge the 
consensus, the overwhelming evidence suggests that when assessments
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of clients are made by independent clinicians the resulting inter­
rater agreement is of a low magnitude (see Frank, 1969, 1975 for 
comprehensive reviews).
As an example Beck and his colleagues (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock & Erbaugh, 1962) selected and especially prepared four 
experienced broad level psychiatrists (i.e. accredited specialists) 
who were paired up to interview successively (about five minutes 
apart) 153 outpatients. Prior to interviewing, the psychiatrists 
conferred with each other and reached agreement on diagnostic 
criteria. The results present the 'most gratifying' study in the 
literature in terms of degree of agreement for subtype of disorders, 
but considerable disagreement still existed. When both psychiatrists 
were 'certain', they agreed in 81 per cent of the cases; when both 
were 'uncertain', they agreed in 25 per cent of the cases; all 
other combinations of certainty yielded around 48 per cent agreement. 
Finally, there was an agreement rate of 70 per cent for the three 
broad categories psychotic, neurotic and character disorder.
Beck and his colleagues (Ward, Beck, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh 
(1962) followed up the work of Beck at al (1962) by using a portion 
of the 153 assessment reports and analysing them in an attempt to 
determine why the psychiatrists had disagreed. The authors report 
three sources of error :
(1) in 5 per cent of cases the primary reason for disagreement 
was inconsistency on the part of the patient who gave 
different information of different interviewers;
(2) inconsistency on the part of the interviewer accounted
for an additional 32.5 per cent of the disagreement; and
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(3) intrinsic inadequacies of the diagnostic systems
categories accounted for the remaining 62.5 per cent.
The general conclusion to be drawn from this and many other studies 
(see, e.g. Rubin, 1948; Thorne, 1961) vis a vis the logic of the 
categorical system can best be summarised by the following state­
ment :
'A certain degree of relationship has been discovered between 
symptoms manifestation and diagnosis. However, the most 
striking finding of the present study is that the magnitude 
of these relationships is generally so small that membership 
in a particular diagnostic group conveys only minimal inform­
ation about the symptomatology of the patient. One is faced 
with the perplexing finding that the occurrence of a wide 
variety of symptoms may be related to more than one diagnostic 
category' (Zigler & Phillips, 1961, p.73).
It appears that the current psychiatric nosological system does 
not provide a cogent and explicitly logical framework for clinical 
judgements : in fact, it is a major contributory factor to inaccuracy 
and lack of agreement. As a result many studies have documented the 
clinician's influence on categorical decision making. For example,
-v-.- based on four psychiatrists' diagnostic judgement of the same 100 
case files Goldfarb (1959) typically concluded by saying : 'The
fundamental question raised by this study was whether or not the 
diagnosis given to groups of patients depends to a significant 
degree upon which clinician made the evaluation. The results suggest 
that the answer to this question is substantially "Yes"" (p.396). 
Grosz and Grossman (1968) report a similar result based on a study 
of diagnostic decisions of five psychiatrists who evaluated com­
parable samples of approximately 30 patients. The psychiatrists 
appeared to differ systematically in their tendencies to rate con­
sistently high or consistently low levels of "abnormalities" in their
patients.
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Change of Psychiatric Diagnosis in Time and Space
Several recent studies have highlighted another aspect of the 
reliability shortcomings of diagnostic systems; namely, the change 
of diagnosis over time. This was graphically evidenced by Blum 
CL968) . Blum reasoned that if the psychiatric nosology provided a 
logical and explicit framework for clinical judgements one would 
expect symptoms to predict diagnosis at different points in time. 
However, over a twenty year period, it was found that the changes 
in patients' primary symptoms could account for only half of the 
variability in ascribed diagnostic labels. Diagnostic patterns 
seem to change over time in ways not fully explained by the symptoms 
the patient presents (Blum, 1978; Kuriansky, Demig & Garland, 1974; 
Morrison, 1974).
In a similar vein Sandifer and his coworkers (Sandifer, 
Hordern, Timerry & Green, 1968) convincingly demonstrated the trans- 
situational variability in diagnostic practice in their study of 
diagnosticians in London and Glasgow. The conclusion was that each 
area appeared to build up its own norms that differ somewhat from 
other areas. Kadushin (1969) indicated how this might occur :
'Because psychiatric theory and concepts are not well agreed 
upon the rules by which diagnosticians move from the manifest 
response of patients to their underlying psychiatric diagnoses 
are incoherently or poorly specified. Therefore, the social 
situation of clinics became more important in determining 
diagnosis than the characteristics of applicants. The diver­
gent theories of the various clinics also account for much 
of the differences among them in diagnosis. Each clinic's 
position is fixed in the process of routinizing the complex 
scientific vocabulary of diagnosis through social interaction, 
each clinic develops its own set of norms for the application 
of diagnostic terminology, for each seems to have a favourite 
diagnostic category. Finally, administrative reasons force 
many clinicians who would not otherwise do so to make diagnoses.
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Consequently, the diagnoses themselves seem to follow a
clinic's administrative exigencies." (p.lll)
The Influence of Examiner Characteristics
Since the psychiatric nosology does not appear to provide 
guidelines for making clinical judgements and additionally since 
assessment is essentially an interpersonal encounter, it is to be 
expected that the clinician may unwittingly influence the outcome 
of assessment in many subtle ways. On this score, there is a sub­
stantial body of research to the effect that " ... the personality 
of the examiner is significantly related to the type of Rorschach 
protocol which he[she] obtains when his[her] technique has been 
standardized and his[her] subjects have been selected at random" 
(Sanders & Cleveland 1953, p.47). Similarly Gibby (1952) found 
strong and significant differences in the Rorschach protocols as a 
function of the examiner. In a study designed to delineate some 
of these differences Filer (1952) concluded that "the three most 
frequently mentioned defence mechanisms in (the) reports are more 
characteristics of the clinicians than their patients" (p.336).
In fact, Kessel and Shepard (1962) suggest that clinical judge­
ments may reveal more about the clinician than it reveals about the 
client whom is being assessed. George Kelly (1955) would no doubt 
agree. According to Kelly, "when the examiner tries to guess what 
the subject is thinking, we call it a projective device" (1955, 
p.332) .
However, as Masling (1959) noted, the ambiguity inherent in 
projective devices may render them particularly susceptible to 
interpretation pffpcts discussed above. Consequently, Masling set 
out to see if similar effects occurred with more objective devices;
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that is, "we call it an objective test ... when the subject is 
asked to guess what the examiner is thinking"(Kelly 1955, p.332). 
Masling (1959) was able to demonstrate differential responding 
by the clinical administrator of an intelligence test as a 
function of the warmth exuded by the examinee. There are good 
reasons to speculate that in the naturalistic setting such inter­
actions could influence the final IQ ascribed to examinees. A 
study by Hersh (1971) replicated Masling's (1959) study on intelli­
gence testing and pointed out that psychological testing is seldom 
purely a dyadic situation - usually there is a referring third 
party. The impact of the expectations of this third party on the 
examiner and the resulting judgements was documented by Towbin 
(1960). In Towbin's study children were referred for assessment 
under two conditions - positive referral that stressed the child's 
social resources and negative referral that stressed the child's 
relatively poor standing academically. The examiner administered 
the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test and the results indicated a 5.5 
point difference in favour of the positive referral group.
Despite the widespread use of tests such as the Rorschach, the 
MMPI and various intelligence scales, most clinical judgements are 
based on interviews with clients, not on specific tests. In fact, 
Wade and Baker (1977) found that only a relatively small percentage 
of respondents in their survey reported that they would accept the 
'opinions' of their tests if they conflicted with personal hypotheses 
developed through other avenues. And secondly, the usual concern 
of psychodiagnosis is with relatively global categorisation of the 
client and not with scores on specific tests. Thus the research 
cited above may not be particularly germane for actual practice.
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However, the research of Temerlin (1968) appears particularly 
germane since it examined the effects of suggestion on the making 
of a diagnosis in an interview situation.
Suggestion and Psychodiagnosis
In the much cited study Temerlin had a professional actor enact 
the role of a well adjusted, super-normal man, he was happy and 
effective in his work, he established a warm, gracious and satisfy­
ing relationship with the interviewer, he was self-confident and 
secure without being arrogant, competitive, or grandiose. He was 
identified with the parent of the same sex, was happily married and 
in love with his wife, and consistently enjoyed sexual intercourse. 
He also had a good sense of humour, no hallucinations, delusions, or 
psychosomatic symptoms, a happy childhood, and reasonable worries 
like concern over Vietnam.
The experiment had three conditions. The first two groups 
represented the first condition; that of no suggestion as to mental 
health; either no suggestion at all or the designation of an 
employment interview. In this condition roughly one third of 
the raters indicated the man was neurotic, none indicated psychosis. 
In the second condition a prestigious figure gave an -unintended' 
suggestion of mental health. The result was that 100 per cent of 
raters indicated the man was mentally healthy.
In the third condition the tape was played for several large 
groups of subjects including clinical psychology graduate students, 
clinical psychologists (Ph.Ds) and psychiatrists (M.D.s) with the 
suggestion that the man was, albeit unapparently, mentally ill.
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Operationally, just before the tape was played, a distinguished mental 
health professional remarked to the man next to him that the person 
on the tape was "a very interesting man because he looks neurotic, 
but actually is quite psychotic". For the mental health condition, 
the suggestion was given in the same way, notably that it was a 
tape of a truly rare man, one who was normal.
The rankings were dramatically affected in condition three, 
and within that condition subgroups displayed differential response 
to the negative suggestion. For example, psychiatrists were most 
influenced resulting in 60 per cent rated the man psychotic, 40 per 
cent neurotic and none thought him healthy. The clinical psycho­
logists were next influenced; 28 per cent rated the man psychotic,
60 per cent neurotic and 12 per cent healthy. The undergraduates 
were least affected with only 11% rating the man psychotic but the 
vast majority rated him neurotic (78 per cent) and only 11 per cent 
rated him healthy.
The early Temerlin (1968) study was replicated and extended by 
Temerlin and Trousdale (1969) with very similar results. Diagnosis 
of some form of 'mental illness' ranged from 84% to 100% in the 
experimental group which received a suggestion of mental illness.
Such diagnoses were made by 0 per cent to 43 per cent of the subjects 
in the control groups depending on their composition. Further, not 
a single experimental subject (out of a total of 300) wrote a 
descriptive rather than inferential report of the interviewee 
when requested to do so. Not a single experimental subject described 
the behavioural basis for his/her diagnosis. Termerlin and Trousdale 
(1967) concluded that "inference, unchecked by systematic and repeated 
observations of behaviour, may produce gross errors of interpersonal
perception" (p.28).
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Diagnostic Decision Making
When it comes time to write a 'case' report, the recourse to 
inference and the security of labelling the client and therefore 
imply understanding (to name is to know) is probably what lies 
behind this astounding finding. In fact, Gauron and Dickensen 
(1966) pointed out that clinicians are at times so personal in 
their criteria for the selection of certain diagnostic inferences 
that they are unable to offer formal explanation of their choices.
In their study, the information (cues) sought out by psychiatrists 
in arriving at their diagnostic decision were correlated with an 
index of actual cues used by psychiatrists. They found that the 
two were not related. Gauron and Dickinson (1966) use this to argue 
that : " ... In actual fact the psychiatrist derived the clues under­
lying his diagnosis from sources other than he [she] thought he [she] 
did" (p.203). Further, Rommetveit (1960) has rather convincingly 
shown that the dimensions which perceivers admit to using in their 
differentiation of others are unrelated to the dimensions on which 
they actually make their differentiations.
These findings are not surprising in the light of recent research 
on our access to higher order mental processes. Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) cogently demonstrated that people often cannot report accurat­
ely on the effects of particular stimuli on higher order, inference- 
based responses. "Indeed, sometimes they cannot report on the 
existence of critical stimuli, sometimes cannot report on the 
existence of their responses, and sometimes cannot even report that 
an inferential process of any kind had occurred." (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977, p.233).
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The situation in clinical diagnosis appears to be exacerbated 
by the evidence that most clinicians accept their personal hypotheses 
over test results if the two were in conflict (Wade & Baker, 1977, 
p.879). Furthermore, the great majority of clinicians reported 
using personalised evaluation procedures for projective tests while 
over one third reported using such procedures with objective tests. 
Wade and Baker (1977) went on to show that respondents claimed they 
would evaluate test results according to their personal or clinical 
hypotheses and opinions. They indicated that most clinicians use a 
clinical data combination system (see, for example, Sawyer, 1966). 
Sawyer has demonstrated that behavioural prediction will be de­
creased when both kinds of data (i.e. clinical and mechanical) are 
combined, rather than by using mechanical (test result) data alone, 
the respondents in Wade and Bakers study clearly indicated that in 
their everyday practice clinicians behave in ways that are likely 
to lessen the judgement and prediction accuracy.
Before leaving Temerlin studies it is important to note that 
only one stimulus person was employed and he represented the values 
of the middle class. The suggestion appeared to produce dramatic 
differences between the experimental and control groups, but rather 
than being purely a function of the suggestion, the difference may 
be due to an interaction between the suggestion and the particular 
stimulus person employed (Jones, 1977, p.69). The person perception 
literature does seem to have demonstrated the strong relationship 
between being actually similar to or highly familiar with the per­
ceived person and accurately perceiving him/her. The sequelae of 
this relationship are visible in the clinical psychology area, as we
Thus
have seen in Chapter VI.
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In a recent discussion of the literature on behaviour classifi­
cation Phillips and Draguns (1971, p.467) point out that research 
on the clinician's diagnostic activity seems to converge in suggest­
ing that social distance is a mediating variable. As we have seen, 
the middle-class diagnostician is likely to employ different cate­
gories for lower-class 'patients' and is likely to note fewer 
symptoms in the process of assigning lower-class 'patients' to 
those categories. The point here is that the kind of 'suggestion' 
employed by Temerlin is relatively artificial and may not occur in 
most naturalistic settings. This, however, does not deny the 
possibility of large suggestion effects in practice.
The Diagnostic Utility of Different Kinds of Data
If we conceptualise clinical diagnosis as a process of 
categorisation, a process in which certain cues or combinations 
of cues are used to refine the placement of " ... the patient from 
a supraordinate stereotype (i.e. class of events) to more subordinate 
ones as increments of information are accumulated" (Kostlan, 1955, 
p.486) then it becomes important to know whether or not the clinical 
judge employs a given combination of cues consistently. That is, 
can a consistent judgement strategy be identified and separated 
from the judge's unreliability?
Research has been undertaken to determine if there are 
certain commonly employed sources of information about clients that 
lead to-more valid inferences about clients. Using a 'functional 
omission' design Kostlan (1954) had twenty clinical psychologists, 
each with at least two years of psychodiagnostic experience, make 
diagnostic judgements on the basis of only three out of a possible
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four pieces of available data (i.e. the Rorschach protocol, the MMPI 
results, the Stein Sentence Completion Test (SCT) protocol, and 
social case history). Each judge viewed the material from one of 
the 'patients' under one of the five conditions (i.e. missing 
the Rorschach, MMPI, SCT, case history or everything except 
"Barnum" data).
The interesting finding was that when deprived on the case 
history, clinicians could make inferences of accuracy no greater 
than they could on the basis of the 'Barnum' profile (i.e. age, 
marital status, occupation, education, and the source of referral). 
Meehl (1959) summarised these results in the following way :
" ... clinicians knowing only the age, marital status, occupation 
and sources of referral of a patient (that is, relying essentially 
upon the Barnum Effect for the ability to make correct statements) 
yield an average of about 63% correct statements about the patient. 
If they have the Rorschach, Multiphasic and Sentence Completion 
Test but are deprived on the social history, this combined psycho­
metric battery results in almost exactly the same percentage of 
correct judgements" (pp.115-116).
In a more recent review of the role of personal history data 
in clinical judgement Potkey (1973) concluded that such data, as a 
source of clinically descriptive or predictive information, is at 
least as effective as information derived from psychological test 
sources. Paradoxically, however, Oskamp (1965) found that self- 
confidence in judgements made by clinicians was found to increase 
as a function of the amount of information available to them but 
without any corresponding increase in judgemental accuracy. Thus 
the answer to the questions posed above appears to be that some
207
of the commonly employed devices used by clinicians in the assess­
ment process, namely, projective and objective tests are not likely 
to increase the validity of clinical judgement beyond that gross 
level of categorization that can be attained with face sheet data.
A line of research addressing the question from another direction 
indicated that an increase in the amount of information brought to 
bear upon particular decisions may not enhance the accuracy of these 
decisions (Cline, 1955; Dailey, 1952 and as Oskamp 1965 indicated 
above). This research, when coupled with that of Bieri (1962) who 
studied the effects of increases in the amount of undirectional 
information revealed that clinicians reach an early appraisal of 
their patients and do not modify these impressions as a function 
of increased information or even as treatment progresses (Meehl,
1960; Parker, 1958). This paints a gloomy picture of psychodiagnosis.
Barnum Statements in Psychodiagnosis
Similarly Sine (1959) in a study designed to establish the 
diagnostic utility of different kinds of data found that omitting 
the Rorschach was associated with greater validity than including 
it. He also found that absolute improvement from the initial bio­
logical data sheet to final clinical judgement based-on additional 
information was minimal. Conversely several studies have shown an 
inverse relationship between the amount of information and the 
accuracy of judgement (Cline & Richards, 1960; Sawyer, 1966;
Schwartz, 1967).
Additional evidence could be cited (see e.g. Frank 1969, 1975; 
Stuart 1970, Chap.4) but presumably the point has been made. The
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clinician has finite and perhaps quite limited capacity for process­
ing information. In spite of what is claimed for the usefulness of 
projective data, decisions do not improve their accuracy of prediction 
or reliability of categorization by employing such data. Apparently 
the important cues or, at least, the cues utilized are contained in 
other aspects of the clinical situation. And as Meehl (1959) has 
forcefully suggested, that for one third of the clients " ... the
application of a stereotype personality description based upon 
actuarial experience in this particular clinic provided a more 
accurate description of the patient than the clinician's judgement 
based upon any, or all, of the available tests, history, and 
interview data!" (p.116) Dawes (1970) has noted that after 20 
years of research demonstrating the superiority of statistical over 
clinical prediction, clinicians continue to ignore the former and use 
the latter.
Of interest to us here is Cline's (1964) review of his work 
in person perception in which he suggested that the superiority of 
the statistical or actuarial type prediction over clinical prediction 
rests primarily on the stereotyped component of actuarial prediction.
It would seem, then, that the traditional clinician has been criticised 
for relying too often on Barnum statements (stereotyped accuracy) 
rather than on differential accuracy. The clinician is then compared 
in his/her predictive accuracy with methods that patently rely on 
actuarial data (stereotyped accuracy). Neither approach appears 
sufficiently sensitive to the individual client. In summary, it 
can be said that psychodiagnostic assessment and clinical judge­
ment which is designed to identify dispositional characteristics 
in their clients have not demonstrated a high level of reliability.
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Evidence reveals that clinicians see different cues in the same 
client, and use the same cues to infer different dispositions 
(Cole & Lavery, 1969). Mistakes and differences in psychodiagnosis 
are common and the psychodiagnostic process seems to be susceptible 
to many of the same influences that shape biases, distortions and 
preconceptions in intuitive psychologist^ person perception.
Although much of the lack of reliability can be attributed to 
weaknesses in the conception of the diagnostic typology, a signif­
icant part is intrinsic to the situation in which judgements and 
predictions are made and to the clinician's cognitive information 
coding and processing of outcome data. Evidence supporting the 
conjecture that trained professional clinical psychologists are 
generally as fallible in their inferential judgements as intuitive 
psychologists will be presented in the next•chapter. Additionally, 
it will be shown that trained professionals are equally vulnerable 
to the temptations of magical thinking. As we have seen stereo­
typing and psychodiagnosis are, in principle, no different and 
therefore we would expect magical thinking to be as much a 
characteristic of the diagnosticians as the modern lay person; as 
indeed the so called 'savage' mind. That is, most of us have a 
'savage' mentality much of the time and this includes the professional 
psychodiagnostician.
The language of psychodiagnosis should not blind us to its 
nature. As has been pointed out many times, it is a mistake to make 
judgements about thought processes on the basis of their content 
(see, e.g., Levi-Strauss, 1966). Extraordinary beliefs follow quite 
logically from extraordinary premises. However, our saturation in
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our culture quite often prevents us from identifying our extra­
ordinary premises - particularly when accorded the hallowed status 
of being 'scientific'. In the discussion that follows it will be 
demonstrated that magical thinking is as much a characteristic 
of our technological society as other 'primitive' societies. It 
is a very rare individual who is bereft of all such thoughts. But 
more importantly, the attribute model of assessment and the 
assessment situation do little to help clinicians guard against 
some of the important pitfalls of information processing in
psychodiagnostic assessment.
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CHAPTER VIII: THE FALLIBLE PSYCHODIAGNOSTICIAN
In the decade since 'Personality and Assessment' (Mischel, 1968) 
was published the study and catalogue of judgemental fallibility of 
clinical psychologists has continued but, fortunately, research in 
cognitive and social psychology, particularly investigations of 
how people categorise, simplify and process information has flourished. 
This has greatly illuminated the cognitive basis for many of the 
catalogued distortions. The same research also helps to explain 
the blatant contradiction between the considerable evidence of 
fallibility of clinical judgement and the seemingly unshakeable 
confidence clinicians show in their judgement ability. It appears 
that the illusions of validity persist very largely because 
clinicians not only use tests of dubious validity but because 
they fall prey to many pitfalls of information processing.
So far, the discussion of the mistakes and differences in 
psychodiagnosis has been mainly descriptive. This chapter will 
attempt to promote an understanding of some plausible processes 
that might account for such biases and lack of reliability, as well 
as the persistent illusions of validity. For example, Wade and 
Baker (1977) revealed that clinicians approach testing in a 
way that maximises the possibility of falling prey to phenomena, 
such as illusory correlates (e.g. Chapman and Chapman, 1971) and 
the Barnum effect (e.g. Meehl, 1956). In addition, the structures 
of judgemental tasks in the natural environment prevent clinicians 
from using important information for drawing valid inferences. This 
shortcoming, when coupled with information processing shortcomings 
such as the disinclination to think probabilistically and the
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inclination to eschew disconfirmatory evidence, predisposes the 
clinician to form and maintain the illusion of validity. In the 
discussion to follow, recent research in cognitive and social 
psychology that bears on the clinical judgement process will be 
reviewed with the aim of isolating factors and processes that may 
explain the fallibility of the psychodiagnostic enterprise.
It is interesting to note that much of the relevant research 
has been conducted in the area of attribution theory and intuitive 
psychology. Attribution theory in its broadest sense is concerned 
with the attempts of ordinary people to understand the causes and 
implications of the events they witness. According to Ross (1977) 
this perspective has led to the elevated image of psychological 
'man' from passive reactor to a status equal to that of the scientist 
who investigates him/her. That is, people, in the perspective of 
attribution theory, are intuitive psychologists who seek to 
explain behaviour and to draw inferences about actions and their 
environments.
Such a perspective, although not new (see again Kelly, 1955), 
does suggest that both the professional and academic psychologist 
and the lay person, are struggling with the same task, namely to 
discern, describe and apply systematic covariation between events. 
Consequently, the onus is on psychologists to demonstrate the 
superiority of their investigating methodology if we are to trust 
their knowledge and explicit personality theories in preference to 
the intuitive, implicit personality theories.
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PITFALLS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING IN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
The research to be discussed below suggests that the professional 
clinical psychologist and the lay psychologist are faced with 
similar problems in their attempts to uncover causal relationships.
Both appear equally vulnerable to fall prey to pitfalls of 
information processing, not only because of their shared human 
qualities but because of important similarities in the context 
in which judgements are made. Consequently, one would expect 
many of the same biases, distortions, preconceptions and expectations 
in psychodiagnosis as one finds in everyday perceptions of lay 
persons that result in stereotyping.
Magical Thinking and the Disinclination to Think Probabilistically
One of the keys to understanding psychological diagnosis is an 
appreciation of the probabilistic relationship between covarying 
events. For example, between behavioural signs and the 
dispositions or entities one infers from these signs. Since there 
is seldom an absolute, one-to-one relationship between a given sign 
and an inferred characteristic, it becomes incumbent upon the 
diagnostician to determine exactly which cues can be relied upon.
For given the probabilistic nature of the relationship between clinical 
signs and inferred attributes, the well developed propensity for 
positing causal relations may lead to magical thinking, (i.e. 
ascription of a causal relation in a case when there are no 
objective grounds for it (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977).
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Common observation and experimental investigation (Michotte,
1963; Jenkins and Ward, 1965) evidence the proclivity of 
observers who in seeking to discover a pattern in events will (too) 
readily construe them as causally related. It is all too easy to 
move from observation of concomitant events to interpretation that 
the first event is the cause of the second event. Although 
systematic covariation is a prerequisite for accurate prediction, 
it is hardly sufficient for the inference of a cause-effect 
relationship. This, of course, relates to the oft-quoted difference 
between correlation and causation, or what David Hume regarded as 
the distinction between sequence and consequence. Hume established 
that this step - from covariation to causation - was logically 
unwarranted on the basis of observation alone.
Blissfully ignorant of Hume's judgements, causal inferences from 
observation are the hallmark of intuitive and professional clinical 
psychologists. As Hume first pointed out, there is nothing other 
than 'habit' or 'custom' to justify induction. It has no logical 
warrant.
Inferring Causality in Person Perception
It is plausible to suppose that a causal interpretation of the 
world is advantageous because it confers some power of prediction 
to its adherents: fallacious theories are usually more useful than
no theory at all (cf. Jones, 1979). With few exceptions, most 
students of person perception have endorsed the view that individuals 
construct images of other people in ways that serve to stabilise, 
make predictable, and make more acceptable their view of the social 
world (e.g. Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1971). The ascription of
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causality is accordingly an interpretation of events, even in the 
case of the simple but powerful causal illusions of the laboratory 
(Michotte, 1963)."In the interpretation of the events of daily life, 
it is almost invariable that in order to 'set them within a broader 
causal or intentional framework, it is necessary to go beyond what 
is explicitly given" (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977, p.438).
Although covariation, no matter how systematic can never demonstrate 
causation, this is also true of the best conceived experiment: 
causality is inferred and is thus a conceptual rather than empirical 
entity. In ordinary life, in or outside the clinic, a correlation 
combined with 'common sense' is usually sufficient to lead to causal 
claims. The inherent dangers in this process will be demonstrated 
below.
The problem, which on the surface appears to be one of simply 
learning which events are associated with which cues, presents 
difficulties to most humans. Or more accurately, the problem is 
not so much learning to associate an event which follows a cue but 
learning what happens to the association when the events appear or 
do not appear in the absence of the cue. Apparently, these important 
bits of evidence pertinent to the association are generally 
ignored. This is readily revealed experimentally (Jenkins and Ward, 
1965; Smedslund, 1963; Ward and Jenkins, 1965).
Correlation as a 'Non-Intuitive' Concept
Ward and Jenkins (1965) for example, constructed a series of 
problems having to do with the relationship between rain and cloud
seeding. Subjects received information on a trial-by-trial basis -
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a series of statements such as: "On the first day the clouds were
seeded and it rained, on the second the clouds were again seeded 
but it did not rain, on the third ... etc." The results indicated 
that most subjects judge the strength of' relationship between cloud 
seeding and rain by the frequency of positive instances, while 
generally ignoring information with respect to negative instances 
as well as false positives and false negatives. They were generally 
very inaccurate in deciding whether or not seeding was related to 
the probability of rain. In fact, only 17 per cent of the subjects 
followed a logically defensible rule for making their judgement.
As Ward and Jenkins (1965) note: "In general, our results
lend support to the conclusion that statistically naive subjects 
lack an abstract concept of contingency that is isomorphic with 
the statistical concept. Those who received information on a 
trial-by-trial basis, as it usually occurs in the real world, 
generally failed to assess adequately the degree of relationship 
present" (p.240). As we will see a little later, correlation is 
a 'non-intuitive' concept, like many statistical concepts, and is 
generally absent from the thinking of most normal adults including 
social scientists (see e.g. Smedslund, 1963; Shweder, 1977).
Causality and Correlation and Clinical Diagnosis
What is the relevance of this research to clinical diagnosis? 
One could argue that experimenters like Ward and Jenkins were 
unrealistic in expecting subjects to take in, store, retrieve, 
and appropriately compare such a large amount of information.
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Certainly the only condition in which a majority of students displayed 
correlational thinking was when they received summary information 
in the form of a 2 x 2 contingency table without prior trial-by-trial 
experience with the data. Further, one might argue that naive 
subjects are not, after all, trained diagnosticians most of whom 
have formal training in statistics and probability.
On the other hand, as Jones (1977) argues, the task facing 
the clinician who has a hunch about a particular cue being related 
to a particular problem is much more complex and difficult than the 
typical laboratory task. Firstly the clinician will probably not 
be exposed to all the necessary information since those who do not 
have the problem are not likely to see the clinician. Hence, the 
clinician will never know whether or not they have the symptom.
That is, half of the 2 x 2  contingency table is usually not available. 
Consequently in the naturalistic setting judges are prevented from 
using information usually available in laboratory studies (cf. 
Bjorkman, 1966) . Secondly, even the information the clinician does 
obtain relevant to the relationship of interest is likely to be 
gathered over the course of months or years rather than in a single 
experimental session. The problems introduced by these two factors 
will be elaborated at length later in the chapter.
In sum then, the analogue studies evidence a strong disinclin­
ation to think correlationally and an inclination to infer the 
strength of a relationship according to the number of positive 
instance of co-occurrence. Support for this view has been made 
in a somewhat different manner by Smedslund (1963) with reference
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to Piaget and Inhelder's (1961) theory of the development of 
probabilistic notions in children. Smedslund notes that the 
stage of concrete reasoning, which precedes the ability to 
apply "correlational reasoning", functions only on the basis of 
observable events. He suggests, although adults are capable of 
using disconfirming information for inferring relationships, they 
frequently fail to do so and operate at lower, cognitive level, 
for example, concrete reasoning. In other words, judgemental 
habits are based on experience with lower levels of cognitive 
functioning. As Shweder (1977) contested, because correlation is 
not an intuitively available concept, normal adults are not likely 
to master it without explicit instructions to do so.
The research cited above indicates that the frequency of 
positive instances of co-occurrence is the major determinant 
of perceived correlational relationships. On the basis of this 
Einhorn and Hogarth speculate that "If outcomes are coded in 
memory as frequencies rather than probabilities, this has major 
implications for explaining the persistence of the illusion of 
validity" (1978, p.400). Recent research on probability learning 
is relevant to this issue and corroborates the conjecture that 
outcomes tend to be coded in memory as frequencies rather than 
probabilities.
Probability Learning
In an extensive series of experiments Estes (1976a, 1976b) 
investigated the coding of outcomes in memory and how subjective 
probability and predictive behaviour are based on such coding.
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Estes' (1976a) results indicate that subjects had a strong
tendency to predict the more frequently occurring variable (in
his study, the winning candidate) even when that variable had a lower
probability of occurring (winning). In the contingency tasks
set by Estes the experimental evidence is consistent with the
notion that frequency is more salient in memory than probability.
Again the studies by Estes evidence the inability of people 
to deal adequately with non-occurrence of events resulting in 
a favouring of coding outcomes a frequency of concrete events 
rather than probabilities. Interestingly, it should be noted that 
the notion of probability itself has developed relatively late 
(sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and David (1962) points out 
that this late development is remarkable when one considers that 
notions of gambling and games of chance existed in antiquity.
This supports the non-intuitive nature of correlation and probab­
ility proposed by Shwedler (1977) .
Shweder (1977) suggests that failure of intelligent but 
statistically ignorant people to grasp the concept of correlation 
is a potential mechanism underlying magical thinking. He asserts 
that "as soon as events can be meaningfully linked to one another, 
magical thinking makes its appearance; Normal adults substitute 
the readily available intuitive concept of resemblance for the 
unavailable non-intuitive concept of correlation" (1977, p.451).
That people readily substitute a mere similarity between two states 
of affairs for an actual correlation between them has been corroborated 
by other researchers (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Thus 
magical thinking seems to occur when adults assess the degree of
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empirical relationship among events that also conceptually 
affiliate or exclude one another in their minds. Thus what 
D'Andrade (1965) has called a 'hazard of science' is an appropriate 
definition for magical thinking. That is, a confusion of 
'propositions about the world with propositions about language'. 
Everyday empirical claims about 'what goes with what' in experience 
typically according to Shweder (1977), turn out to be claims about 
non-correlational relationships among interpretive categories.
Resemblance in Reasoning
What is striking about Shweder's claim, however, is not that 
people untutored in statistics have difficulty with correlation - 
we have already seen this - but the nature of the concept with 
which they replace it: resemblance between things. In fact,
Shweder claims that resemblance, not correlation, is a fundamental 
conceptual tool of the everyday mind. If this claim is corroborated 
then homeopathic magic (i.e. in which one event is supposed to cause 
another event of a similar sort) is almost unavoidable. Most people 
regardless of their culture, Shweder argues, will be prone to argue, 
if A resembles B, then A tends to be associated with B. When this 
is coupled with the principle of causal inference discussed earlier, 
one obtains: A tends to be associated with B, and if A proceeds
B then A causes B. By these two inferential steps, people may come 
to believe that the application of fowls' excrement cures ringworms 
(Tambiah, 1973) or that penicillin cures a sore throat (Malleson, 
1973), or even perhaps that experiences of early childhood play a 
.crucial role in determining adult personality. Such propositions 
may, of course, be true - that is a matter of scientific testing.
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The point to be emphasised is that 'magical' thinking is simply a 
useful heuristic for generating ideas. The danger arises when 
these 'ideas' pose as scientific knowledge as may be the case in 
clinical inferential learning where 'resemblance' may be used as 
an index of contingent or correlational relationships in experience.
CONFIRMATORY BIAS
One thing does seem clear, however, and that is that in practice 
a clinician who would like to check out a conjecture about a 
relationship between a behavioural cue and a personality disposition 
by observing how these covary in the next, say, twenty clients who 
display the cue is inevitably going to end up making an inaccurate 
assessment. For as was noted above, and as Wason (1968) points 
out, "... scientific inferences are based on the principle of 
eliminating hypotheses, while provisionally accepting only those 
which remain. Methodologically, such eliminative induction implies 
adequate controls so that both positive and negative experimental 
results give information about the possible determinants of 
phenomena" (p.219). At the very least, the clinician would have to 
determine for all clients whether or not they have the particular 
disposition, regardless of whether or not they display the cues.
The propensity to ignore information other than positive has been 
briefly alluded to above.
It will be shown below that thinking in terms of positive 
instances is an example of the difficulty people have in making use 
of 'disconfirming information', by which is meant the information 
that can be gained by the non-occurrence of an action or prediction.
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Furthermore, a principal cause of this difficulty is the structure 
of judgemental tasks in the naturalistic environment. The 
propensity to ignore disconfirmatory information is so persistent 
that Snyder and Swann, in a study designed' to induce accurate 
hypothesis testing asserted "that we have yet to develop any 
procedure that will induce individuals to eschew such strategies 
(confirmatory) in favour of either disconfirmatory or equal 
opportunity strategies" (1978, p.1210).
Disconfirmation and the Logic of Lay Persons
There is now available an exciting research literature on the 
ability to use disconfirming information for making inferences. 
Central to this literature is the series of papers by Wason 
(1960, 1966, 1968) in which he explored this issue in detail. In 
his first published study (Wason, 1960) he presented subjects with 
a task that gave direct assessment of logical abilities. The task 
employed was as follows. Subjects were given a triad of numbers 
(2, 4, 6) and told that these numbers conformed to a simple 
mathematical rule. Their task was to discover this rule by 
generating (testing) other triads of numbers and then deducing the 
rule. Each time they announced an experimental triad, they were 
told whether it conformed to the rule. Subjects were told to assume 
their hypothesis about the rule only when they were very confident 
of its correctness. The correct solution to this task should involve 
a search for disconfirmatory evidence rather than the accumulation 
of confirming evidence.
Most individuals seemed to prefer confirmatory rather than 
disconfirmatory reasoning. As we have already seen, this pattern
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is a logically dangerous one in science since "It is easy to obtain 
confirmations and verifications for nearly every theory - if we look 
for confirmation" (Popper, 1963). However, confirmation here is 
always a disguised form of affirming the consequent. The fact that 
only 6 out of 27 subjects were correct in making their first 
statement that they had found the rule the first time they thought 
they did illustrates the dangers of induction by sample enumeration. 
As Wason (1960) pointed out, the solution to this task must involve 
"... a willingness to attempt to falsify hypotheses, and thus to 
test these intuitive ideas which so often carry the feeling of 
certitude" (p.139).
Logical Reasoning by Scientists
For our present purpose the parallel studies of Mahoney and 
his associates into the logical fallibilities of individual 
scientists may be more readily generalised to the clinical 
population under discussion. In a survey study (Mahoney and 
Kimper, 1977) physicists, biologists, sociologists and psychologists 
were asked to rate the validity of four forms of implication.
Although most of the scientists recognised the validity of modus 
ponenSj over half of them failed to appreciate the validity of 
modus tollens (disconfirmation). Twenty-eight per cent of the social 
scientists thought that denying the antecedent was logically valid 
and ten per cent thought likewise of affirming the consequent. To 
further test their reasoning abilities an analogue task patterned 
after the one employed by Wason (1968) was included (the task will 
be described in detail later). Fewer than eight per cent of the 
scientists were able to identify the logically irrelevant experiments 
and fewer than ten per cent were able to specify the only two 
experiments which had the critical potential for falsification.
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In a second study by De Monbreun and Mahoney (1976) , the 
critical reasoning skills of psychologists and physical scientists 
were compared to those of relatively uneducated Protestant 
ministers. The task was that used by Wason (1960) described 
above. Most of the subjects did not solve the problem and of those 
who did, only two were errorless - both were ministers. Like 
Wason's undergraduate students, neither the scientists nor the 
non-scientists were very inclined to use disconfirmation. Over 
eighty-five per cent of the self-generated hypotheses were confirm­
atory. Interestingly, although the scientists and non-scientists 
were not differentiated on the basis of logic - both were equally 
poor - differences did emerge on several other measures of reasoning 
and conservativeness. "Contrary to the story book model", Mahoney 
notes, "scientists showed a tendency to be more speculative than 
non-scientists - generating more hypotheses, more quickly and with 
fewer experiments per hypothesis I Likewise, they were apparently 
more tenacious as reflected by their differential tendency to return 
to already falsified hypotheses" (Mahoney, 1976, p.156).
Thus, as Greenwald (1975) has shown 'even' researchers in the 
behavioural sciences tend to design empirical investigations that 
seek to confirm, rather than disconfirm their hypotheses. This 
conclusion converges with those of Wason and Mahoney and suggest 
that our confident presumption of superior reasoning ability in the 
scientist may be ill-founded. Professional training may do little 
to foster critical reasoning skills and logic.
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The Clinical Judgemental Task and Disconfirmatory Evidence
It is important to emphasise that in the analogue research 
cited above, a search for disconfirmatory evidence Was possible.
However, where the actions of the investigator are based on 
judgements (as in the case in clinical settings), learning based 
on disconfirmatory evidence becomes more difficult to achieve.
For example, consider how a clinician might erroneously learn 
the rule 'my judgement is highly predictable'. Suppose the 
clinician is required to assess the suitability of clients to be 
admitted into a specific treatment program. The crucial factor 
here is that action (admittance or not) is contingent on judgement. 
Therefore, at a subsequent date, the clinician can only examine 
admitted candidates to see how many have benefited. If there are 
many improvements (and there are important reasons to think there 
may be (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1973)) these instances all confirm the 
rule but, as has been pointed out above, there are several important 
sources of data not examined or even available here. Thus the 
tendency not to test hypotheses by disconfinning instances may be 
a direct consequence of the task structure in which actions are 
taken on the basis of judgements. Furthermore, as Wason (1960) 
pointed out, "In real life there is no authority to pronounce 
judgements as inferences: the inferences can only be checked against
the evidence" (p.139). Therefore, large amounts of positive feed­
back can lead to reinforcement of a non-valid rule and hence to
the illusion of validity.
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Additional Analogue Demonstrations of our Logical Fallibility
In an equally illuminating study Wason (1968) gave subjects 
conditional rules of the form if p then q3 where p was a statement 
about one side of a stimulus card and q a statement about the other 
side. Four stimulus cards, corresponding to p, not p, q and not q 
were provided. The subjects task was to indicate those cards - and 
only those cards - which had to be turned over in order to determine 
if the rule was true or false. The only cards that could falsify 
the rule however are p and not q. Since the not q card was almost 
never selected, the results indicated again the strong proclivity 
to seek confirmatory rather than disconfirmatory evidence. This 
bias for selection of confirmatory evidence has proved remarkably 
difficult to eradicate as indicated earlier (see Wason and Johnson- 
Laird, 1972, pp.171-201).
This experiment not only highlighted the disinclination to 
select disconfirmatory evidence (namely, ignoring not q) but by 
choosing q instead subjects seemed to follow an assumed symmetry 
in the problem of the form: If p implies q, then q implies p. 
Although this assumed symmetry is clearly a logical fallacy (i.e. 
showing q is true does not establish either the truth or falsity 
of p), the choice of q in addition to p indicates^ that the subjects 
did not perceive it as such. The relevance of this observation for 
understanding how contingency judgements are made is obvious. In 
fact Jenkins and Ward (1965) state that subjects in contingency 
tasks tend to reason as follows: "If there were a contingency,
favourable results would occur, since favourable results did occur, 
there was a contingency."
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In a later replication of Wason's (1968) study Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1978) selected 28 statisticians known to have been trained 
in examining possible disconfirmatory evidence. Although they used 
Wason's (1968) experimental paradigm they chose a stimulus related 
to checking predictive ability in the hope of reducing the 
abstractness - they chose the relationship between forecasting 
market rises and subsequent movements. The results indicated that 
a mere five subjects out of twenty-three subjects emitted the correct 
response but interestingly none committed the logical fallacy 
implied in choosing p and q as did Wason's undergraduates. Thus 
skilled statisticians, trained to make use of disconfirmatory 
information did conduct more disconfirmatory experiments (almost 
half did evidence this) but half of the subjects chose to examine 
the same piece of confirmatory evidence, namely p. Like Mahoney's 
scientists, the statisticians found the task puzzling and inordin­
ately difficult.
On the Strong Proclivity of all Humans to Favour Confirmatory Evidence
Only one study designed on inference behaviour in a setting 
chosen to resemble the conditions under which actual science is 
done is reported in the literature. In this study Mynatt, Doherty 
and Tweney (1977) found that: first, substantial evidence of
failure to consider alternative hypotheses, suggesting confirmation 
bias remarkably similar to that _found by Wason (1960) and secondly, 
subjects could use falsifying data once they got it. That is, if 
an initial hypothesis was not entertained falsifying evidence led 
to selection of correct or partially correct hypotheses. Anecdotal
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evidence from Mitroff's (1974) large-scale non-experimental study 
of NASA scientists, reported that a strong confirmation bias 
existed among many members of this group. He cites numerous 
examples of the scientists' verbalisations of their own and other 
scientists' obduracy in the face of data in favour for this conclusion.
Although it may seem implausible to those trained in scientific 
method and experimental design that people do not seek disconfirm- 
atory evidence when testing hypotheses, the relative novelty of 
thinking in this manner should not be overlooked. As Einhorn and 
Hogarth point out,the concept of a control group which illustrates 
the necessity of non-occurrence came late in the history of thought; 
as did the notion of equating experimental and control group prior 
to treatment. Certainly the evidence of Greenwald (1975, cited 
above) documents scientists' persistence in their claims of 
confirmation (cf. Popper, 1959, 1953, 1972).
There is much evidence to suggest that the structure of the 
judgemental task promotes the confirmatory bias and the 'illusion 
of validity', but additionally,all the above evidence suggests 
that a bias in favour of confirmatory evidence may be a general 
characteristic of human reasoning. The structure and process of 
human thought fosters and promotes the ready and willing adoption 
of confirmatory strategies for hypothesis testing. Considerable 
research on concept formation and utilisation indicates that people 
prefer and use positive instances of concepts over negative ones 
(see, e.g. Hovland and Weiss, 1953). Moreover confirming instances 
generally have more impact than do disconfirming instances (see 
e.g. Gollob, Rossman and Abelson, 1973) and as we have seen,
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covariation between positive instances leads to estimates of greater 
relationship than does covariation between negative or mixed 
instances (e.g. Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1965). Further­
more, in judgements of similarity, individuals preferentially look 
for common features rather than distinctive features (e.g. Tversky, 
1977).
Confirmation and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
To the extent that the individual clinician believes that 
hypothesis-confirming behaviours are typical of the client's 
activities, he or she may consider it not unreasonable to confine 
or at least focus the assessment to those areas in which the client 
can provide the most informative and meaningful facts vis-a-vis 
the clinician's hypotheses. Accordingly, the clinician may 
unwittingly use the assessment interaction as a means of collecting 
preferential evidence that confirms the hypothesis under scrutiny. 
Such a preferential evidence-gathering procedure may generate a 
sample of evidence in which hypothesis-confirming evidence will be 
over-represented and hypothesis-disconfirming evidence will be 
under-represented: There is every reason to believe that our
clients will be 'generous' in providing specific instances of 
hypothesis-confirming actions. And, as Regan, Straus and Fazio 
(1974) have shown, behaviour consistent with one's expectations of 
another tend to be perceived as due to dispositional properties 
of the other, whereas inconsistent behaviours are perceived to be
due to the situation.
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To the extent that clinicians chronically formulate and enact 
confirmatory strategies for assessing the accuracy of their 
hypotheses about the relation between behavioural signs or symptoms 
and dispositional attributes, they may create for themselves a world 
in which hypotheses became self-perpetuating beliefs (see, e.g., 
Snyder and Swann, 1978; Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978). From this 
perspective, it becomes clear how erroneous beliefs about clients 
are formed and why they are so stubbornly resistant to change.
ILLUSORY CORRELATES
Unfortunately, there are other sources of error that plague 
our attempts to determine relationships between symptoms and 
personality characteristics in addition to the failure to think 
probabilistically and seek and utilise disconfirmatory evidence.
A line of research begun some years ago by Chapman (1967) has 
identified an extremely robust and resistant type of error that 
appears to be particularly widespread in psychological assessment 
situations.
Initially, Chapman studied a relatively simple verbal learning 
task in which subjects were shown pairs of words projected on a 
screen for a couple of seconds and were later asked, to recall how 
many times particular pairs had been shown. For example, one 
series consisted of 12 word pairs, each shown ten times giving a 
total of 120 presentations. The important finding was that when 
asked to recall how frequently each of the 12 word pairs had been 
presented in the series, subjects significantly overestimated the 
number of times those with strong verbal associations had been 
shown (i.e. bacon-egg, lion-tiger were examples of the pairs
overestimated).
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Projective Tests and Illusory Correlates
In a follow-up study Chapman and Chapman (1967) attempted to 
extrapolate the finding to the clinical assessment situation. 
Specifically they felt that it had some applicability to "One 
of the most puzzling and distressing problem that confronts 
clinical psychology today ... the persistent report by many psycho­
diagnosticians of clinical observations which, by objective 
evidence, clearly appears to be erroneous" (p.193). To be more 
precise, the Chapman's were concerned with the continued reports 
that certain responses to projective tests were correlated with 
certain 'problems' such as homosexuality or depression, when the 
research evidence appeared to indicate no relationship. The 
resultant "report by observers of the correlation between two 
classes of events which, in reality, (a) are not correlated, or 
(b) are correlated to a lesser extent than that reported, or (c) 
are correlated in the opposite direction from that which is 
reported" is called illusory correlation by Chapman (1967, p.151). 
The over-estimation of strong associates in the Chapman and 
Chapman study suggested the systematic errors are produced by 
variables inherent in the stimuli observed and based on verbal 
associative connections of the test sign to the symptom rather than 
on valid observations. As such, "... entirely naive observers who 
view psychodiagnostic material would report the same erroneous 
correlates of patients' symptoms" (1967, p.193-194).
To check this Chapman and Chapman (1967) reported a series of 
studies which demonstrated illusory correlation in judgements 
from human figure drawing. After determining that practising
232
psychodiagnosticians agreed with each other beyond a chance level 
concerning which Draw-a-Person figures were correlates for various 
symptoms, a set of figure drawings by 'psychotics' and 'normals' 
were assembled. From a list of six symptom statements, two 
statements were paired with each drawing in such a way that each 
of the six statements occurred equally often with each drawing 
characteristic. Undergraduates were exposed to the drawing-symptom 
combinations and were then asked to report which drawing character­
istics occurred most often with various symptoms. The results 
showed that subjects produced massive illusory correlation and 
that the correlates they reported were very similar to those 
previously reported by the experienced psychodiagnosticians. For 
example, "... 'eyes' are a stronger associate to 'suspiciousness' 
than to any other symptom" (p.200). The Chapmans also determined 
that the systematic misperceptions were related to the strength of 
associative connections between various drawing characteristics 
and symptom statements. Further while the illusory correlations 
phenomenon could be reduced slightly by increasing the subject's 
motivation to attend to the task and by allowing unlimited 
time to study the stimulus materials, the misperceptions were 
markedly resistant to modification.
In a later study Chapman and Chapman (1969) demonstrated that 
illusory correlation was present when subjects were asked to judge 
homosexuality from Rorschach responses. They found that expert 
diagnosticians, on the basis of their clinical experience, and 
naive judges, on the basis of their observations of random materials, 
tended to report the same Rorschach signs as being valid indications 
of homosexuality. This was found to be the case even though these
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signs had not been demonstrated in the previous research literature 
to relate to the purported problem of homosexuality, nor did they 
have, in the experimental task, a non-random association with the 
purported problem of homosexuality.
Consistent with previous studies, Chapman and Chapman (1969) 
found that subjects picked those percepts that had the highest 
verbal associative connection with the symptom, in this case 
homosexuality. In addition, the Chapmans demonstrated that subjects 
still tended to report the popular invalid sign disproportionately 
even when it was paired randomly with the symptom "homosexuality" 
and the unpopular valid sign was paired 100 per cent of the time 
with the same symptom.
A Robust and Resistant Clinical Phenomenon
In an extensive replication of the Rorschach study Golding and 
Roser (1972) came to the same conclusion. They found little 
change occurred even when the non-illusory ('valid') cues were 
paired 100 per cent of the time with the symptom of homosexuality 
and when the illusory ('invalid') cues had a randomly paired 
relationship with the symptom of homosexuality. In addition they 
found that while the illusory correlation did drop, significantly 
over a large number of trials, the phenomenon was remarkably 
resistant to modifications even under conditions designed 
specifically to modify it. Starr and Katkin (1969) applied the 
Chapman method to the Rotter Incomplete Sentence Blank. Clinical 
and non-clinical graduate students and naive undergraduate 
observers all displayed illusory correlation after exposure to 
sentence completion response-symptom combinations.
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While the illusory correlation phenomenon has been demonstrated 
with three different projective techniques Dowling and Graham (1976) 
demonstrated massive amounts of illusory correlation in the reports 
of both graduate and undergraduate judges in an objective technique, 
namely MMPI sub-scale names. Lastly, Kurtz and Garfield found, in 
spite of the fact that attempts were made to influence the illusory 
correlation by providing a simulated training session for the subjects, 
it was not possible to reduce the illusory correlation. Under 
neither the 100 per cent nor the 50 per cent presentation conditions 
was training more effective than the non-training conditions in 
reducing the effect of this phenomenon. This finding is consistent 
with that of Chapman and Chapman (1969) and Golding and Roser (1972) 
with respect to the resistance to modification and extinction of the 
phenomenon, and when coupled with the other research, attests to 
the robustness of the phenomena. In all of these studies, the 
erroneous beliefs about relationships between test responses and 
particular psychosocial problems, that is, the illusory correlations, 
were interpreted in terms of pre-existing associative links between 
aspects of the test response and connotations of the psychosocial 
problems.
In his original article, however, Chapman (1967) postulated 
a second basis for illusory correlations. In addition to finding 
over-estimation of the frequency of word-pairs for which there was 
a pre-existing associative link (lion-tiger), Chapman also found 
that the frequencies of word pairs made up of a atypically long 
words (e.g. blossoms notebook) were also over-estimated. Chapman 
interpreted the later finding as being due to the "distinctiveness" 
of pairing two long words in a series in which most of the word- 
pairs were two short words or one short and one long word.
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HEURISTIC PRINCIPLES AND BIAS
Recently Tversky and Kahnemann (1973) postulated a judgemental 
heuristic or informal decision-making criterion to explain both 
sources of illusory correlations. They pointed out that the 
judgement of how frequently two events co-occur could be based on 
the strength of the associative bond between them. When the 
association is strong, one is likely to conclude that the events 
have been frequently paired. Consequently, strong associates would 
be judged to have occurred together frequently. The ease with which 
instances of a particular class of events can be brought to mind 
has been termed ava'i'labil'ity by Tversky and Kahnemann (1973) , who 
pointed out that "Availability is an ecologically valid clue for 
the judgement of frequency because, in general, frequent events are 
easier to recall or imagine than infrequent ones" (p.209). Repetition, 
however, is not the only influence affecting the availability of a 
particular class of events. Anything that makes the particular 
class more salient will make that class more available. But since 
availability is often poorly correlated with frequency or probability, 
systematic error and bias in judgement inevitably result.
Availability and Illusory Correlates
According to this view, the illusory correlation between, say 
suspiciousness and peculiar drawing of the eyes found by Chapman 
and Chapman (1957), is due to the fact that suspiciousness is more 
readily associated with the eye than with any other part of the 
body. To return to the earlier study (Chapman, 1967) by way of an 
additional example, in judgements of the frequency with which pairs 
of words had been presented, subjects erred by over-estimating the
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frequency of pairs such as 'Bacon-Egg', for which there were a pre­
existent association and by over-estimating the frequency of pairs 
composed of atypically long words. Thus, rather than implicating 
two different bases for the formation of illusory correlates, 
Tversky and Kahnemann (1973) pointed out that these data may be 
viewed as indicating that:
"... illusory correlation is due to the differential 
strength of associative bonds. The strength of these 
bonds may reflect prior associations between the items 
or other factors, such as pair distinctiveness, which 
facilitates the formation of bonds during learning.
Thus the various sources of illusory correlation can all 
be explained by the operation of a simple mechanism - 
the assessment of availability or associative strength."
(p.224)
We could speculate that representations of the client 
behaviourally confirming the clinician's hypothesis are more 
cognitively available than representations of the client violating 
the hypothesis. Thus there is every reason to believe that the 
clinician will over-estimate the likelihood that the client will, 
in fact behave in ways that confirm the hypothesis. Consequently, 
by virtue of contemplating the forthcoming interaction with the 
client in the light of the hypothesis, the clinician not only will 
find it easier to think of the client confirming the hypothesis 
but will believe that these hypothesis-confirming actions will 
occur in greater numbers and that these hypothesis-confirming 
behaviours will be representative of the target's 'true' personal 
nature (Snyder and Swann, 1978) .
In a very impressive series of papers Tversky and Kahnemann 
(1971, 1973, 1974; Kahnemann and Tversky, 1972, 1973) have 
elegantly shown how other every-day heuristics of inference may
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bias the judgements of lay persons and clinicians alike. These 
investigators have demonstrated that intuitive predictions and 
judgements deviate markedly from the dictates of the conventional 
statistical model. In addition to the availability heuristic, 
the adjustment (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974) and the vepvesenta- 
tdveness (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1973) were advanced as additional 
heuristics governing intuitive prediction and judgement.
The Representativeness Heuristic
The representativeness heuristic, for instance, is reflected 
in the tendency to predict that outcome which appears more 
representative of salient features of the evidence while ignoring 
conventional statistical criteria. That is, individuals tend not 
to detect bias in their quantitative estimates because they lack a 
code for such judgements. They are prejudiced by a 'representative 
fact': they take a resemblance between A and B as the basis for
inferring a relationship between them. A pervasive bias of this 
kind holds for most individuals over a wide range of statistical 
concepts. The employment of this approach to the judgement of 
probability leads to serious errors because similarity, or 
representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should 
affect judgements of probability. The representativeness heuristic 
leads one to predict incorrectly extreme values and low probability 
events when they happen to resemble what one is trying to predict.
Consider, for example, the effects of base rates. There is a 
growing literature indicating that people, including clinicians, 
ignore base rate information in making probabilistic judgements
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(e.g. Lyon and Slovic, 1976; Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974). According 
to normative statistical theory, this tendency can result in large 
mistakes. The implication of the persistence of the illusions of 
validity are equally serious. By way of an example, consider 
the clinician who, on the basis of Rorschach test data of in­
patients diagnosed as schizophrenic noted that his/her diagnosis 
agrees with the staff diagnosis on about 70 per cent of the cases. 
Without knowledge of the base rate, this may seem to be indicative 
of accurate judgement. However, if the base rate was 70 per cent 
(i.e. the number of cases diagnosed as schizophrenic was 70 per 
cent) then the agreement rate of 70 per cent would not look so 
impressive. Hence his/her diagnostic work did not exceed the base 
rate for diagnosis of schizophrenia, and diagnosing every additional 
patient as schizophrenic, would have been as accurate as diagnosis 
derived from the Rorschach examination. The lesson is that 
accuracy of judgement should be evaluated as marginal increase in 
the 'positive hit rate' over the base rate. If the clinicians choose 
not to use the marginal rate evaluating their judgements they are 
likely to over-estimate the judgement ability. As Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1978) pointed out in an extreme example - if the base 
rate was .75 with judgement ability and treatment effects both of 
zero, then the positive hit rate would be .75 (equal to the base 
rate).
The representativenes heuristic seems to be widely applied when 
evaluating the probability of obtaining a particular result in a 
sample drawn from a specific population. In their research Kahnemann
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and Tversky (1972) have shown that most subjects are dominated by 
the same proportion and are essentially unaffected by the size of 
the sample, which plays a crucial role in determining the probab­
ility of an outcome. Most judges assess the probability of an 
outcome to be the same in small and large samples, presumably 
because these events described by the same statistic and are 
therefore equally representative of the general population. In 
contrast, Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) pointed out that the sample 
size is crucial in determining the probability of obtaining a 
given result drawn from that population. Similarly intuitive 
judgements are dominated by the sample proportion in estimation 
of posteriori probability, that is, of the probability that a sample 
has been drawn from one population rather than from another.
Rosenthal and Gauto (1963) have demonstrated that research 
psychologists appear to misunderstand the statistical basis of 
hypothesis testing. In their study the psychologists claimed that 
they would place greater 'confidence' in experimental results with 
a larger sample size than with a small sample size when the 
probability value of rejecting the null hypothesis was held constant. 
This is a mistake because the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis automatically increases as a function of the number of 
observations. Hence, rationally, more 'confidence' should have 
been attributed to the experimental results with a small sample 
size. The probability value is evidently wrongly interpreted as a 
measure of 'confidence' rather than reflecting on a prior decision 
on which to reject the null hypothesis. This error is not incon- 
cistent with Tversky and Kahnemann's emphasis on the importance of
large samples in research.
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One of the most obvious applications of the representative 
heuristic is to shortcomings in dealing with problems of regression. 
Regression effects occur when there is an imperfect relationship 
between judgements and criterion values. 'People expect and predict 
behaviours and outcomes on variable B to be as 'distinctive' or 
deviant from the norm as the predictor of variable A, and they are 
surprised and often disturbed by the phenomenon of 'regression to 
the mean'. In fact, they are prone to invent spurious explanations 
for events that, in reality, are simple regression phenomena 
(Kahnemann and Tversky, 1973). For example, when actions are given 
to extreme groups (as measured by some A) , outcome (B) will be 
regressive with respect to A. However, unless one understands the 
regressive nature of the environment, it is easy to incorrectly 
attribute outcomes to actions. Furthermore, regression effects 
are symmetric, that is, A is also regressive with respect to B. 
Again, Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) emphasised that inadequate 
understanding of regression is not restricted to non-scientists. 
Further, when actions are based on judgements, the regression 
phenomenon produces several non-intuitive outcomes (Einhorn and 
Schacht, 1977).
The representative heuristic also helps to account for other 
common judgemental embarrassments, which are found in the literature 
on clinical inference - reviewed earlier. Indeed the 'illusion of 
validity' (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1972, p.249) arises and persists 
because the very factors that enhance the judges' subjective 
confidence - such as the consistency and extremeness of the data - 
often are in fact correlated negatively with the accuracy of
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predictions, creating the paradox of confident predictors who persist 
in practices that are objectively unjustifiable. In fact, Kahnemann 
and Tversky (1973) have shown that people are most confident in 
judgement when information is consistent and/or extreme, even 
though these factors should induce them to decrease confidence in 
judgement. Indeed they stated:
"The foregoing analysis shows that factors which 
enhance confidence, for example, consistency and 
extremity are often negatively correlated with 
predictive accuracy. Thus people are prone to 
experience much confidence in highly fallible 
judgements, a phenomenon that may be termed the 
illusion of validity. Like other perceptual and 
judgemental errors, the illusion of validity 
persists even when its illusory character is 
recognised." (p.249)
The Adjustment Heuristic
The last heuristic is referred to as the adjustment heuristic and 
its use leads one to make estimates and predictions by 'adjusting1 
either some salient initial value or the result of some partial 
computation procedure. Such adjustments, however, are rarely 
sufficient, and the result is typically an 'anchoring effect'. 
Tversky and Kahnemann argued convincingly that over-estimation of 
likelihood for conjunctive events (i.e., the likelihood of A and B 
and C all occurring) and under-estimation for disjunctive events 
(i.e. the likelihood of at least one of A or B or C occurring) 
are further results of the intuitive statistician's failure to 
adequately adjust preliminary or partially computed estimates.
It appears that in our drive to confirm our causal model we 
easily twist data to make them fit poor models and are reluctant 
and slow to revise the models themselves (Tversky and Kahnemann,
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1979). These judgement frailties and particularly tendencies to 
be overly influenced by the representative heuristic and under­
influenced by such considerations as sample size and base rates, 
are not limited to wide-eyed 'gut' clinicians and naive lay 
persons: Tversky and Kahnemann (1971) demonstrated similar
tendencies among sophisticated mathematical psychologists. If any 
general conclusion can be drawn at this point it is that even highly 
educated adults rely upon intuitive considerations rather than the 
appropriate abstract principles. In the absence of the appropriate 
code, individuals rely upon their own experiences, derived from 
familiar content, in making an inference or judgement. Hammond 
(1978) has correctly pointed out that as one leaves the experimental 
'mode of inquiry':
"Inability to hold certain variables constant, and 
to manipulate other variables leaves -the question 
of causal directions ambiguous. As a result, 
interdependent variables must be disentangled 
sheerly by cognitive activity, that is, by reaching 
a judgement about what the results of disentangle­
ment might be ... for the disentanglement of causal 
relations by (passive) cognitive instead of (active) 
experimentation is subject to a variety of 
psychological factors, such as memory loss, information 
overload, and recency and primacy effects, to mention 
only a few." (p.16)
What we have seen is that the difficulty of disentangling variables 
by unaided judgement is important, but equally important is the 
fact that intuitive judgement is frequently based on everyday 
heuristics of inference that almost invariably bias the judge.
PREMATURE CONCLUSIONS IN CLINICAL ASSESSMENT
In addition to the errors that can be introduced into the 
assessment and interpretation of our clients discussed above, 
other variables have been delineated that influence clinical 
judgement. For example, a number of studies have indicated that 
premature conclusions about what another person is 'really' like 
can interfere with appropriate utilisation of new information about 
the person. Dailey (1952) concluded that "... premature conclusions 
on the basis of small amounts of data can apparently prevent the 
observer from profiting as fully from additional data as he (she) 
would without the premature decision" (p.142). Recall that research 
has indicated that clinicians form a firm and relatively resistant 
image of their clients within one to four interviews. If the 
premature decisions were based on unimportant information - due, say 
to impression management - then the detrimental effect of premature 
conclusion would be exacerbated. Importantly, Dailey concluded that 
in situations "... involving repeated evaluation by observers of 
the same persons, validity may be lost by the cumulative tendency 
of understanding to affect itself adversely; to diminish, as it is 
expressed" (p.151). This point will be returned to below, but first 
a recent study that builds on Dailey's conclusions merits discussion 
Snyder and Urbanowitz (1978) demonstrated that social stereotypes 
(clinical labels?) exert a retrospective as well as prospective 
influence on our interpersonal perception and information processing 
In their study subjects reconstructed the events in a case history 
in ways that supported and bolstered a later arrived at stereotype. 
They demonstrated that individuals selectively retrieve information
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that reinforces current stereotyped interpretations about another 
person, and these reconstructuve processes may serve to perpetuate 
acceptance of widely held but essentially inaccurate social 
stereotypes. No doubt a parallel phenomenon could be shown in the 
clinical assessment situation, for in the clinical-psychotherapeutic 
situation the clinician does make repeated observations and 
evaluations of the same person over time. Information revealed in 
later sessions may induce reconstruction of earlier information in 
ways that reinforce the current construction.
Long-term Memory 'Drift'
According to D'Andrade (1974) situations in which repeated 
observations and evaluations of the one subject are taken over time 
are "... subject to a special effect analogous to that of an 
illusion; an effect in which there is a reliable and systematic 
distortion of judgements' (p.161). D'Andrade's argument is that, 
when an observer relies on his or her long term memory in making 
assessments of a number of different people each of whom performed 
a number of different behaviours, the characteristics and behaviours 
that the observer considers to be similar are likely to be recalled 
as applying to the same person. That is, there is a tendency for 
observers to remember similar behaviours as having been performed 
by the same actor under such circumstances, then over a few months 
the therapist will build up partially erroneous pictures of various
clients.
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D'Andrade (1974) in an analysis of the patterns of correlations 
among the various attributed behaviours in both the observers' and 
participants' memories for what occurred in group interactions 
revealed a systematic bias-reflecting a tendency to recall similar 
behaviours as having been performed by the same person, when in fact 
they were not. Shweder (1975) in a re-analysis of Newcomb's (1929) 
study of extroverted and introverted social behaviour among 
boys at a summer camp graphically evidenced the tendency of human 
memory to 'drift' in the direction of pre-existing conceptual schemata. 
As D'Andrade (1974) pointed out, the implication here is that, "With 
this type of memory error, any attempt to discover how human 
behaviour is organised into multi-behaviour units ... which is based 
on data consisting of long-term memory judgements will result in 
conclusions which primarily reflect the cognitive structure of the 
rater" (pp.175-177). Unfortunately, as Jones (1977) pointed out, 
one way of conceptualising the task of psychodiagnosticians and 
psychotherapists is to discover how an individual's behaviour is 
organised into multi-behaviour units.
In the foregoing discussion some of the important pitfalls that 
interfere with accurate coding and information processing in 
personality assessment have been examined. Hopefully, enough has 
been said to make the fallibility of the clinician patent. When 
this is coupled with the major problems revealed in the psychiatric 
system of classifying abnormal behaviour and the dubious validity 
of many assessment devices, the traditional approach to psycho­
diagnosis appears to be, if not untenable,at least fraught with 
difficulties. However, such a conclusion may be premature; the 
implications of the research presented to date will be discussed in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IX:__CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the ostensibly overwhelming negative evidence 
that attests to the inadequacy of the tradi-tional psychometric 
approach to psychodiagnosis, research suggests that to a considerable 
extent the clinical practitioner still operates within a paradigm 
based upon the 'essence' concept of personality. To briefly 
recapitulate, according to this view, mental and personality structures 
and processes are considered to be the determinants of human behaviour. 
Despite their diversity most personality theories share a common 
assumption in that they conceive of personality as consisting of 
certain relatively stable and interrelated motives, characteristics 
and dynamics that underlie and are responsible for the person's 
overt actions. In order to fully understand why an individual 
behaves in a particular way, then, one needs .to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of the underlying dynamics.
Most psychometric tests and assessment devices are designed to 
be measuring instruments to index the internal traits and person­
ality structure of the individual, and, importantly, many clinicians 
indicate that they use psychological tests precisely for that reason. 
For example, Wade and Baker (1977) found that clinicians select and 
use tests for the information they provide concerning personality 
structure. Thus, not only do clinicians view as relatively 
unimportant the two criterion measures of test performance in research 
(i.e. behavioural prediction and diagnostic accuracy) but they appear 
to operate within a superseded paradigm or at least one which is 
becoming increasingly unpopular from the academic researcher's
perspective (Ekehammar, 1974).
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The central aim of this essay was not only to highlight the 
substantial disparity between psychodiagnostic practice and the 
body of empirical data evidencing its shortcomings, but to delineate 
plausible explanations for the failure of clinical psychologists to 
adapt themselves to the imperatives of the literature. By way of 
an example, consider the clinicians failure to adequately respond to 
one of the oldest and most convincingly corroborated generalisations 
to emerge from psychological research, namely, the relative 
specificity of the structure of psychological traits. The finding 
that correlations between various manifestations of any psychological 
trait are substantially lower than the reliability of those manifes­
tations (Shapiro, 1979, p.211) antedates Mischel's (1968) expose by 
at least three decades. For example, Spearman (1932) was cme of the 
first to discuss specificity; it was embodied in his formulation 
that all the various manifestations of intelligent behaviour involve 
a general factor and a very large number of factors specific to each 
manifestation. Similarly, Hartshorne and May (1930) demonstrated 
that the intercorrelations between various reliable tests of honesty 
in young children approached zero.
The failure of clinical psychologists to adapt themselves to 
this situation is an outstanding anomaly. Clinicians continue to 
try to confine their assessment operations to general traits, and 
in so doing they concern themselves therefore with only a relatively 
small part of the reliable variance of behaviour and experience.
When one places the great variety of human phenomena in the context 
of relative specificity, one is led to expect a unique pattern of 
dysfunctions and related variables in each individual client. The 
implications of this assertion have not made a significant impact
on clinical practice.
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Conventional psychometric approaches which aim to measure 
common variance only, and not specific variance, cannot therefore 
be expected to meet our clinical needs and will inadvertently serve 
to maintain what Mischel (1979) identified. as the 'prevalent form 
of clinical hostility' (p.245).
In the earlier chapters several other important research/ 
practice anomalies were discussed along with a delineation of the 
factors and processes that maintain what appears to be untenable 
practices. However, before considering what may be done to change 
the situation, as this appears desirable, it may be timely to discuss 
briefly what factors influence the clinicians' initial orientation 
to psychodiagnostic assessment.
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Influences on Clinician's Testing Practices
In their recent survey Wade and Baker (1977) found that 70.7% 
of their respondents first learned to use assessment instruments 
in graduate training, 27.7% in undergraduate training and only 
1.6% in postgraduate employment. These figures strongly suggest 
that initial training instructions are to be held, at least partly 
responsible for the current situation. This is augmented by other 
findings, for example, only 20.6% of respondents indicated that they 
systematically collected and analysed data regarding their own 
testing practice. Additionally, although 54.7% indicated that they 
read at least several articles relevant to testing every six months, 
only 25% stated that the studies critical of tests seemed accurate. 
The majority of respondents indicated that these studies employed 
inappropriate criteria or questionable methods, that they over­
generalised or that they reported conflicting findings.
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From the above and other research (see e.g. Garfield and 
Kurtz, 1974; Shemberg & Keeley, 1970) it appears that the initial 
training of clinicians in Universities and Colleges fails in at 
least two important respects. Firstly, instructors continue to teach 
students to administer and interpret tests of dubious validity, 
and secondly, they fail to develop behaviours compatible with the 
ideals embodied in the concept of 'scientist-practitioner'. It is 
beyond the scope of this essay to undertake an analysis of the 
factors that could explain this situation but it should be reiterated 
that the presentation of negative evidence is invariably insufficient 
to dissuade neophytes from using the 'offending' tests especially 
when they are faced with the role expectations of mental health 
colleagues. A viable alternative must be taught to a high level 
of competence if clinical training is to have a marked effect on 
assessment practices. Additionally, however, a repertoire of social 
skills (i.e. assertion, diplomacy, etc.) and cogent rationale may be 
equally important if the new graduate is to implement, sustain and 
evaluate an alternative approach to psychodiagnostic assessment.
In the light of the importance of initial training of clinicians 
for later assessment practices, this conclusion focuses specifically 
on the implications of the earlier chapters for the teaching of 
clinicians. The specific aims are to: Firstly, recommend ways
of improving clinical assessment conducted within the dominant approach. 
This will be intentionally brief as it is the author's view that the 
paradigm is not the 'best' available. It has been argued that the 
model is not only conceptually and empirically inadequate but also 
facilitates the medicalisation of deviance and supports a 'blame-
the-victim' ideology (Ryan, 1971).
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Secondly, an already available alternative assessment paradigm, 
namely, behavioural assessment, will be briefly introduced. Again 
its presentation will be brief as it is considered to be predicated 
on an equally limited and truncated image of humans. However, it 
will be argued that many of the problems associated with the 
attribute approach - delineated in the earlier chapters - are avoided 
when the behavioural model is applied. Thus it will be argued that 
it is a preferable approach.
Lastly, an approach to assessment predicated on a recognition 
of the transactional nature of the person-environment relationship - 
a perspective requiring that the person be viewed at the psychological 
level as a component of the complex-system of which he/she is a part - 
will be advocated. This interactionalist perspective does not 
represent a rapprochement between the opposing theoretical camps 
represented in the two alternatives listed above (i.e. personologism 
and situationalism) but a synthesis of the dialectic. It represents 
a dialectical synthesis that should result in the eventual abandonment 
of both prior positions. The recognition that complex human behaviour 
tends to be influenced by many determinants and reflects the almost 
inseparable and continuous interaction of a host of variables both 
in the person and in the environment, has deep implications for 
psychodiagnostic assessment.
WITHIN PARADIGM RECOMMENDATIONS
To this point the essay has been negative in the sense that it 
has delineated and discussed the numerous conceptual and empirical 
weaknesses of the 'attribute' model. However, it is possible to 
convert some of the critical findings into recommendations that
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may help clinicians avoid some of the identified shortcomings. 
Although this may amount to little more than 'mending a thread 
bare' paradigm it cannot be disputed that the attribute model 
remains the dominant assessment model and as such, until a viable 
alternative is accepted, the onus is on trainers and researchers 
to develop strategies that diminish the errors and biases in 
diagnostic assessment conducted within the paradigm. Thus in 
this section several recommendations for what should be included 
in the training course for students in psychodiagnostic assessment 
will be made. They include suggestions on how to improve the 
clinician's ability to learn from experience, on how to sensitise 
clinicians to the importance of the cognitive structure and 
strategies they bring to the assessment situation, on how to 
sensitise the clinicians to the influence of their values and 
biases in clinical judgement, on ways to sensitise clinicians to 
unfamiliar people, and on how to give up the luxury of global 
labelling.
Improving the Clinician's Ability to Learn from Experience
In Chapter VIII the many information processing pitfalls in 
psychological assessment were enumerated. The difficulties centre 
to a very large degree on the disinclination to think probabilistic­
ally and make use of disconfirmatory evidence. Although the 
fallibility of the clinician is now well documented an important 
question that remains largely unanswered is the degree to which 
these shortcomings can be alleviated or at least attenuated through 
systematic training.
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An obvious exception, however, is the research on the effects 
of training and the offering of inducements in the search for and 
utilisation of disconfirmatory evidence. The research with regard 
to this is disheartening. Certainly formal training in experimental 
design, teaching the logic of central groups and base line 
predictions, and so on, would seem a reasonable suggestion but as we 
have seen it has been demonstrated that statistically sophisticated 
subjects make similar mistakes to those without training (Einhorn 
and Hogarth, 1978). Further, even when explicitly instructed to do 
so and when rewards were made contingent upon disconfirmatory 
strategies, little improvement was found (Wason and Johnson-Laird,
1972). The prospects for overcoming this tendency appear bleak.
It represents a real hurdle for those instructors committed to
moving their students towards the ideals of the scientific practitioner
model.
A second major factor in the clinician's inability to fully 
utilise feedback from their assessment endeavours is their lack 
of awareness of environmental effects on outcome. In order to 
overcome this deficit instructors should explore ways of increasing 
awareness of effects like regression, base rates, selection ratios 
and treatment effects. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) suggest that the 
use of a model of the environment, such as that advocated by Hammond 
and his colleagues (Hammond, 1971; Hammond, Wilkins and Todd, 1966) 
may prove useful for this purpose. Such a model draws attention 
to the structure of the environment and the manner in which structure
affects outcome.
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Lastly, methods of improving the clinician's coding, storing 
and retrieving of outcomes should be included. Several years ago 
Goldberg (1968) suggested that a simple tallying of data relevant 
to a particular hypothesis (i.e. keeping ä 'box score') may be 
useful. This may serve a dual purpose if disconfirmatory instances 
can be included. In the study of Jenkins and Ward (1965) the only 
condition that substantially improved the subject's ability to 
accurately infer causal relationships was when they were given 
the data in a 2 x 2 contingency table. However, when the table 
was given after subjects had experienced the set of instances and 
non-instances the table failed to improve their performances.
On the basis of their explorations with decision-making 
heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that people should 
attempt to encode events not by their substantive content but by 
judged probability. They point out that when events are grouped 
in this manner it is possible to keep a tally of the extent to which 
judged probabilities match subsequent empirical relative frequencies. 
Again they highlighted the inadequacy of feedback indicating whether 
an event did or did not occur for indicating one' s ability to make 
probabilistic judgements. The most obvious outcome of this brief 
review is that it is a fruitful area for research. At this stage 
little in the way of empirically corroborated strategies, found to 
be efficacious in inoculating the clinician against the many pitfalls to 
information processing in psychological assessment, can be offered.
Sensitising the Clinicians to the Importance of Their own 
Cognitive Structures
It was argued earlier that the clinician and the client are 
faced with the same task, namely to discern, describe and apply
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systematic covariation between events. To sensitise clinicians
to this and thus to the need to examine the cognitive structures 
which they bring to bear on the assessment situation introduction 
to the theoretical perspectives of George' Kelly and/or Egon 
Brunswik is recommended by Jones (1977). These two offer useful 
perspectives on clinical judgement within which the evidence on 
judgement fallibility makes sense and within which there is explicit 
appreciation of the importance of the clinician's own beliefs and 
expectations.
The basic philosophical position underlying Kelly's (1955) 
perspective which is termed 'constructive alternativism', is very 
compatible with the teachings of Popper and Kuhn and thus may 
present the clinical instructor with a useful link between philosophy 
and practice. Kelly asserts that:
"... whatever nature may be, or however the quest 
for truth will turn out in the end, the events we 
face today are subject to as great a variety of 
constructions as our wits will enable us to contrive ... 
Events do not tell us what to do, nor do they carry 
their meanings engraved on their backs for us 
to discover. For better or worse, we ourselves 
create the only meanings they will ever convey 
during our lifetime" (Kelly, 1966, cited in 
Bannister and Mair, 1968, pp.6-7)
Kelly assumed that in the attempt to bring order to the events 
surrounding them, persons including clinical psychologists, will 
develop their own idiosyncratic, hierarchically organised system of 
personal constructs. A construct is simply a dichotomous abstraction 
that the person has made of the similarities and differences among 
events in the onrushing stream of stimuli surrounding them. The key, 
of course, is that different people make different abstractions from
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the 'same' events. To say that a person's system of constructs is 
hierarchically organised means that some constructs are more 
important than others and it is the interrelationships among 
constructs that are of central concern. It is important to note 
the similarities between Kelly's notion of a hierarchically organised 
set of personal constructs and the notion of an implicit theory of 
personality. The relationships among constructs define a network 
of interrelated expectations or anticipations that is essentially 
the same as the correlation matrix with its underlying dimensional 
structure. It is equally important to note the idea that one's 
perceptions are tentative and subject to reconstruction is basic to 
Kelly's argument.
A related perspective on clinical judgement has its origins 
in the work of Brunswik (1952, 1956). Like Kelly, Brunswik 
focus was on the fact that different people may see the 'same' 
situation in different ways. His basic point about perception was 
that the perceivei/s knowledge of the environment is of a probabilistic 
nature. His system or theoretical stance is referred to as 
'probabilistic' functionalism and interestingly a revival of interest 
in Brunswik's 'lens' model will not doubt follow its promotion 
by Petrinovich (1979) as an alternative paradigm for psychology - 
an alternative to the ideal of the linear process experiment paradigm.
It is beyond the scope of the essay to fully introduce either 
of these theoretical perspectives or to outline others (e.g.
Sarbin, Taft and Bailey, 1960); merely to suggest the utility 
of these perspectives for sensitising clinical trainees to the 
salience of their own cognitive structures in any assessment
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Situation. A real advantage of both viewpoints is that the models 
apply equally well to understanding the clinician and client in 
that both are represented as utilising similar cognitive strategies 
in organising their experiences of people and, hence, developing 
certain implicit expectations and beliefs. To phrase this in 
Brunswtkian terms, the clinician develops a set of cue-utilisation 
coefficients, which may or may not match the ecological validities 
of the cues and may or may not correspond to the cue-utilisation 
coefficients of the client with whom he or she is interacting. In 
Kelly's terms, both the clinician and the client have systems of 
personal constructs, which may or may not be organised in the same 
way.
Scientific Knowledge and Social Values
In line with Kelly's notion of 'constructive alternativism' 
students of clinical assessment should not harbour illusions about 
the veracity of their clinical inferences or the 'realness' of the 
constructs. I believe that through an exposure to the ideas of 
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Mitroff and other important philosophers of 
science (e.g. Feyerabend, Bartley) students of clinical assessment 
may learn to be more circumspect and conditional about their 
knowledge and hopefully learn to show considerable tolerance for 
statements that convey relativity and tentativeness.
As Cohen and Wartofsky (1978) have so aptly highlighted:
"... modern philosophy of science has turned out to 
be a Pandora's box. Once the box was opened by 
critical independent minds, puzzling monsters 
appeared: not only was the neat structure of
classical physics changed (and partly by philo­
sophical analysis within physics), but a variety 
of wide-ranging questions were let loose.
Philosophy of science could not help but become
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epistemological and historical, and could no longer 
avoid metaphysical questions, even when these were 
posed in disguise. Once the identification of 
scientific method with that of physics had been 
queried, not only did biology and psychology come 
under scrutiny as major modes of scientific inquiry, 
but so did history and the social sciences, 
particularly economics, sociology and anthropology. 
This trend raises anew a much older question, 
whether the conception of science is to be distin­
guished from the wider conception of learning and 
inquiry? Or is 'science' to be more deeply under­
stood as the most adequate form of learning and 
inquiry, whose methods reach every domain of rational 
thought and action? Is modern science to be seen as 
matured reason, or is it simply one historically 
adapted and limited species of reasoning, and of 
western reasoning at that?" (p.2)
Exposure to some of the questions raised in the above quote 
may diminish the tendency to justify ones beliefs by recourse 
to claims as to their scientific status. Further, by exploring 
the alternative paradigms available to psychology (i.e. the 
Natural Science Model versus the Historical Model for example) 
trainees may, in a non-threatening way be introduced to the view 
that 'facts' and 'truths' emerge within 'specific places and 
times'. Thus, that sociohistorical influences are intrinsic to 
all knowledge, including our clinical judgements and beliefs may 
reduce resistance to the issue of the politics of clinical judge­
ments. Just as Merton (1967) pointed out that the values embodied 
in the Protestant Ethic 'pervaded the realm of scientific endeavour 
[such that] the why and wherefore of science bore a point-to-point 
correlation with the Puritan teachings on the same subject'(pp.575- 
576), so Draguns (1974) has highlighted a similar set of values is 
reflected in the typology used to classify problematic behaviour.
Understanding the intrinsic fallibility of our attempts to 
know the world scientifically could well be a prerequisite for 
acknowledging our personal fallibilities and attempting to apply 
methodologies to improve the usefulness of our own attempts to 
generate knowledge.
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Perceiver and Perceived Relationship
In a recent discussion of the literature on behaviour classif­
ication, Phillips and Draguns (1971) pointed out that research on 
the clinician's diagnostic activity seem to converge in suggesting 
that social distance may well be the most salient variable in 
systematic biases and judgement error. As we have seen the middle- 
class diagnostician is likely to employ different categories for 
lower class clients and is likely to note few symptoms in the process 
of assigning these clients to those categories. Many factors have 
been suggested to account for this phenomenon (see e.g. Adinolfi, 
1971) but irrespective of these hypothesised mediators, the person 
perception literature does seem to have demonstrated the strong 
relationship between being actually similar to, or highly familiar 
with, the perceived person and accurately perceiving him/her.
Adinolfi (1971) suggests that '... notwithstanding contrary 
indications in person perception research and demonstrations in 
clinical relationships, there seems to be a persistent attempt to 
explain, categorise and characterise others in the face of pervasive 
unfamiliarity' (p.171). In practice clinicians may simply not have
the requisite cognitive skills to comprehend those who are unfamiliar 
to them.
Even though it may prove to be inadequate, Adinolfi suggests 
that clinical trainees who plan or wish to do assessment or 
therapeutic work with those different from themselves should imbue 
themselves in the experiential products of members of the unknown 
groups. That is, rather than read the intellectual-conceptual
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exercises of middle-class observers, students should go to expressive 
works (poetry, art, novels, cinema, etc.) by the people they are 
trying to understand.
The literature on the impact of other client irrelevant 
influences on assessment (i.e. sex, colour, political beliefs, etc.) 
evidence that awareness of their impact may well lead to a diminution 
of their effect. Consequently, exercises that are designed to 
confront trainees with their own biases may be helpful in reducing 
undesired systematic errors. It will be important to emphasise 
that the goal is not to achieve the impossible state of being value- 
free but to explicitly incorporate desirable values and biases.
Giving up the Luxury of Labelling
If the primary function of psychodiagnosis is to describe the 
client's problematic behaviour in ways that facilitate the selection 
of an efficacious treatment regime then it is doubtful that the 
currently available psychiatric labels have sufficient utility to 
justify their usage. Additionally, as Mischel (1968) repeatedly 
claimed, to do justice to the complexity of those we are trying to 
comprehend, clinical psychologists will have to divest themselves 
of the luxury of categorisation which too readily leads to an 
unwarranted extrapolation of correlative variations.
Failing this, instructors should highlight the pragmatic, 
provisional and metaphoric nature of classificatory typologies.
The diagnostic labels should be 'de-reified' and the all important 
issue of 'who defines' should be omnipresent in any course of 
psychological assessment. Here too, the teachings of contemporary 
philosophers of science may prove useful. That is, following the 
logic of Popper it can be asserted that no one classification can
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be said to equal the original data. In consequence, therefore, 
it would seem important to have more than one set of categories 
at one's disposal, to avoid confusing any one category with the 
unique event.
No doubt, more recommendations could be made but in the limited 
space available the aim was not to be all inclusive but suggestive. 
Fortunately, for the instructor who decides to operate within the 
attribute model the vast research literature throws up many 
suggestions that may lead to the development of more sensitive, 
humane and efficacious clinical psychologists.
BEHAVIOURAL ASSESSMENT
In an attempt to simplify recent developments in personality 
assessment, researchers have distinguished between three different 
conceptions of human behaviour that seem to reasonably represent 
the contemporary scene. Although heterogeneous and to some extent 
overlapping,the three theoretical positions (personologism, 
situationalism and interactionism) can be readily distinguished.
It should be noted that there are differences in points of view 
within each model and similarity between the models. For the 
present purpose, the typical and in some sense a caricatured 
position for each model is presented, with the focus on their 
differing points of emphases and the implications of these for 
assessment.
The traditional attribute model under the above typology, is 
an example of personologism. In contrast situationalism can be 
regarded as the antithesis of personologism with its emphasis on
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environmental (situational) factors as the main source of behaviour­
al variation. Although individual differences are recognised, 
situationalism in practice tends to focus almost exclusively on 
observable events, current behaviour and situational determinants 
(O'Leary, 1979). This almost exclusive focus on the immediate 
environment, particularly in the late 50's and early 60's was 
possibly in reaction to the personologism.
Contemporary social learning theories (see e.g. Bandura, 1969, 
1977; Mischel, 1968, 1979) redirected the focus from the situation 
and the hypothetical underlying attributes in the organism to 
what the organism does in particular situations. The concept of 
personality from this viewpoint now becomes more or less a short­
hand term for summarising the sum total of an individual in his/her 
social environment. Thus an individual does not have a personality, 
but rather the concept 'personality' is an abstraction that one may 
make after observing a person interacting in a comprehensive sampling 
of situations. From within a behavioural framework, personality 
is viewed as a set of learned capacities (cf. Wallace, 1968).
Mischel's (1973) recent cognitive approach to personality represents 
probably the most useful behavioural approach to the concept.
Although at the theoretical level social learning theorists 
have emphasised the reciprocal interaction of the person and the 
situation, rarely has this commitment to reciprocal causality 
manifested itself in practice (an outstanding exception is the 
recent work in self-control). In practice a rather static, uni­
directional model of causality where the individual is construed 
as relatively passive seems to dominate. Parenthetically, this
262
parallels the difficulties with the trait concepts that Hogan et al 
(1977) claim are a function of the individuals who apply them 
rather than being attributable to inherent qualities of the concept.
The Nature of Behavioural Assessment
Although the recent spate of books devoted to behavioural 
assessment (Ciminero et al, 1977; Cone and Hawkins, 1977; Haynes, 
1978; Hensen and Bellack, 1976; Mash and Terdal, 1976) and the 
even more recent launching of two specialist journals, may be taken 
as indicators of the rise and widespread acceptance of a new 
approach, behavioural assessment is not a new field at all. Because 
assessment and continuous monitoring of the process of change are 
essential to the behaviour therapy model, behaviour assessment is 
as old as behaviour therapy. In a more general sense it is not new 
since at its heart, the goals of behaviour assessment are to identify 
meaningful response units and their controlling variables for the 
purpose of understanding and altering behaviour. Recent develop­
ments merely represent the emergence of behavioural assessment as 
a defined area of professional interest in its own right.
However, surprisingly, even at this stage no definition or 
conceptualisation of behavioural assessment has been widely 
adopted. Most attempts at definition have been put forth in relation 
to, and usually by way of comparison with the attribute model. 
Comparisons have been made with respect to the different underlying 
assumptions regarding the concept of personality and test construc­
tion, interpretation and use. This is understandable as the 
legitimate work of 'criticism between paradigms'. This amounts
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to offering an alternative viewpoint, one which is an adequate 
representation of the phenomena and which is discontinuous in the 
sense of being incompatible with the original position.
For example, in discussing ’behavioural personality assessment' 
Goldfried and Sprafkin (1974) state:
"... the point of divergence between traditional 
and behavioural approaches lies in the assumptions 
underlying the construction and interpretation of 
these assessment methods. A delineation of the 
contrasting assumptions should provide ... the 
general principles of behavioural personality assess­
ment. As indicated by Goldfried and Kent (1972) 
a comprehensive distinction between traditional and 
behavioural personality assessment must involve the 
assumptions underlying (a) what is basically 
involved in the definition of 'personality',
(b) the selection of the items to be included with­
in the test, and (c) the approach taken to the 
interpretation of the individual's responses." (p.3)
The differential assumptions relating to each of these areas 
are elaborated by Goldfried and Kent (1972). Bersoff (1971) in 
discussing 'psychosituational assessment' states:
"... to obtain a better sample of typical functioning 
it may be necessary to pursue techniques more 
appropriate to that end. These techniques can be 
considered within the framework of what the author 
calls a 'psychosituational assessment' - defined 
as an assessment designed to measure and interpret 
behaviour as it is elicited through interaction with 
“ specific stimulus situations. A number of specific 
methods have been constructed to accomplish such a 
goal. (p.392)
According to Bersoff (1973) these methods include primarily the
... > cnr c > .» . . r ' . = i v~ i cnr.c
systematic observation of behaviour in its usual context and the 
design of assessment situations which resemble the more natural 
settings in which behaviours occur. These methods attempt to 
minimise the amount of inference necessary in generalising assess­
ment information to an individual's usual life circumstances. In
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a recent paper O'Leary (1979) suggested that historically there 
have been three important hallmarks of behavioural assessment, viz., 
emphases on observable events, on current behaviour and as situation­
al determinants of problematic behaviour. • He stresses that the 
hallmarks should be seen as 'emphases', not rigid structures that 
may confine creativity in assessment situations.
Because behaviour therapy and behavioural assessment are part 
of one and the same process (Franks, 1978; Yates, 1971) assessment 
must be capable of identifying the environmental variables - 
internal as well as external, self-imposed as well as imposed by 
others - that are currently maintaining the individual's problematic 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour. This requires analysing both the 
specific environmental events controlling the problematic response 
repertoire and the broader social learning and biological histories 
that are mediating or otherwise influencing the way in which the 
environment modifies behaviour.
To think within the behavioural model requires that the clinical 
psychologist radically älter his/her concepts and role. Firstly,'" 
as Franks (1976) points out he/she must come to a view of assessment 
not merely as a prerequisite to therapy - the customary role of 
traditional testing - but as an ongoing process interwoven with the 
process of therapy. Secondly, the clinical psychologist must come 
to see him/herself not as a team member performing a circumscribed 
task, first testing then therapy, but rather as a professional for 
whom assessment and interaction are intrinsically integrated.
However, as Nelson and Haynes (1979) correctly point out, the 
novelty of the field of behavioural assessment lies not so much in 
its goals and strategies "... but rather in its deliberate attempt
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to improve the identification and measurement of dependent variables, 
to increase the probability of selecting successful treatment 
techniques, and to re-define the evaluation of those intervention 
procedures" (p.2). The strength of the behavioural assessment 
approach is not to be found in any single element, but rather in the 
relationships and similarities of concepts, methods, and practices 
that characteristically occur. As Mash (1979) points out, this 
notion parallels the concept of 'family resemblance' as discussed by 
Wittgenstein, and to use his analogy, "the strength of the thread 
does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its 
whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres (Wittgenstein, 
1968, p.32, cited by Mash, 1979).
Central Aspects of Behaviour Assessment
In the view presented above, there are no rigid boundaries 
for what differentiates behavioural assessment from alternative 
approaches. Although continued efforts at definition are likely 
to do with the methodology and practical validity of behaviour assess­
ment as a potential contributor to both theory and the solution of 
applied problems. Several of these issues will be highlighted in 
the brief comments below.
Rejection of traditional diagnostic systems: The eshewing of
psychiatric labels by behavioural assessors was recently shown to 
have important implications in practice. The fact that labels 
create sets that influence subsequent perception has been already 
documented, but recently Langer and Abelson (1974) studied the 
effects of labels on clinician's judgements in a 2 x 2 factorial 
design. Clinician's representing two different schools of thought,
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behavioural and analytic, viewed a single videotaped interview 
between a man who had recently applied for a new job. Half of the 
group was told that the interview was with a 'job applicant', while 
the remaining half was told that he was a ''patient'. At the end 
of the videotape, all clinicians were asked to complete a question­
naire evaluating the interviewee. The important finding was that 
the behaviour therapists were apparently immune to the biasing 
effects of the label itself, i.e. patient versus job applicant. 
Although this finding is open to alternative interpretation it is 
in line with the substantial literature on person perception and 
does suggest a possible solution to many of the problems discussed 
in Chapter VI.
The rejection of traditional diagnostic systems within 
behavioural assessment has created a need to develop an alternative, 
because some classification framework is required as a guide for 
theory, research and practice. The need for alternative classif­
ication systems was recognised early in the development of behaviour 
therapy (see e.g. Ferster, 1965) and has received continued 
recognition (e.g. Adams et al, 1977; Dengrove, 1972). In an obvious 
attempt to develop a diagnostic and classification system for 
behavioural assessors that serves a function similar to those of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of the American Psychiatric 
Association, Cautela and Upper (1975) produced a total of 283 
behavioural classifications on their Behavioural Coding System. A 
client would be diagnosed as having certain responses needing 
alteration, and would be classified by listing the Behavioural Coding 
System numbers of these behaviours.
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A behavioural diagnostic system might eventually include information 
as to the relative effectiveness of various intervention strategies.
The recent article by Kanfer and Grimms (1977) makes a start in 
this direction.
Behavioural approach to abnormality; From the behavioural perspective 
behaviours traditionally called abnormal are no different, either 
qualitatively or quantitatively, in their development and maintenance 
from other behaviours (Ullman and Krasner, 1975) . That is, no behaviour 
is ipso facto abnormal or an indicator of 'mental illness1. From this 
perspective human behaviour is not dichotomous but rather can be 
understood and dealt with through a single set of principles.
Behaviour that is reacted to as 'abnormal' is seen to be the reason­
able outcome of past and present person-environment interactions.
As Masserman (1976) pointed out: "In effect many of the amazingly
diverse patterns of behaviour we elicited [in the laboratory] could be 
labelled 'experimentally neurotic', 'addictive', 'sociopathic', or 
even 'psychotic', yet could also be considered adaptionally 'normal' 
in the cogent sense that, with due regard to genetic proclivities, 
they were the product of the unique-experiences of the individual"
(p.ix)
Identification of Controlling Variables: Besides identifying the
behaviour to be changed, a second goal of behavioural assessment 
is to identify the variables that control the occurrence of that 
behaviour. The reasons for doing so are to understand and explain 
the occurrence of the behaviour and to use the controlling variables
that can be altered for therapeutic gains.
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The current working model within behavioural assessment 
identifies two major classes of controlling variables: Current
environmental variables (antecedent and consequent stimuli) and 
organismic variables (individual differences produced by physiology 
'ard by past learning). The components to be considered within 
behavioural assessment have been neatly summarised by Goldfried 
and Sprafkin's acronym (1976) of SORC (stimulus-organism-response- 
consequence). In any particular case, the controlling variables 
needing further assessment are frequently suggested by the nature 
of the problematic responses (or the diagnostic label assigned to 
covarying responses). For example, schizophrenic behaviour may 
lead to inquiries about family history of similar disorders or to 
. questions about this individual's own history with regard to social 
withdrawal. Again, the nature of the problem behaviour or the 
diagnostic label provides only nomothetic suggestions of controlling 
variables for the clinician to consider in an idiographic assessment.
Situational specificity and temporal consistency: The case for the
specificity of behaviour has been put and need not be repeated here. 
However, as Epstein (1979) indicated it is common to find a good 
deal of temporal consistency to behaviour. The implications of these 
i.ilt. two issues for assessment is that consistency across situations or 
across time cannot be assumed. Thus the technique of behavioural 
assessment must include careful consideration and description of 
the relevant stimulus situation, in order to fully assess the 
response to interest. Without independent empirical support, con­
clusions should not be generalised from one situation to another, 
nor from one response type to another, nor from one time to another. 
Similarly because the assessment technique itself is part of the
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situation, generalisations are not automatically made from one 
assessment technique to another.
Triple Response System: Behavioural assessments have also emphasised
the need for multiple sources of information, especially in light of 
the non-convergence of different types of assessment such as verbal 
report, observation, and situational tests. Today, most behaviour­
ists consider all forms of organismic activity to be 'behaviour'.
Thus behavioural assessment also includes the measurement of physio­
logical-emotional behaviour and cognitive-verbal behaviour. Although 
these three types of behaviour may covary, it is not assumed that 
such covariation occurs. In fact, when contemporaneous measurements 
are taken from all three response systems, the correlations are often 
only moderate. There are, however, few guidelines for how such 
diverse and sometimes discrepant information sources can be integrated 
in formulating intervention programs. Questions regarding the 
relative weight to be given to different types of assessment 
information in decision-making are important, and in fact, the 
generation of decision-making models for the use of assessment 
information with specific populations is needed.
Although there are other 'threads' in the make up of behavioural
Aassessment, there is insufficient space to discuss this issue further. 
Similarly, there is insufficient space to even briefly discuss the 
variety of behavioural assessment methods. Certainly direct 
observation in the natural setting is the szne qua non of behavioural 
assessment. However an elaborate set of procedures utilising self-
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report data, self-monitoring, analogue and physiological measures 
have been developed. Detailed descriptions are available in any 
of the behavioural assessment handbooks cited earlier.
Before moving on to a discussion of the interactionalist position, 
however, two issues merit brief discussion. Firstly, the utility of 
behavioural assessment seems to be a persistent problem for 
practitioners. Careful functional analysis involving direct 
observation in natural circumstances, or utilising multiple settings 
and informants is not easily achieved. This was noted in a recent 
study by Wade, Baker and Hartmann (1979) , which also showed that 
assessment was a small part of the activities of behaviour therapists, 
and that many continued to use traditional assessment devices. It 
would appear that the growth of behaviour assessment in principle, 
as evidenced by books, journals, and research, may be greater than 
the growth of behavioural assessment in practice. Developing a 
usable technology is a high immediate priority.
On this issue Haynes (1979) has argued that while an idiographic 
approach has certainly resulted in substantial improvements in 
conceptualisation of behavioural determinants of individual target 
problems and in identifying factors associated with treatment 
outcomes, it is costly and frequently unnecessary. Thus comprehensive 
pre-interaction behavioural assessment, when evaluated by a cost/ 
benefit analysis, may be only warranted under some conditions. The 
utility of a comprehensive pre-intervention assessment is probably 
a function of two factors: (1) the clinical significance of the
targeted behaviour and (2) the power of the intervention. However,
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because behavioural interventions have most frequently been applied 
in research settings, there has been minimal pressure to develop 
cost/efficient assessment strategies that are adaptable to 
clinical settings.
Secondly, several prominent spokespersons have recently called 
for a rapprochement between traditional psychometrics and social 
learning theory (Evans and Nelson, 1977; Staats, 1975). They see 
the strict situational approach, personified in the functional 
analysis of the operant kind, too narrow and necessarily limited in 
application and suggest the dismissal of the psychometric testing 
tradition and diagnostic labels would be premature. Arthur Staats 
(1975) demonstrates how such a rapprochement could be made in a chapter 
called 'social behavioural psychometrics' in his recent book.
However, in the next section it will be .argued that what 
is required is not a rapprochement between the opposing theoretical 
perspectives but a dialectical clash that should result in an 
eventual abandonment of both prior positions. This reflects a view 
that both situationism and personologism are the products of 
historical and cultural perspectives that are no longer relevant 
(Cronbach, 1975; Riegel, 1978; Sampson, 1978).
A PROLEGOMENON FOR INTERACTIONAL ASSESSMENT
So far we have discussed the two alternative paradigms that are 
seen by many to present antithetical views on the nature of people. 
Although fundamentally different, they are similar in sharing an 
emphasis on either the individual or the social environment as a 
passive force in the process of human development and change.
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Personologism retains the 'Lockeian' notion of a passive environment 
but introduced the individual as an active agent. In contrast 
situationalism places the passive organism in an active environment. 
These views about the nature of people conveyed by these two 
perspectives require critical examination on conceptual or social 
grounds for as we have seen what we believe people to be affects 
which aspects of human functioning we study most thoroughly and which 
we disregard. Premises thus delimit research and are, in turn, 
shaped by it. As knowledge gained through study is put into practice, 
the images of people on which social technologies rest have even 
vaster implications.
In this section it will be shown, through the examination of 
interactionism, that both personologism and situationalism present 
a truncated and inadequate image of people. As Bandura (1977) 
cogently argues:
"... people are neither driven by inner forces nor 
buffeted by environmental stimuli. Rather psycho­
logical functioning is more adequately explained 
in terms of a continuous reciprocal interaction 
between personal behaviour and environmental 
determinants." (pp.11-12)
Although it is widely accepted among psychologists that the 
behaviour of a given person in a particular environment is a joint 
function of the relevant behavioural determinants within the person 
and those within the environment, few researchers appear to operate 
within the paradigm. As Mischel (1977) reminds us:
"... in the abstract this recognition seems as bland 
and obvious as a cliche, and one wonders if a focus 
on intevactionism and multiple determinism may not 
be little more than a substitution of a new slogan 
for old varieties." (p.246)
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It will be argued that when examined more concretely, this recognition 
has profound implications for psychology in general, as well as 
specifically for psychodiagnosis. For, if it is useful to construe 
behaviour as a joint function of person and situation determinants, 
then it follows that psychological assessment should systematically 
take account of both person and situational variables and their 
transact'ions. It need hardly be said that this is rarely the case 
in contemporary assessment practice.
Interactionist Conceptions
Although interactionist thought can be traced back to Aristotle, 
in Psychology explicit statements from this perspective were cogently 
put by Kantor (1924; 1926); Lewis (1936) & Murray (1938). Whereas 
the classical interactionist views were usually formulated within 
comprehensive personality themes, most often without empirical 
support, the more recent conceptualisations have usually been professed 
in the absence of any elaborate theories, but often with some 
empirical support. Some exceptions to this common picture are the 
recent attempts by Bowers (1973) and Mischel (1973) to base 
interactionist formulations of personality' on empirical evidence. 
Interestingly, Bowers (1973) arrived at his defence of the inter­
actionist view by arguing against the situationist position whereas 
Mischel (1973) and others (e.g. Argyle and Little, 1972) came to the 
same conclusion (i.e. the defence of interactionism) from a critical 
examination of the personologist view.
The conceptualisations of the classical theories of, for 
example, Kantor's early 'interbehavioural psychology', Lewin's 
'field theory' and Murray's 'personology' are essentially the same
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as the main ideas of the recent interactionist formulations by 
Argyle and Little (1972); Bowers (1973); Endler and Magnusson (1976) 
and Mischel (1973). They all have in common the view that human 
behaviour has to be seen as a function of the interaction between 
person and environment. In spite of the conceptual similarity 
between early and recent interactionists' thoughts, the latter seem 
to have been developed almost independently of the former (Ekehammar, 
1974). In fact, Hogan et al (1977) rather disparagingly remarked 
that:
"It is also interesting to watch the discipline 
of personality research recycle itself. Thus Bern 
and Allen (1974) return to Allport's (1937) thesis 
that the variables of greatest importance in the 
study of personality are those that are most 
important to the subject. Similarly, Bowers (1973) 
reformulates Murray's (1938) view that overt 
behaviour is a function of the interaction between 
traits (i.e., psychogenic needs) and situational 
contingencies (i.e., environmental press). Mischel 
(1977) also seems to return to a Murray theme.
His statement that people are "so complex and 
multifaceted as to defy easy classifications and 
comparisons on any single or simple common 
dimension" (p.253) sounds remarkably like Murray 
warning us about the overwhelming complexity of 
the human personality. This warning is puzzling 
as well as interesting, since as a historian friend 
once remarked, anyone who has thought for long 
about human affairs knows that they are complex; 
the question is what to do next." (p.262)
However, in a recent review Buss (1977) examined several 
prominent approaches to interactionalism and concluded that 
two radically different meanings of the term are often emphasised - 
the mechanistic paradigm and the organismic or system paradigm. 
Overton and Reese (1973) made a similar distinction between the
mechanistic or reactive organism and the organismic or dynamic model.
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The mechanistic model being concerned with unidirectional causality 
assumes that independent variables affect dependent variables. The 
organismic model is concerned with reciprocal interaction between 
environmental events and behaviour. The distinction is all 
important if a genuine, creative system-oriented paradigm is to 
emerge as a dilectical synthesis of personologism-situationism clash. 
Essentially the resulting perspective should depict an active 
organism transacting with an active environment (e.g. Mischel,
1977; Riegel, 1978).
As Bandura (1977) has pointed out interaction can be conceptualised 
in different ways reflecting alternative views of how causal processes 
operate. In the unidirectional notion of interaction, persons and 
situations are treated as independent entities that combine to 
produce behaviour. This approach is usually represented as B = f 
(P,E) where B signifies behaviour, P the Person, and E the environment. 
The validity of this commonly held view is questionable on several 
grounds, but particularly because personal and environmental 
factors do not function as independent determinants, rather they 
determine each other. Nor can 'persons' be considered causes 
independent of their behaviour. It is largely through their actions 
that people produce the environmental conditions that affect their 
behaviour in a reciprocal fashion. The experiences generated by 
behaviour also partly determine what a person becomes and can do 
which, in turn, affects subsequent behaviour.
A second conception of interaction acknowledges that personal 
and environmental influences are bidirectional, but retains a 
unidirectional view of behaviour. In this analysis, persons and 
situations are depicted as interdependent causes of behaviour as 
though it were only a product that does not figure at all in the
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causal process (B = f (P -* E) . As we have already seen, behaviour 
is an interacting determinant, not simply an outcome of a 'person- 
situation interaction'.
The Main Features of Modern Interactionism
Modern interactionism rejects unidirectional causality 
represented in the two model above. According to Endler and 
Magnussen (1976) the essential four features of modern interaction­
ism can be summarised as follows:
1. Actual behaviour is a function of a continuous process 
of multidirectional interaction (feedback) between the 
individual and the situation that he or she encounters.
2. The individual is an intentional, active agent in this 
interaction process.
3. On the person side of the interaction, cognitive factors 
are the essential determinants of behaviour, although 
emotional factors also play a role.
4. On the situation side, the psychological meaning of the 
situation for the individual is the important determining 
factor.
1. Reciprocal Causality
A continuous dynamic process of interaction in which behaviour, 
other personal factors, and environmental factors all operate as
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interlocking determinants of each other ---» E) is the hall­
mark of the modern interactionist position. The relative influences 
exerted by these interdependent factors differ in various settings 
and for different behaviours. There are times when environmental 
factors exercise powerful constraints on behaviour, and other times 
when personal factors are the overriding regulators of the course 
of environmental events. Thus modern interactionism rests on a 
model of reciprocal causality. The distinction between the reciprocal 
causality model of interactionism and the reactive (Overton and 
Reese, 1973) and mechanistic (Buss, 1977) has been discussed by 
Pervin (1968) who suggests the term interaction for unidirectional 
causality and the term transaction for reciprocal causation.
2. Intentional and Active Agents
In the interactional dynamic process, the person is an 
intentional, active agent. Individuals interpret situations and 
assign meaning to them. Additionally, as Bandura (1977) has 
pointed out they activate the environment through their actions. 
Mischel (1977) reflects this perspective in his conjecture that 
our subjects are much smarter than many of us thought they were 
and with respect to psychological assessment he recommended that:
"It would be wise to allow our 'subjects' to slip 
out of their roles as passive 'assesses' or 
'testees' and to enrol them, at least sometimes, 
as active colleagues who are the best experts on 
themselves and are eminently qualified to 
participate in the development of descriptions 
and predictions - not to mention decisions - about 
themselves." (p.245)
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3. Cognitive Personal Variables
The personal variables that are central to modern interaction 
focus are primarily cognitive factors, for example selective 
attention and encoding relevance, rehearsal and storage processes, 
cognitive transformation and the active construction of cognitions 
and actions (see, e.g. Bandura, 1977; Mischel, 1973). For example 
Mischel (1973) argued that the following five cognitive factors 
and their interactions are important in explaining individual 
differences:
(a) constructive competencies (the ability to construct or 
generate particular congitions and behaviours);
(b) encoding strategies and personal constructs;
(c) behaviour outcome and stimulus outcome expectancies in 
particular situations;
(d) subjective stimulus values; and
(e) self-regulatory systems and plans, rules and self­
reactions for the performance and organisation of complex 
behaviour sequences. These social cognitive person 
variables develop ontogenetically in a social learning 
process on the basis of a given genetic disposition,
and interact multidirectionally with situation variables 
in determining actual behaviour.
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4. The Analysis of Environment
On the situation side of the person-situation interaction, the 
psychological meaning that a situation as a whole has for an 
individual is seen as the essential determinant of his or her 
behaviour. The emphasis on the psychological meaning of situations 
has important consequences for research. Very little empirical 
research in this area has been conducted. There has however, been 
a dramatic rise of interest in the environment as it relates to 
the person and as is true in most new fields, a first concern has 
been to try to classify them into a taxonomy. Depending on one's 
purpose, many different classifications are possible and useful 
(e.g. Magnusson and Ekehammar, 1973; Moos, 1975). But as Mischel 
(1977) points out
"To seek any single 'basic' taxonomy of situations 
may be as futile as searching for a final or 
ultimate taxonomy of traits: We can label
situations in at least as many different ways 
as we can label people. It will be important 
to avoid emerging simply with a trait psychology 
of situations, in which events and settings, 
rather than people, are merely given different 
labels. The task of naming situations cannot 
substitute for the job of analysing how conditions 
and environments interact with the people in them." 
(p.250)
In summary - from the perspective of modern dynamic 
interactionism the person is constructed as an active, 
aware problem-solver, actively constructing his or her psychological 
world, and influencing the environment. It views the person as 
so "complex and multifacted as to defy easy classifications and 
comparisons on any single or simple common dimension, as multiply 
influenced by a host of interacting determinants, as uniquely
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organised on the basis of prior experiences and future expectations, 
and yet as rule-guided in systematic, potentially comprehensible 
ways that are open to study by the method of science" (Mischel,
1977, p.253).
It is an image that is far removed from the paradigms of 
personologism and situationalism and its implications for 
psychodiagnostic assessment are substantial.
Interactional Assessment
Although much recent thinking and empirical evidence confirms 
the importance of studying not just the person and the situation 
separately but the interaction between them, little more than lip 
service to the position has occurred in the assessment literature. 
Textbooks of assessment - including both tho.se of traditional and 
those of behavioural orientation - concentrate almost exclusively 
on person evaluation, though a number of newer ones also include 
chapters on assessment of environmental variables. The only text 
that includes a chapter on interactional assessment is Sundberg 
(1977) which includes a chapter titled 'Assessment of Person in 
Contexts' (Chapter 5, pp.110-132).
The essence of interactional assessment is the* systematic attempt 
to assess the individual-situation transaction. This is not simply 
the assessment of individuals and the assessment of situations, but 
rather the assessment of the two in an integrated fashion for a given 
individual, and to do so in a systematic, objective manner. In other 
words, to assay, "... for a particular person in a given situation, 
both the relevant intrapersonal and situational determinants for 
that person in that environment" (McReynolds, 1979, p.239). Although
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the reciprocal sources of influence are separated for assessment 
purposes, in everyday life the two-way control operates concurrently 
and this should be recognised by the assessor.
Within the realm of systematic assessment, Murray's (1938) 
early work on needs and press is a rare example of assessment within 
the interactional orientation. In his theoretical formulation a 
press is anything outside a person that can do something to or for that 
person. Both press and need have organising and directional 
qualities. Murray (1938) clarified the concept press as follows:
"... a directional tendency in an object or situation.
Like a need, each press has a qualitative aspect - 
the kind of effect which it has or might have upon 
the subject ... as well as a quantitative aspect, 
since its power for harming or of benefiting varies 
widely. Everything that can supposedly harm or 
benefit the well-being of an organism may be considered 
presstve^ everything else 'inert." (pp. 118-119)
Murray"distinguished between two kinds of press - the alpha press 
that is the environmental force which objectively exists, as far 
as scientific inquiry can determine it, and the beta press that is 
the subject's own interpretation of the phenomena that he or she 
perceives. For instance, walking along a strange street at night,
I might think a dark object ahead is a crouching person (beta press), 
but on getting closer I see it is only a shrub (now my beta press 
coincides with the alpha press).
In assessment, one also must relate personal needs to press. 
Murray, of course, used stories elicited by pictures on his Thematic 
Appreception Test to discern both needs and press. TAT analysts 
look for need-press patterns; the conjunction of need and press is
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called a thema. It is doubtful, however, that many clinicians 
actually score the TAT for press, and in any event the use of 
this procedure does not involve the direct assessment of the 
subject's environment (i.e. alpha press).'
More recently George Stern (1970) has carried Murray's ideas 
and the analysis of press further than anyone else in the field of 
assessment. Stern developed several instruments to measure need and 
press variables in the college context. Student needs are assessed 
by the Activities Index and characteristics of college-environments 
are evaluated by several Environmental Indexes. This project 
represents an example of the systematic assessment of the person 
combined with systematic but separate assessment of the relevant 
environment(s). This method assumes that relevant data could be 
obtained on the prospective target environment, and further, that 
these data could be combined to yield a specific prediction.
A more recent application of this methodology is to be found 
in the work of Bern and Funder (1978). These authors emphasise the 
need for the development of a common language for describing and 
measuring both the person and the target environment, and they propose 
a "template-matching" technique to accomplish this end. The essence 
of this proposal is that a situation can be described in terms of 
a set of templates, each of which is "a personality description of 
an idealised 'type' of person expected to behave in a specified way 
in that setting" (p.486). The assessor can then directly compare the 
personality of the subject with each of the situation templates in 
order to evaluate the likelihood of the subject behaving in that way
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in the given situation. Bern and Funder report three illustrative 
studies using Q-sort techniques to develop both the situation templates 
to indicate the probability of given behaviours occurring.
An approach that by-passes the problem of combining data and 
attempts to record the person-environment transaction is the direct 
behaviour sampling of persons-in-situations. Many sophisticated 
examples of this approach are to be found in the chapter on 'Direct 
Measurement in Natural Settings' in Cone and Hawkins (1977) and other 
equivalent handbooks (e.g. Ciminero et al, 1977; Hersen and Bellack, 
1976; Mash and Terdal, 1976) and will not be outlined here.
Little more can be said at this stage since, despite Ekehammar's 
(1974) assertion that "if interactionism is not the zeitgest of today's 
personality psychology, it will probably be that of tomorrow's"(p.1045), 
very little attempt has been made to explore the implication of the 
paradigm to psychodiagnostic assessment. Much more research is 
required at both the theoretical and technical levels. With respect 
to the former McReynolds (1979) notes that the interationist formula 
is not, as such, a usable formula, but merely a point of view that 
will need a great deal of elaboration before being directly applicable 
in research and practices. At the technical level, McReynolds suggests 
that most of the available assessment techniques are "more suitable 
for research than for dealing with individual clients, hence, there 
is an excellent opportunity for innovativeness in the development of 
practicable, usable interactional assessment packages" (1979, p.245)
In the light of McReynolds (1979) conclusion, it appears as if 
the practitioner will not be significantly affected by the rising 
paradigm for many years. It was pointed out in the introduction that,
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according to Kanfer (1977), we are currently witnessing the synthesis 
stage of the dialetic between personologism and situationism.
However, it was also pointed out that this 'revolution' has hardly 
touched the practicing clinician. And it is unlikely to, until the 
technological by-products of the new paradigm are developed and taught 
to trainee clinicians. Thus, the onus is squarely on researchers 
and instructors to develop reliable and valid processes with 
demonstrable utility and to socialise a new generation of clinical
psychologists or counsellors in their use.
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